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requirements for the Degree of Philosophy in Finance 
Abstract 
Microfinance Performance in Malaysia 
 
by 
Suraya Hanim Mokhtar 
 
A microcredit programme was introduced to Malaysia in 1987 as one of the poverty 
eradication strategies in the country. Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) was the first 
microfinance institution established followed by Yayasan Usaha Maju (YUM) and The 
Economic Fund for National Entrepreneurs Group (TEKUN). These three microfinance 
institutions are subsidised by the government. However, the effectiveness of the microfinance 
subsidised system implemented by Malaysia is not well documented. This research measures 
the effectiveness of Malaysia’s subsidised microcredit system by assessing the impacts of 
microcredit loans on the borrower’s microenterprise, household, and the borrower. In 
addition, this research examines the determinants of loan repayment problems among the 
TEKUN and YUM borrowers.  
The impact of microcredit loans on borrowers is measured based on the Household Economic 
Porfolio Model (HEPM). The logistic regression is employed to analyse the factors that 
influence borrowers with loan repaymnent problems. Both primary and secondary data are 
used in the analysis. Primary data are collected through a survey of borrowers using a 
structured questionnaire; secondary data are obtained from the three Malaysian microfinance 
institutions and Bank Nagari in Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia. 
The results showed that micrcocredit loans have significantly increased the borrower’s 
microenterprise’s revenue, the household’s income and provided social (more involvement in 
business and family decisons and increased self-esteem) and economic security (increased 
personal savings, more optimistic in facing the future and increased effectiveness in coping 
with negative shocks). However, microcedit loans are not effective in building the borrower’s 
assets at either the microenterprise or household level. The logistic regression results showed 
that both TEKUN and YUM shared similar findings where borrowers involved in agricultural 
types of business activity encountered problems in repaying loans. However, both TEKUN 
 iii
and YUM results were different regarding borrowers’ ages’ contribution to loan repayment 
problems. Older borrowers in the age group 46 to 55 years old had significant loan repayment 
problems in TEKUN. In contrast, younger borrowers in the age group 18 to 25 years old had 
significant loan repayment problems in YUM. In addition, TEKUN borrowers who paid 
weekly loan repayments and YUM borrowers who paid more than RM201 a week loan 
repayments encountered problems in repaying their microcredit loans. 
 
Keywords: Malaysia, microcredit, household economic portfolio model, logistic regression. 
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     Chapter 1 
      Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Overview of the Malaysian Economy 
 
Malaysia is a multi-ethnic country with three distinct ethnic groups; Bumiputra1, Chinese and 
Indian. Malaysia gained independence from British rule in 1957. After receiving 
independence and a colonial inheritance of a well-developed infrastructure and efficient 
management, Malaysia experienced rapid economic growth (Menon, 2009). In the 1970s, the 
Malaysian economy was predominantly based on mining and agriculture then, in the 1980s, a 
transition began towards the industrial sector, which led to Malaysia’s growth. Among the 
countries in East and Southeast Asia, Malaysia’s per-capita income, levels of literacy and 
health care are well ahead of its neighbours (Menon, 2009). Since 1976, Malaysia has 
recorded an annual growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of over 5% except during the 
recession of 1985-1986, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and also in 2001 and 2002 (see Table 
1.1).  
 
Table 1.1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of Malaysia, 1970-2007 
 
 
GDP Growth 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
6.0 5.8 9.4 11.7 8.3 0.8 11.6 7.8 6.7 9.3 7.4 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
6.9 5.9 6.3 7.8 -1.1 1.2 5.4 9.9 9.1 9.0 9.5 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
8.9 9.9 9.2 9.8 10.0 7.3 -7.4 6.1 8.9 0.3 4.1 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007       
5.7 7.2 5.2 5.9 5.4       
Source: EPU (2010) 
 
 
The rapid growth of the economy between 1957 and 1970 was due to the government 
promoting foreign and domestic investment, especially in the manufacturing sector (Esfahani, 
1994). As a result, investment in GDP rose from about 13%, in 1955, to over 20%, in 1970 
(Esfahani, 1994). Despite the economic growth, the economic status of the Bumiputras did 
not improve. Although the average income of Malaysia was higher than its neighbours, large 
income disparities existed between the Malays and Chinese, inherited from the colonial period 
(Jomo, 2004) (see Table 1.2). 
 
                                               
1 Bumiputra is a Malay word that refers to the Malays and Indigenous people in Malaysia.  
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Table 1.2: Mean monthly gross household income (RM) in Malaysia by ethnicity and  
residential strata, 1970-2004 
 1970 1974 1976 1984 1987 1989 1992 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004 
Malaysia 264 362 505 1,098 1,083 1,169 1,563 2,020 2,606 2,472 3,011 3,249 
Ethnicity             
Bumiputra 172 242 345 844 868 940 1,237 1,604 2,038 1,984 2,376 2,711 
Chinese 394 534 787 1,552 1,488 1,631 2,196 2,890 3,378 3,456 4,279 4,437 
Indian 304 408 538 1,107 1,105 1,209 1,597 2,140 2,896 2,702 3,044 3,456 
Strata             
Urban 428 570 843 1,573 1,488 1,606 2,050 2,589 3,357 3,103 3,652 3,956 
Rural 200 269 385 842 881 957 1,009 1,326 1,704 1,718 1,729 1,875 
Source: EPU (2010) 
Note: 1 RM = 0.30 USD 
 
 
Between 1970 and 1990, the Malaysian government introduced the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) that undertook social and economic development in the country (Jomo, 2004). The 
main objective of the NEP was to eradicate poverty and restructure the society of the country 
(Jomo, 2004). It was hoped that the NEP would eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function; for example, Chinese in the business sector, Malays in agriculture and 
Indians in rubber plantations (Jomo, 2004). Among the actions taken were increased 
investment in education and training of the poor to enable them to acquire the skills needed to 
enter high wage employment and the promotion of income-generating projects such as the 
establishment of three agricultural land authorities, namely: Federal Land Development 
Authority (FELDA), Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA) 
and Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA) (Jomo, 2004). 
FELDA and FELCRA are government agencies involved in the resettlement of rural poor into 
smallholder farms on newly developed areas, especially palm oil plantations (RISDA on 
rubber plantations). During the NEP period, in 1987, Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) 
introduced a microcredit programme to the country. The main objective of AIM is to reduce 
poverty among Bumiputras by granting small loans to borrowers involved in income 
generating activity. Overall, the NEP successfully reduced the country’s poverty level from 
52.4%, in 1970, to 17.7%, in 1990 (Roslan, 2006). After the NEP, economic and social 
development of the country was continued, from 1991 to 2000, by the National Development 
Policy (NDP) framework. 
The NDP continued the policies of the NEP to reduce racial imbalances in the economic 
sector (Menon, 2009). In addition, in the NDP, the private sector played a supportive role, 
with the government, in the social and economic development of the country (Menon, 2009). 
Because of this, much of the public sector was privatised, such as energy (electricity) and 
telecommunication. With this transformation from the public sector into private profit-
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oriented organisations, the private sector provided an efficient service to the people (Esfahani, 
1994). The NDP successfully led Malaysia to achieve higher economic growth, more than 8% 
from 1990-1996 (see Table 1.1). However, economic growth contracted to 7.4%, in 1998, as a 
result of the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Menon, 2009). Malaysia was resilient in response to 
the crisis and, by 2000, the GDP had grown to 8.9% (Menon, 2009). 
The NEP and NDP were replaced by Vision 2020. Vision 2020 provides a framework for the 
long term objective of Malaysia becoming a fully developed nation by 2020. In realising 
Vision 2020, there are nine challenges that need to be addressed: (1) establishing a united 
Malaysian nation; (2) creating a psychologically liberated, secure and developed Malaysian 
society; (3) developing a mature democratic society; (4) forming a community that has high 
morals, ethics and religious strength; (5) establishing a matured liberal and tolerant society ; 
(6) establishing a scientific and progressive society; (7) establishing a fully caring society; (8) 
establishing a fully caring society; (9) establishing a prosperous society (Islam, 2010). 
Overall, the NEP, NDP and the first half of Vision 2020 development planning successfully 
reduced poverty in the country (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4), achieved positive growth in GDP (see 
Table 1.1), increased the income of the Bumiputras (see Table 1.2) and reduced 
unemployment (see Table 1.5). 
 
Table 1.3: Incidence of poverty in Malaysia by ethnicity and residential strata (1984-2007)              
 1984 1987 1989 1992 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004 2007 
Malaysia 20.7 19.4 16.5 12.4 8.7 6.1 8.5 6.0 5.7 3.6 
Ethnicity           
Bumiputra 28.7 26.6 23.0 17.5 12.2 9.0 12.3 9.0 8.3 5.1 
Chinese 7.8 7.0 5.4 3.2 2.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.6 
Indian 10.1 9.6 7.6 4.5 2.6 1.3 3.4 2.7 2.9 2.5 
Strata           
Urban 8.5 8.5 7.1 4.7 3.6 2.1 3.3 2.3 2.5 2.0 
Rural 27.3 24.8 21.1 21.2 14.9 10.9 14.8 13.5 11.9 7.1 
 Source: EPU (2010) 
 
 
Table 1.4: Incidence of hard-core poverty in Malaysia by ethnicity and residential strata   
(1984-2007) 
 1984 1987 1989 1992 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004 2007 
Malaysia 6.9 5.1 3.9 2.9 2.0 1.4 1.9 1.0 1.2 0.7 
Ethnicity           
Bumiputra 9.9 7.4 5.8 4.4 3.2 2.2 2.9 1.6 1.9 1.0 
Chinese 2.2 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Indian 1.9 1.8 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Strata           
Urban 2.4 1.9 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Rural 9.3 6.7 5.2 5.1 3.6 2.5 3.6 2.6 2.9 1.4 
 Source: EPU (2010) 
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Table 1.5: Unemployment rate in Malaysia, 1984- 2007 
Year 1984 1987 1989 1992 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004 2007 
Unemployment 
rate 
5.0 7.3 5.7 3.7 3.1 2.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.2 
Source: EPU (2010) 
 
 
1.2  Microcredit Programmes in Malaysia 
 
Poverty reduction became a major objective in Malaysian development plans following the 
development of NEP and NDP. As a result, the incidence of poverty in Malaysia has fallen 
over the years (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4). Although the overall poverty incidence in Malaysia 
has been reduced; there are still outstanding issues that need to be addressed. First, the 
Bumiputra still represent the largest ethnic group among those living in poverty and, 
secondly, the incidence of hard-core poverty in rural areas is still high (see Tables 1.3 and 
1.4). 
Inspired by the microcredit programme in Bangladesh, as pioneered by Muhammad Yunus, 
Malaysia introduced a microcredit programme as one poverty eradication programme in the 
country. Despite the need to eradicate poverty, especially among Bumiputra, the microcredit 
programme also hoped to reduce the dependency of poor people on the government by 
promoting the concept of self reliance (Roslan, 2006). In microcredit programmes, the poor 
are given credit to start an income-generating activity.  
The first microfinance institution in Malaysia was Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM), 
established in 1987. AIM provides microcredit services throughout Malaysia (Peninsular, 
Sabah and Sarawak). Meanwhile, in 1987, the state of Sabah established its own microfinance 
institution called Yayasan Usaha Maju (YUM), with a focus on providing microcredit loans to 
the poor people of Sabah. Both YUM and AIM replicate the Grameen Bank microcredit 
model. The third microfinance institution in Malaysia is The Economic Fund for National 
Entrepreneurs Group (TEKUN), established in 1998. TEKUN provides microcredit services 
throughout Malaysia. AIM and YUM are poverty-oriented institutions, in that they give 
microcredit loans only to people who live at, or below, the country’s poverty line (see Table 
1.6). TEKUN provides microcredit loans to both poor and not-so-poor people2. AIM applies a 
group lending scheme, whereas YUM and TEKUN apply individual lending schemes. 
                                               
2 Not-so-poor people refer to the people who live above the National Poverty Line (see Table 1.6). 
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AIM is a Non Government Organisation (NGO), whereas YUM and TEKUN are government 
organisations under the Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-Based Malaysia, respectively. All 
are subsidised microfinance institutions. They receive full financial support from the 
government in terms of grants and soft loans (Roslan, 2006). The charges for microcredit 
loans are very low and, as a result, the three microfinance institutions have not achieved 
financial sustainability since their establishment (Roslan, 2006). 
 
Table 1.6: Malaysia’s national poverty line by region 
 Overall Poverty Hard-core Poverty 
Region Gross PLI 
(RM) 
Per Capita PLI 
(RM) 
Gross PLI 
(RM) 
Per Capita PLI 
(RM) 
Peninsular  
Malaysia 
661 152 398 91 
Sabah 
(East Malaysia) 
888 173 503 97 
Sarawak  
(East Malaysia) 
765 167 482 105 
Source: EPU (2010) 
PLI: Poverty Line Income 
 
 
1.3  Research Problem Statement 
 
Some researchers claim that relying on subsidies can undercut a microfinance institution’s 
scale and efficiency. Morduch (2006) argues that subsidised credit may not only undermine 
the financial performance of microfinance institutions, but also can undermine the social 
impacts by limiting the scale and quality of the subsidies allocated. In addition, according to 
Robinson (2001a), subsidised resources will lead to: (i) rent-seeking behaviour on the part of 
borrowers; and (ii) high default rates since subsidies lead to lower repayment levels because 
the borrowers often perceive credit as disguised donations. Subsidised credit is also subject to 
political interference, such as when relatives and supporters of political leaders receive 
preferential treatment. Thus, many poor are denied credit because of selection bias. 
Subsidised microfinance systems also prevent the development of sustainable microfinance 
institutions, due to low charges on loans and discouragement to mobilise deposits (Robinson, 
2001a).                           
According to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)3, microfinance institutions 
need to achieve financial sustainability in order to reach significant numbers of poor people 
                                               
3 CGAP is the microfinance research institute. 
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(CGAP, 2004b). The CGAP Donor Guidelines on Good Practice in Microfinance also state 
that microfinance institutions should finance themselves after 7-10 years of operation (CGAP, 
2004a). These two guidelines show that subsidies should only provide temporary start-up 
support and that microfinance institutions should finance themselves thereafter and achieve 
financial self-sufficiency. 
The critics of subsidy assistance to microfinance institutions and borrowers are well 
documented but, for the last 20 years, the Malaysian government has subsidised its 
microfinance institutions. The government claims that this is part of its social obligation to the 
poor to elevate them from poverty. But there is also a political motive behind such subsidies 
(Kasim, 2000). 
In this study, the performance of a microfinance institution is measured in terms of the impact 
of the microcredit loans on the borrower’s life. This study investigates if there are any 
significant changes in the borrower’s business, household and individual development after 
receiving a microcredit loan. A major criticism of subsidised microfinance systems is their 
high default rates (Morduch, 2006; Robinson, 2001a). This notwithstanding, according to the 
AIM management report as at 31 July, 2009, AIM recorded repayment rates of 98.98% (AIM, 
2009). This is a good achievement for a subsidised microfinance institution. However, 
TEKUN and YUM did not record such a good repayment performance. For example, in 2009, 
TEKUN recorded an 85% repayment rate, with RM 225 million worth of loans outstanding 
since 1999 (Berita Harian, 2009). As at 31 December, 2008, YUM’s repayment rate stood at 
90.72% (YUM, 2009). Therefore, this study will investigate the factors leading to TEKUN’s 
and YUM’s repayment problems. 
This study will also compare Malaysia’s microfinance institutions’ lending systems with the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and People’s Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat-BPR) in 
Indonesia. The Grameen Bank and BPR are non-subsidised microfinance institutions. This 
study uses the Grameen Bank for comparison because Malaysia adopted the Grameen Bank 
model and the Grameen Bank is also the world’s leading example of the microfinance 
framework. In contrast, BPR in Indonesia, has a unique microfinance system and has a long 
history in micro-lending practices since Dutch colonial times during the 1890s (Jay, Richard, 
Johnston, & Widjojo, 2007). This study chose BPR in Padang province in West Sumatra, 
Indonesia, because the customs and economic activities of the people in the province are 
similar to Malaysia  
 
 7
1.4  Research Objectives 
 
The research objectives in this research are to: 
 
1. Provide an overview of Malaysian microfinance institutions and their services and to 
compare the Malaysian microfinance lending system with the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, and People’s Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat-BPR) in Indonesia; 
 
2. Investigate the impact of microcredit loans on the borrower’s business, household and 
individual for each of the microfinance institutions (AIM, TEKUN and YUM); 
 
3. Examine the determinants of the loan repayment problem among the borrowers in 
TEKUN and YUM; and 
 
4. Provide policy implications from the research findings. 
 
 
1.5  Contribution of the Research 
 
This research expects to contribute to the development of the microfinance sector in Malaysia. 
To date, there are no studies on the impact of microcredit loans on YUM and TEKUN 
borrowers and only one study in the literature on the impact of microcredit loans on AIM 
borrowers. However, this was a small scale study by Ismail (2001) of 60 AIM borrowers. 
Thus, this research will be the first large scale study on the impact of microcredit loans on 
borrowers from subsidised microfinance institutions (AIM, TEKUN and YUM). 
 
In addition, this is the first study to investigate the factors that influence loan repayment 
problems among TEKUN and YUM borrowers. Examination of the determinants of the loan 
repayment problems among TEKUN and YUM borrowers will benefit these two institutions 
in understanding the factors that lead borrowers to default or miss their loan repayments. This 
understanding may improve their repayment collection scheme and future profit margins. 
 
Since the study is conducted on subsidised microfinance institutions, it will fill a gap in the 
microfinance literature about how the different lending designs adopted by subsidised 
microfinance institutions play a role in determining the institutional performance and success.  
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1.6  Outline of this Thesis 
 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents an overview of the relevant 
literature on the impact of microcredit and the determinants of loan repayment performance. 
Chapter 3 provides the background of microfinance institutions in Malaysia and compares 
microcredit lending systems between Malaysia, Bangladesh (Grameen Bank) and Indonesia 
(BPR). Chapter 4 discusses the empirical models, the estimation technique and data collection 
methods. Chapter 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Chapter 6 summarises the 
major findings and policy implications, followed by the limitations of the research and 
suggestions for future research. 
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     Chapter 2                                 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of subsidies in microfinance, the impact and performance 
of microfinance and loan repayment issues. Section 2.2 provides a definition of microfinance. 
Section 2.3 discusses the history of microfinance. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss the 
characteristics of Grameen Bank microfinance and microfinance providers, respectively. The 
issue of subsidies in microfinance are discussed in section 2.6. Section 2.7 discusses the 
performance measurement of microfinance institutions and section 2.8 reviews previous 
studies on the impact of microfinance. Section 2.9 reviews previous studies on repayment 
issues in microcredit loans.  
 
2.2 Definition of Microfinance 
 
Microfinance can be defined as financial instruments, such as loans, savings, insurance and 
other financial products that are tailored only to the poor. Microfinance is created in the 
economy for the economic benefit of the poor and to alleviate poverty. Before microfinance, 
the poor had difficulty accessing commercial financial institutions because of a lack of 
collateral and unverified credit histories. Robinson (2001a, p. 9) provided a formal definition 
of microfinance as: 
Microfinance refers to small scale financial services primarily credit 
and savings-provided to people who farm or fish or herd; who operate 
small enterprises or small business enterprises where goods are 
produced, recycled, repaired, or sold; who provide services; who 
work for wages and commissions; who gain income from renting out 
small amounts of land, vehicles, draft animals, or machinery and 
tools; and to other individuals and groups at the local levels of 
developing countries, both rural and urban. 
  
Microcredit is the lending side of microfinance. Microcredit loans help the poor to be 
involved in income generating activities that allow them to accumulate capital and improve 
their standard of living (Littlefield, Morduch, & Hashemi, 2003). As quoted by the late Milton 
Friedman, Nobel Prize winner in Economics 1976, “The poor stay poor not because they are 
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lazy but because they have no access to capital” (Smith & Thurman, 2007, p.1). This is true 
since many poor people around the world are already benefiting from microfinance.  
By providing access to financial services, microfinance plays an important role in the fight 
against poverty. For example, income generation from a business helps not only the business 
activity to expand but also contributes to household income and improves food security, 
children's education, and empowers women. For example, microcredit in Bangladesh has 
empowered women by increasing their contribution to the household income and asset 
accumulation, which significantly improved the living standard of the family (Khandker, 
Samad, & Khan, 1998). Thus, microcredit emerges as a tool for promoting the economic and 
social development of the poor. 
 
2.3 The History of Microfinance 
 
Previously, microfinance was known as rural finance or informal finance. Rural finance and 
informal finance have similar characteristics and practices as microfinance, because they 
involve small loans that are normally tailored to the poor. The term “microfinance” became 
popular and widely used with the establishment of Grameen Bank by Muhammad Yunus in 
the 1970s. 
Rural finance was practised in Ireland and Germany in the 16th and 17th centuries 
(Steinwand, 2001). In Germany, Friendrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen created a credit cooperative, 
which is one tool of the microfinance provider, after the “hunger year” of 1846 (Hollis & 
Sweetman, 1998). The credit cooperative provided loans to poor farmers in rural areas and, by 
1910, it had successfully served 1.4 million farmers in Germany and been replicated in 
Ireland and Northern Italy (Morduch, 1999a). 
The credit cooperative model, known as the “Raiffeisen Model”, was replicated by the British 
and Dutch during their colonial eras in India and Indonesia. Bank Rakyat in Indonesia (BRI), 
one of the successful microfinance institutions in the world today, is based on the “Raiffeisen 
Model” (Seibel, 2005). 
In contrast, informal finance is popular among Asian countries. It is called by different names 
in different countries. For example, informal lending is called “Hui” in China, “Chit funds” in 
India, “Arisan” in Indonesia and “Paluwagan” in the Philippines (Seibel, 2005). However, the 
rapid development of formal microfinance started in Bangladesh in the 1970s. It was initiated 
by Muhammad Yunus, a Bangladeshi economist who was conscious of the hardship the poor 
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faced, especially the women, in his country (Yunus, 2007a). Muhammad Yunus began the 
practice of microlending by giving out collateral-free loans from his own pocket to women 
villagers in Jobra who were involved in income generating activities such as weaving bamboo 
stools and making pots (Yunus, 2007a). 
Muhammad Yunus believed that the capitalist banking system could not resolve the poverty 
predicament of his country. In 1976, after finally convincing the people of the validity of his 
ideas, he set up a bank called the Grameen Bank (Bank of the Villages – in Bangla) (Yunus, 
2007a). The Grameen Bank offers easy and small credit to poor women without requiring 
collateral. In the beginning, many were pessimistic about the success of the Grameen Bank 
since giving loans without requesting any financial security is a risky venture. 
However, Muhammad Yunus successfully proved that even without collateral, the Grameen 
Bank could succeed and be a realistic strategy in changing poor people’s lives. The credit the 
bank offers not only improves the women’s economic status but also empowers their lives. 
With microcredit, the women become an income contributor to the family and this has 
increased their self-worth. The women borrowers also become more financially independent 
and have the confidence to participate in community organisations. For his outstanding efforts 
in shaping the modern industry of microfinancing, Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank 
were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 (Yunus, 2007a). 
 
2.4 Characteristics of the Grameen Bank  
 
One important feature of microfinancing initiated by Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the 
Grameen Bank, is that it does not require any collateral. However, this type of financing is 
risky. In order to reduce the risk, microfinancing has initiated some innovative and unique 
characteristics. Among the innovations are flexible and frequent loan repayment instalments, 
involvement in small disbursement of loans, the requirement for compulsory savings and the 
imposition of joint liability lending (Yunus, 2007a).  
 
With flexible loan instalments, borrowers may repay their loan weekly, monthly or 
seasonally, over a year. Weekly instalments are most widely applied in microcredit loan 
products whereas monthly and semi-annual instalments are usually imposed for credit 
products that focus on seasonal ventures, such as agriculture. Weekly repayments are 
scheduled for small scale businesses, such as petty trading since such businesses tend to 
generate a daily or weekly revenue flow (Yunus, 2007a). 
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This frequent collection of revenue enables borrowers to repay their loan in weekly 
instalments. In addition, the frequent loan instalment system also means that credit officers 
will meet borrowers regularly, thus providing early warning signals to credit officers about 
emerging repayment problems before they happen (Jain & Mansuri, 2002).   
 
Another prominent characteristic of the Grameen Bank microfinance system is group lending 
(Yunus, 2007a). In group lending, borrowers are grouped into five to ten people. The 
members of the group are responsible for choosing the borrowers they want in their group. 
Thus, a borrower who wants to be in a particular group must be reliable and have a good 
business performance so that she can meet the loan repayment schedule. This is because each 
borrower in the group is responsible for repaying the loan if one of them defaults on the loan 
(Yunus, 2007a). 
 
The group lending approach develops social collateral in order to mitigate morally hazardous 
behaviour among the borrowers, such as not repaying their loans (Yunus, 2007a). Group 
lending applies a stepped loan system whereby the amount of the next loan given is contigent 
on the performance of the borrowers’ repayments on the previous loan (Yunus, 2007a). This 
approach educates the borrowers how to use credit effectively and cultivates their 
creditworthiness.  
The main objective of the group lending innovation is to transfer the responsibilities from the 
microfinance institution’s staff to the borrowers (Beatriz & Morduch, 2005). In conventional 
financial institutional practice, client selection, client performance monitoring and 
enforcement are administered by bank staff. However, in microfinance, these responsibilities 
are assumed by the borrowers. The studies by Chowdury (2005), Armendariz de Aghion 
(1999), Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994), Stiglitz (1990) and Varians (1990) showed 
that the joint liability feature in group lending is efficient in promoting loan repayments 
among the members of a group even in the absence of physical collateral. 
 
Another characteristic of the Grameen Bank’s microfinancing is compulsory savings (Yunus, 
2007a). As originally proposed by the Grameen Bank, compulsory savings are required by 
microfinance institutions as a condition for obtaining the loan. Each member must contribute 
to the group savings, regardless of whether they have a loan (Yunus, 2007a). Members with 
larger loans are required to contribute more to the group and the payments are collected 
during the weekly meetings. The savings from the group fund can be borrowed by group 
members for economic consumption or emergency purposes (Yunus, 2007a). 
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2.5 Microfinance Providers 
 
In general, microfinance institutions can be divided into three types: group lending, village 
banking and individual lending. Each microfinance institution adheres to basic microlending 
principles such as servicing the poor and imposing frequent loan repayment instalments.  
 
2.5.1 Group lending design 
 
Group lending is a well-known microfinance institution design. The group lending 
microfinance institution model, designed by Muhammad Yunus, has been replicated in over 
40 countries, including both developing and developed countries. These include Malaysia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, India, China, Mali, Honduras, Bolivia, Chile, 
Tanzania, the United States and Canada (Hulme, 2008).  
The group lending design is an effective mechanism to reach the poorest but it does not 
necessarily lead to the microfinance institution achieving financial sustainability (Hartarska, 
2005). In addition, based on experience in China, group lending microfinance institutions 
recorded nearly 100% repayment rates (Park & Ren, 2001). A similar experience is shared by 
Malaysia. Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia, which applies group lending design, recorded higher 
repayment rates (98.98%) than TEKUN (85%) and YUM (90.72%), which apply individual 
lending design (AIM, 2009; Berita Harian, 2009; TEKUN, 2009). 
 
2.5.2 Village banking design 
 
Village banking is the second microfinance institutional design. Indonesia was the first 
country to initiate the village banking type of microfinance institution. It was introduced by 
the Dutch in the 1890s (Jay et al., 2007). The People’s Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat-BPR) 
is modelled on the village banking framework. In practice, the village bank belongs to the 
villagers, is run by the villagers and the services offered are for the benefit of the villagers 
(Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007). 
In the village banking model, the villagers manage their own funds, disburse and deposit all 
funds, resolve loan repayment problems and manage discipline among members. This is 
different from the Grameen Bank’s group lending practice where the funds belong to the 
bank, and the bank itself is responsible for managing and disbursing the funds to the villagers. 
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Modern village banking was introduced by John Hatch in 1984, with the establishment of The 
Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA) (FINCA, 2009). FINCA is 
considered an influential microfinance organisation in the world today and offers its services 
widely in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia (Painter & MkNelly, 1999). FINCA received funding from the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and private donors to finance programmes all over the 
world (FINCA, 2009).   
 
2.5.3 Individual lending design 
 
The third category of microfinance institution is individual lending. An individual-based 
lending institution normally uses standard bilateral lending contracts between a lender and a 
single borrower, which is similar to commercial lending practices. The only major difference 
is that the loan offered is much smaller than commercial financial institutions. In addition, 
some microfinance institutions that apply the individual lending model also impose frequent 
loan repayments, such as weekly payments.  
Among microfinance institutions that apply the individual lending design are Banco Sol in 
Bolivia and Bank Rakyat in Indonesia. A microfinance institution in this category normally 
imposes higher interest rates, which tend to achieve financial self sufficiency, and does not 
rely on subsidies or donations (Morduch, 2000). The objective of the business is profit 
making and not social; this contrasts with what has been practised by the Grameen Bank.  
Studies by Cull et al. (2007) and Hartarska (2005) on the importance of microfinance 
institutional designs with respect to the trade-off between financial performance and depth of 
outreach (reach only the poorest) show that individual based types of institution seem to have 
higher profits since they focus more on breadth of outreach (numbers of borrowers) rather 
than depth of outreach (reach only the poorest). 
Bhatt and Tang (2001) clarified that a variety of microfinance institutional designs was 
important in providing microfinance services to the poor in a particular country.  However, 
one type of microfinance institution design does not mean it will fit well for all countries. For 
example, the group lending design is more effective in reaching the poorest in Bolivia, 
whereas, in Cameroon, the individual lending design is more effective (Zeller & Meyer, 
2002b). The prominent characteristics of group lending, village banking and individual 
lending designs are shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: A comparison of microfinance group lending, village banking and individual 
lending designs. 
Characteristic Group lending Village banking Individual lending 
Example Grameen Bank - 
Bangladesh 
People’s Bank (Bank 
Perkreditan Rakyat-
BPR)-Indonesia 
Banco Sol - Bolivia 
Target borrower Poor people Poor people Not-so-poor people 
Type of business Social business Social business Commercial 
business 
Loan 
management 
(e.g., loan 
distribution, 
repayment 
collection) 
By microfinance 
institution’s staff 
By villagers By microfinance 
institution’s staff 
 
 
2.6 Subsidies in Microfinance 
 
Conducting a microfinance business is costly since giving small scale loans incurs high 
transaction costs. The poor cannot provide collateral to commercial financial institutions to 
obtain a loan. The reasons why commercial financial institutions do not engage in micro-
lending include the risks and higher transaction costs involved. Many established 
microfinance institutions are financed by the government in the form of subsidies and 
donations in their early stages of development. 
Subsidies can be defined as the opportunity cost of the subsidised resource; subsidised 
resources are funds that are priced below the opportunity cost of those funds (Schreiner, 
2003). According to Schreiner (2003), there are six kinds of subsidised resources: direct 
grants, public paid-in capital, revenue grants, discounts on soft debt, discounts on expenses 
and discounts on the true profit. 
Schreiner (2003) defined the direct grant type of subsidy as a cash gift, such as computers, 
furniture or vehicles, that are counted as assets on the balance sheet. Public paid-in capital, in 
contrast, comes from the sale of shares to donors, whereas private paid-in capital comes from 
the sale of shares to private entities. Revenue grants are cash gifts from government donations 
and the discount on soft debt subsidy is the opportunity cost of the soft debt minus what the 
microfinance institution paid. 
Schreiner (2003) defined discounts on expenses as costs absorbed by donors, which the 
microfinance institution does not record as expenses; for example, technical help, exemptions 
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from reserve requirements, no deposit insurance, coverage of organisational costs and 
feasibility studies, debt guarantees, fees for consultants, training for loan officers and travel 
for workers. The true profit, the sixth form of subsidised funds, can be calculated by 
subtracting grant profits from accounting profits. Overall, these subsidised resources can be 
categorised according to the type of grants, either in cash or non-cash forms (see Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: Categories of subsidised funds for microfinance institutions 
Subsidised funds Grant Cash/non-cash 
Direct grant  
Equity 
 
Cash Public paid-in capital 
Revenue grant  
Profit Discount on soft debt  
Non-cash Discount on expenses 
True profit Equity 
Source: Adapted from Schreiner (2003, p. 45). 
 
Subsidised credit programmes are derived from the supply-leading finance theories that 
emerged in the late 1940s and 1950s after World War II (Robinson, 2001d). The supply-
leading finance theory emerged from the belief that farmers need more capital than they could 
save and also that farmers could not pay the full cost of credit (Lewis, 1955, as cited in 
Robinson, 2000d, p.140). Thus, governments at that time supplied the capital to the people in 
terms of credit and technology. According to Robinson (2001d), after World War II there was 
wide use of highly intensive modern agricultural technologies that poor farmers could not 
afford. Thus, poor farmers were given credit at below market rates with the hope they could 
use the new technology and increase the country’s agricultural productivity.  
Adams (1984) highlighted other reasons why governments provided subsidies in terms of 
charging very low interest rates on the loans given. The government believed that charging a 
higher interest rate was forbidden in the Holy Bible and the Holy Talmud. Governments also 
believed that there was nothing wrong in giving farmers cheap credit since the governments 
also received cheap money from foreign donors. According to Adams, governments 
underestimated the farmers’ ability to make borrowing decisions. 
Governments believed that farmers would borrow money only if the cost of borrowing was 
lower. Therefore, governments believed they needed to subsidise credit as an incentive to 
encourage farmers to borrow money and increase their production. These assumptions were 
made by governments but were not supported by any evidence (Adams, 1984). 
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Based on such assumptions over the decades, subsidised agricultural credit proliferated in 
many credit programmes, including microfinance. However, according to Morduch (2000), 
subsidised agricultural, as well as microfinance, credit documented disappointing results 
nearly universally. One of the drawbacks of subsidised credit programmes is that they lead to 
rent-seeking behaviour by the borrowers because they often perceive credit as disguised 
donations (Robinson, 2001d; Adams, 1984). Thus, in many cases, subsidised credit 
programmes had higher default rates.  
Subsidised credit programmes also often experienced political interference, including buying 
political support (Adam, Graham, & Von Pischke, 1984). The Social Development Fund of 
Zimbabwe, the Argentine Provincial Banks of Argentina, Regional Rural Banks of India and 
Rural Credit Cooperatives of China are among the examples of politicised microcredit 
programmes that charged very low interest rates, with no action taken over late repayments 
and loan defaulters were forgiven (Robinson, 2001c).  
Criticisms of subsidised microfinance programmes have been documented in many studies 
(Robinson, 2001c; Morduch, 2000; Adam et al., 1984). Many subsidised microcredit 
programmes ended up with non-poor borrowers, undermined savings mobilisation and the 
inability of microfinance institutions to achieve financial self-sustainability.  
However, some scholars also believed that subsidies will help microfinance institutions reach  
more poor people. For example, a study on microfinance institutions in Latin America 
showed that the more subsidies and donations they received, the more poor people they 
reached (Zeller & Meyer, 2002b). Such beliefs create a conflict over the role of subsidies and 
how microfinance institutions should finance them. Murdoch (2000) called this conflict a 
“microfinance schism”. There are two parties in this schism; the institutionalist and the 
welfarist.  
The welfarists believe that there is nothing wrong with subsidising microfinance institutions. 
Subsidised microfinance institutions can achieve sustainability without achieving financial 
self-sufficiency (Morduch, 2000). The welfarist believes that if the microfinance institution 
focuses on achieving financial self-sufficiency the very poor people will not be reached. They 
advocate that the microfinance institution should work on providing microfinance services to 
only the poorest and reach as many as possible instead of focusing on achieving financial self-
sufficiency. There is nothing wrong in giving subsidies to microfinance institutions if the 
objective in lifting the poor out of poverty is achieved (Woller, Gary, Dunford, Christopher, 
& Woodworth, 1999).  
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According to Woller et al., (1999), if the social return on the investment of the microfinance 
institution is higher than alternative investments, then that particular microfinance institution 
will not be considered a subsidised microfinance institution. However, if the social return is 
less than alternative investments, then that particular microfinance institution will be 
considered a subsidised institution and investors need to discontinue financing it. 
The institutionalists have a different view. The founders of the institutionalist paradigm are a 
group of researchers from Ohio State University’s Rural Finance Program. This paradigm has 
grown since the 1980s (Brau & Woller, 2004; Zeller & Meyer, 2002a). For institutionalists, 
achieving financial self-sufficiency is important for microfinance institutions in order to give 
better service to the poor (Morduch, 2000). Microfinance institutions need to finance 
themselves rather than depend on subsidies or donations. Since profit is the main objective, 
many microfinance institutions that focus on achieving financial self-sufficiency concentrate 
on providing microfinance services to as many borrowers as they can (poor and not so poor)  
beside the poorest (Morduch, 2000). This is because reaching the poorest alone incurs higher 
transactions costs.  
In addition, microfinance investors also have a similar view as the welfarists and 
institutionalists. There are two types of investors in the microfinance industry, the social 
investor and the selfish investor (Woller et al., 1999). Social investors can be divided into two 
groups. The first group comprises investors who seek solely the social improvement of the 
poor as a return from the investment. They want to ensure that with the money invested they 
have lifted the poor from poverty and improved their standard of living. The second group 
comprises investors who seek both social and financial returns (capital gains). Selfish 
investors can also be categorised as investors who are concerned only about the financial 
return from their investment. 
However, Hulme and Mosley (1996b) state that it does not matter whether the microfinance 
institution operates according to a welfarist or instutionalist framework, or what are the 
investors’ motives. The important factor is whether the microfinance institution and the 
investor provide positive changes to the lives of the poor.   
 
2.7 Performance of a Microfinance Institution 
 
Measuring the performance of a microfinance institution is about examining progress and 
determining whether the goals of microfinance have been met. The important goal of 
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microfinance is to improve the standard of living of the poor and lift them out of poverty. 
However, according to Schreiner (1996), the performance of microfinance differs according 
to the perspective of the borrowers, society, donors, the microfinance institution’s staff and 
investors.  
The borrower measures the performance of microfinance institutions by their repeated use of 
microfinance products to gain benefits. For example, with microcredit loans, borrowers are 
able to improve their businesses, provide healthy food for their families, provide better 
education for their children and also empower their personal life (Schreiner, 1996). Society, 
like the borrowers, also measures the performance of microfinance. 
Donors, on the one hand, measure the performance of microfinance using market leverage. 
‘Market leverage’ is the gain that the microfinance institution has achieved with the donations 
given (Schreiner, 2003). For example, with donations, outreach to the poor will increase and 
the microfinance institution will be considered more stable and efficient in delivering the 
services.  
On the other hand, the staff consider that a microfinance institution has performed well once it 
achieves financial self-sufficiency (Schreiner, 2003). Staff members are more concerned with 
financial self-sufficiency of the microfinance institution because they feel that they will still 
have a job when the donors leave. Lastly, a good performance for a microfinance institution, 
according to investors, is when the microfinance institution achieves high profitability from 
the investors’ investment (Schreiner, 2003).  
The approach taken to measure the performance of microfinance programmes can be divided 
into three developmental phases (Zeller & Meyer, 2002b). The first phase is when the 
subsidised credit policy is widely implemented. During this phase, the indicator of a good 
microfinance programme is the number of the poorest being served. The microfinance 
institution does not worry about its financial performance since it is fully supported by 
goverment subsidies. The approach is similar to the welfarist view, which claims that the 
performance of microfinance institutions should be assessed especially in terms of their social 
impact on the poor and whether the microfinance institution has achieved its poverty 
reduction objective (Morduch, 2000).  
However, in the 1980s, when many failed subsidised rural credit and microfinance 
programmes were documented, the issue of sustainability arose. Institutionalists claimed that, 
in order that microfinance institutions achieved sustainability, they should focus on profits by 
charging higher interest rates. Thus, the indicator of good performance in microfinance 
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shifted to an institution’s ability to achieve financial self-sufficiency (Woller & Woodworth, 
2001; Morduch, 2000). 
Based on the CGAP guidelines, five core areas need to be taken into consideration when 
measuring the performance of microfinance institutions: (i) Outreach, (How many clients are 
being served?); (ii) Client poverty level (How poor are the clients?); (iii) Collection 
performance (How effective is the microfinance institution in collecting its loan?); (iv) 
Financial sustainability (Is the microfinance institution profitable enough to maintain and 
expand its services without continued support from subsisided donor funds?); (v) Efficiency 
(How well does the microfinance institution control its administrative costs?) (CGAP, 2007, 
p.1). 
According to Zeller and Meyer (2002), there are three important criteria that microfinance 
insitutions need to examine in delivering their services and these criteria should also be used 
in measuring their performance. The criteria are: (i) outreach, (ii) financial sustainability and 
(iii) welfare impact. The measurement of the microfinance programmes’ performance should 
consider whether the three criteria are achievable. Zeller and Meyer (2002) called this the 
triangle of microfinance (see Figure 2.1). 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The triangle to measure the performance of microfinance institutions 
Source: Adapted from Zeller and Meyer (2002, p. 6) 
INSTITUTIONAL 
INNOVATIONS 
OUTREACH 
TO THE POOR 
FINANCIAL SUSTANABILITY  IMPACT 
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According to Zeller and Meyer (2002), the inner circle of the Triangle of Microfinance 
represents the microfinance institution’s innovations in technology, policy, organisation and 
management that affect how well each objective (outreach, impact and financial 
sustainability) is met. However, there is a trade-off in meeting the objectives of achieving 
financial sustainabilty, reaching the poorest and, at the same time, ensuring a positive impact 
on the borrower. Many believe that it is impossible for a microfinance institution to achieve 
financial sustainability and, at the same time, reach higher numbers of the poorest (Hartarska, 
2005; Zeller & Meyer, 2002; Park & Ren, 2001) 
The basic judgment about this belief is that reaching the poorest means the microfinance 
institution charges a low interest rate because the poorest cannot afford to pay a high interest 
rate while the microfinance institution incurs higher transaction costs (Park & Ren, 2001). 
Hartarska (2005) also stressed that there is no “win-win” situation for a microfinance 
insitution between reaching only the poorest and achieving financial sustainability. The 
microfinance institution either reaches only the poorest, charges low interest rates and is 
subsidised or reaches the not-so-poor borrower, charges higher interest rates and achieves 
financial sustainability.  
2.7.1 Measuring outreach  
 
Outreach means the number of poor served, including the number of women clients, how well 
the microfinance institution reaches the poorest and the variety of financial services available. 
There are six variables in measuring the outreach dimensions: breadth, depth, length, scope, 
cost and worth (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzales-Vega, & Meza, 2000). In their study, 
Navajas et al. (2000) combined a measurement of financial sustainability with the outreach 
dimension of the microfinance institution (see Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3: Outreach dimensions, definitions and indicators for microfinance institutions 
Outreach 
Dimensions 
Definition Indicators 
Breadth The number of clients reached.  Number of loans to clients 
 Number of financial accounts 
Depth The value that society attaches 
to the net gain of a given client. 
 
 
 Average loan size 
 Percentage of female clients 
 Percentage of rural clients 
 Borrowers’ education (less is 
preferred) 
 Borrowers’ ethnicity (minorities are 
preferred) 
 Types of housing (small are 
preferred) 
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Length Assessment of financial 
performance-profitability and 
portfolio quality. 
 Financial self-sufficiency 
 Operational self-sufficiency 
 Return on assets adjusted 
 Average loan size to GNP per capita 
 Real growth portfolio yield 
 Capital costs to assets 
 Labour costs to assets 
 Loans to assets 
 Donations to loan portfolios 
 Average loan size 
Scope The number of types of products 
and services offered to clients. 
 Loans 
 Savings 
 Insurance 
 Other 
Cost The sum of price costs and 
transaction costs to clients. 
 Price costs 
 Transaction costs 
Worth The value clients place on 
products and services. 
 Increase in profits 
 The drop-out rate: repeat purchases 
Source: Navajas et al., (2000). 
 
2.7.2 Measuring financial sustainability 
 
Measurement of the financial sustainability of a microfinance institution is similar to the 
measurement proposed by Navajas et al. (2000), as shown in the third component of Outreach 
(length) (see Table 2.3). However, this measurement has been expanded by other researchers 
(see Table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.4: Financial performance indicators for microfinance institutions 
Indicator 
1. Portfolio at risk 
2. Provision expense ratio 
3. Risk coverage ratio 
4. Write-off ratio 
5. Operating expense ratio 
6. Cost per client 
7. Personnel productivity 
8. Credit officer productivity 
9. Funding expense ratio 
10. Cost of funds ratio 
11. Loan loss reserves 
Sources: Cull et al. (2007), Gutirez-Nieto et al. (2005), Tucker (2001). 
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The financial performance measurements shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 are generally 
applicable to unsubsidised microfinance institutions. Yaron (1992) introduced an additional 
measurement specifically for subsidised microfinance institutions, called The Subsidy 
Dependence Index (SDI). The SDI measurement was then expanded by Schreiner (1999).  
The SDI is a measurement of self-sufficiency for subsidised financial institutions. It is the 
percentage change in the yield on lending with everything else held constant, which makes the 
subsidy equal to zero.  
The computation of SDI is based on Shreiner and Yaron’s (1999) framework, given as : 
nLP
SSDI
.
  
where: 
S = annual subsidy received by the microfinance institution calculated from 
S =A (m-c) + [( E*m) – p] + K 
A = microfinance institution concessionary borrowed funds outstanding 
M = interest rate that the microfinance institution would assume to pay for 
borrowed funds if access to concessionary funds were eliminated 
C = weighted average annual concessionary rate of interest actually paid by the 
microfinance institution on its average annual concessionary borrowed funds 
outstanding 
E = average annual equity 
P = reported annual profit before tax (adjusted for loan loss provisions and 
inflation) 
K = the sum of all other annual subsidies received by the microfinance institution 
(such partial or complete coverage of the microfinance institution’s costs by 
the State or Federal Government) 
LP = average annual outstanding loan portfolio of the microfinance institution 
n = weighted average yield earned on loan portfolio of the microfinance 
institution. 
 
A high SDI value indicates low financial sustainability for the microfinance institution 
whereas a low SDI value indicates a higher financial sustainability. The index value also 
suggests how much the average interest rate would have to be increased to compensate for a 
complete and immediate subsidy elimination (Shreiner & Yaron, 1999).  
Schreiner (2003), Morduch (1999b) and Hulme and Mosley (1996a) used the SDI framework 
to examine the level of subsidy dependence of the Grameen Bank. Schreiner (2003) also 
examined the SDI of Banco Sol Bolivia. In addition, the SDI model has been applied in non-
MFI institutions, such as cooperative and NGO agencies in Nigeria and commercial banks in 
Fiji, by Sharma Alufohai, (2006) and Uriam (2003), respectively. 
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2.7.3 Welfare impact of microcredit 
 
The measurement of the welfare impact of microfinance on the borrowers is essential in 
determining the success of microfinance programmes. Many researchers measuring the 
performance of microfinance concentrated solely on the welfare impact on the borrowers 
(business, household and individual); for example, Afrane (2002), on microfinance borrowers 
in Ghana and South Africa, Copestake et al. (2001) in Zambia, and Coleman (1999) in 
Thailand (see Table 2.5). Some researchers concentrated solely on outreach, for example, 
Navajas et al. (2000) in Bolivia, and others on financial performance, such as Adongo and 
Stork (2005) on microfinance institutions in Namibia and Tucker (2001) on microfinance 
institutions in 17 Latin American countries.  
Some studies focused on both financial performance and outreach in measuring the 
performance of microfinance institutions; for example, Cull et al. (2007) on microfinance 
institutions from 49 developing countries, and Kereta (2007) in Ethopia (see Table 2.5). Park 
and Ren (2001) measured the performance of microfinance institutions on the outreach, 
financial performance and the welfare impact of microcredit on the poor. Details of the impact 
of microcredit on borrowers are discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 2.5: Summary of studies measuring microfinance institutions’ performance 
Performance indicator Study by Country of study 
Welfare impact  Afrane (2002) Ghana and South Africa 
 Coleman (1999) Thailand 
 Copestake, Bhalotra and 
Johnson (2001) 
Zambia 
 Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) Peru 
 Mosley (2001) Bolivia 
 Nader (2008) Cairo 
 Pitt and Khandker (1998) Bangladesh 
 Zaman (1999) Bangladesh 
 Hossain and Diaz (1997) Philippines 
Outreach  Navajas et al. (2000) Bolivia 
Financial performance  Adongo and Stork (2005) 
Tucker (2001) 
Namibia 
17 Latin American 
countries 
Outreach and financial 
performance 
Cull et al. (2007) 49 developing countries 
Ethiopia 
African countries 
13 village banks (various 
countries) 
Kereta (2007) 
Lafourcade Isern, Mwangi and 
Brown (2005) 
Gary and Woller (2002) 
Outreach, financial 
performance and 
welfare impact 
Park and Ren (2001) China 
 25
2.8 Impacts of Microcredit Loans on the Borrowers 
 
Measuring the impact of microcredit loans on borrowers is essential in determining the 
success of microfinance programmes. The donors and government, for instance, need to know 
the performance of the microfinance programmes in order to justify their investment in terms 
of improving the socio-economic position of the borrowers. The impacts of microcredit loans 
on the borrowers can be economic or social. 
The impact of microcredit loans can also be classified into: (1) intermediate outcomes and (2) 
end outcomes (Khalily, 2004a). Intermediate outcomes include changes in the borrower’s 
income, consumption, expenditure, asset accumulation, savings, children’s education, 
nutritional intake and employment. Meanwhile, poverty alleviation is the end outcome of 
microcredit programmes. Overall, the impact of microcredit loans on the borrowers is on their 
businesses, households and personal lives. The success of the microcredit programme is 
shown by positive changes in the borrower’s business, household and personal life. 
The main objective of microcredit loans is to encourage the poor to get involved in income 
generating activities such petty trading businesses. Microcredit loans allow the poor to buy 
raw materials or invest in high-yielding varieties that yield higher production and output 
(Islam, 2007). Increases in production will also lead to increases in business income and this 
leads to poverty reduction (Islam, 2007). 
A study by Khandker (1998b), who surveyed 1800 households in 86 villages in Bangladesh, 
found that microcredit loans had a positive impact on the borrowers’ income, employment, 
consumption, asset accumulation and savings. The author also found that 5% of the 
respondents managed to leave the poverty category each year.  
The positive findings of the impact of microcredit loans on microenterprises were also found 
by other researchers in various studies of Bangladesh microcredit programmes, such as 
Husain (1998), Hashemi and Zaman (1998) and Schuler and Riley (1996). Those authors 
found that microcredit programmes have led to poverty reduction and better living conditions 
for the poor. 
In Malaysia, the borrower’s type of business activity is important in determining the impact of 
microcredit loans. A study by Ismail (2001) on 60 AIM members showed that borrowers 
involved in small business activities generated higher business revenue than those involved in 
agricultural activities.  
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It is also believed that growth in the business resulting from microcredit loans will also 
increase employment levels (Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001). Dunn and Arbuckle’s study on the 
impact of microcredit programmes in Peru showed that microcredit not only made a positive 
impact on the microenterprise net-revenue but also on employment generation. 
Similar findings were documented for microcredit programmes in the Philippines. Hossain et 
al. (1997) evaluated the Grameen Bank microcredit programme replication in the Philippines 
and showed that microcredit borrowers had substituted self-employment for wage 
employment. The employmnent opportunities created by the microenterprise also benefitted 
the community (Woller & Parsons, 2002). 
The impact on borrowers also depends on how efficiently they use the funds. The impact is 
less if the borrowers use microcredit loans for personal consumption than if they invest in 
productive ventures (MacIsaac, 1997). The worse-off borrowers typically used microcredit 
loans for personal consumption whereas better-off borrowers invested their microcredit loans 
in business development.  
Microcredit loans not only had a direct impact on the microenterprise by increasing the 
profitability and stability of the business, but microcredit loans could also indirectly impact 
household income and welfare (Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001). The impact on household welfare 
includes house condition, household appliances, food expenditure and children’s education.  
Studies on the impact of microcredit loans on household level in Bangladesh by Khandker 
(2005), Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Zaman (1999) showed that microcredit loans improved 
the borrower’s consumption, food spending and children’s education. However, different 
countries documented different impact results. For example, the study of microcredit 
borrowers in Peru by Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) showed that microcredit loans increased the 
borrower’s household income and food consumption but not expenditure on household 
appliances and children’s education. A study by Mosley (2001) on microcredit borrowers in 
Bolivia showed that richer borrowers enjoyed a larger positive impact than the poor. A similar 
result was reported in Thailand by Coleman (2002) who also documented that microcredit 
loans had a larger impact on richer borrowers. However, micrcocredit loans can also make the 
borrowers’ lives worse off. This happened when borrowers borrowed to repay existing loans 
from other informal lenders (Islam, 2007). 
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Microcredit loans do not only improve the economic status of the borrower but also empower 
female borrowers. In Bangladesh, for instance, men have priority and are dominant in every 
aspect of life. Yunus (2007a) believed that women can obtain equal social and economic 
status in the society and need not be treated as a burden to the family if they could get a 
chance to borrow money and have their own income. Hulme (2000), Khandker et al. (1998), 
Husain (1998) and Mustafa et al. (1996) showed that microcredit programmes in Bangladesh 
have empowered female borrowers in terms of participating in family decision making and 
increasing their personal savings.  
The variables used in measuring women’s empowerment in previous research included: (i) the 
control over loans, income and savings (Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001; Pitt & Khandker, 1998; 
Goetz & Gupta, 1996); (ii) the women’s mobility, ability to make purchases and make 
decisions and the women’s legal and political awareness (Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001; Hashemi, 
Schuler, & Riley, 1996); and (iii) women’s control over household assets and knowledge 
regarding family control (Garikipati, 2006; Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001; Zaman, 1999).  
The positive impact of microcredit loans on female borrowers was also recorded in other 
microcredit programmes in different countries. For example, a study by Kevane and Wydick 
(2001) on the performance of female and male microentrepreneurs in Guatemala showed no 
significant difference between male and female borrowers in generating business sales. The 
study also showed that microenterprises belonging to female borrowers were more stable and 
had higher rates of employment generation than male borrowers. The microfinance 
programme drop-out rates were very low among female borrowers compared with men. A 
similar positive impact of microcredit loans on women’s empowerment was found among 
women in Cairo (Nader, 2008), South Africa and Ghana (Afrane, 2002). 
 
2.8.1 Techniques used in microcredit impact studies 
 
According to Hulme (2000), micrcocredit impact studies can be categorised into three 
approaches. The first is a scientific approach, also known as the quantititative method. The 
scientific method involves large scale sample surveys, a longitudinal study, incurs higher 
costs and, usually, requires a higher standard of econometric analysis (Hulme, 2000). 
Examples of microcredit impact studies that applied the scientific method include Mahjabeen 
(2008), Morris and Barnes (2005), Coleman (1999), Khandker (1998a), Husain (1998) and 
Mustafa et al. (1996). 
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The second approach uses the humanities’ traditional method, also known as the ethnographic 
or qualitative method. Interviews are the key technique in this method. A study that uses this 
method can only be conducted on a small scale (for example, see Hietalathi and Linden, 
(2006). However, some researchers combined both the qualitative and scientific methods in 
order to achieve better findings, for example, Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) in Peru, Nader 
(2008) in Cairo and Afrane (2002) in Ghana and South Africa. 
The third approach is the participatory learning and action approach (PLA). This is action-
oriented research. This kind of research can be conducted with a quantitative or qualitative 
approach (Hulme, 2000). However, the technique is less extensive than the other two and 
involves simple statistical analysis. 
 
2.8.2 Impact assessment limitations 
 
The accuracy of an impact assessment study is questionable if the following problems exist in 
the study: (i) fungibility of the fund; (ii) selection bias; and (iii) endogeneity of the 
programme placement (Khalily, 2004a). 
The fungibility of funds occurs when the researcher fails to separate the uses of microcredit 
loans from other funds that have been borrowed (Khalily, 2004a). This can be one drawback 
in a microcredit impact assessment study. If the borrower borrows money only from one 
microfinance institution, the results of the impact assessment for the particular microcredit 
loan on the borrower would be reliable. However, if the borrower also borrows money from 
other sources as well as the microfinance institution, the impact of the microcredit loan could 
be overestimated. The separation of the borrower’s funds in an impact assessment study is 
impossible because the funds are mixed up if borrowers have invested the money in their 
business (Hulme, 2000). 
Selection bias and endogeneity of the programme placement occurs when the microcredit 
impact study compares a treatment group (borrowers) and the control group (non-borrowers) 
in order to see whether there are life development differences between the two groups. The 
objective is to test whether the microcredit borrowers perform better than non-microcredit 
borrowers or vice versa. Among the studies that used this method are Nader (2008), Dunn and 
Arbuckle (2001) and Coleman (1999). Hulme (2000) asserted that the important criteria for 
chosing the non-borrowers are their location, economics, physical as well as social 
environment and they should be matched with the borrowers. If the researcher fails to meet 
these criteria, then selection bias will occur and the comparison would not be fair. Alfrane 
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(2002) stated that it is difficult to obtain non-borrowers who have similar characteristics to the 
borrowers. 
Alfrane, in his study on the impact assessment of microfinance interventions in Ghana and 
South Africa, used a “before and after” approach. In this approach, the impact of the 
microcredit loan on the borrowers is measured based on the performance, i.e., whether the 
borrowers’ business and life has been positively changed, remained the same or negatively 
changed after they receive the microcredit loans. 
Khalily (2004b) stated that the issue on fungibility of funds in a microcredit impact 
assessment study is more serious than just selection bias and endogeneity issues. According to 
Khalily (2004b), the Household Economic Portfolio Model (HEPM) model proposed by 
Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS) can address the issue of fungibility 
of funds in microcredit impact assessment studies. 
The HEPM recommended that a microcredit impact assessment study should be conducted on 
three different aspects of a borrower’s life. The first is the borrower’s business, the second is 
the borrower’s household and the third is the borrower’s personal attitudes. The main idea of 
the HEPM framework (see Figure 2.2) is to avoid overestimating one particular aspect of the 
borrower’s life.  
The HEPM framework is based on Chen and Dunn’s (1996) study. The first component in the 
HEPM framework is household resources. The resources belonging to a household include: 
(i) human (time, labour power, skills), (ii) physical (land, buildings, tools, raw materials) and 
(iii) financial (cash and liquid savings). These resources belong, either individually or 
collectively, to the members of the household. The household could borrow or obtain money 
either from a formal or informal financial institution or from a social network. 
With the resources available, the household will convert them into household activities. The 
activities could be: (i) production (income generating activity, household maintenance activity 
and outside work); (ii) consumption (food, clothing, medical services, liqour, ceremonies and 
amusements); and (iii) investment (real property, physical stores of wealth, productive assets, 
strengthened social networks and improvement in human capital through training and 
education). The income generated from these activities will flow into the household 
resources. 
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The HEPM framework is operationalised by taking into consideration all aspects of the 
borrower’s household activities. The HEPM framework suggests a micrcocredit impact 
assessment study should be conducted on all components of a borrower’s life 
(microenterprise, household and individual) since each of the components is related to the 
other.  
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Figure 2.2: The Household Portfolio Economic Framework for assessing the impact of microcredit loans 
Source: Adapted from Chen and Dunn (1996, p. 24) 
HOUSEHOLD RESOURCES 
HUMAN 
(Time, labour power, skills) 
 
PHYSICAL 
(Land, buildings, tools, raw 
materials, input stocks, inventory, 
equipment, livestock and personal 
items) 
 
FINANCIAL 
(Cash, liquid savings) 
HOUSEHOLD ACTIVITIES 
 
PRODUCTION 
(Income generating activities – 
microenterprise, household maintenance 
activities, wages and outside work) 
 
CONSUMPTION 
(Food, clothing, medical services, 
liquor, ceremonies and amusements) 
 
INVESTMENT 
(Real property, physical stores of 
wealth, productive assets, strengthened 
social networks, improvement in human 
capital through training or education) 
INPUT  
AND  
EXPENDITURE 
INCOME AND OTHER 
ADDITIONS TO 
RESOURCES 
Household Flow 
Household Flow 
CREDIT/ 
DEBT 
SOCIAL 
NETWORKS 
 32
2.9  Microcredit Loan Repayment Issue 
 
Apart from measuring the performance of a microfinance institution, the capability of 
borrowers to repay their microcredit loans is another issue that needs attention. Borrowers can 
either repay their loan or choose to default. Borrower defaults may be voluntary or 
involuntary (Brehanu & Fufa, 2008). According to Brehanu and Fufa (2008), involuntary 
defaults of borrowed funds could be caused by unexpected circumstances occurring in the 
borrower’s business that affect their ability to repay the loan. Unexpected circumstances 
include lower business revenue generated, natural disasters and borrowers’ illness. In contrast, 
voluntary default is related to morally hazardous behaviour by the borrower. In this category, 
the borrower has the ability to repay the borrowed funds but refuses to because of the low 
level of enforcement mechanisms used by the institution (Brehanu & Fufa, 2008). 
Research has shown that a group lending mechanism is effective in reducing borrower 
defaults (Armendariz de Aghion, 1999). In group lending, the loan is secured by the co-
signature of members within the group and not by the microfinance institution. Each member 
will put pressure on the others in the group to meet the loan repayment schedule. Thus, group 
sanction is important in discouraging defaults among members in microfinance (Van Tassel, 
1999).  
Studies on the effectiveness of the group-lending mechanism include Ahlin and Townsend 
(2007) on Thailand’s microcredit borrowers and Olomola (2000) on Nigeria’s microcredit 
borrowers. In addition, Sharma and Zeller (1997) and Zeller (1998) undertook studies on 
Bangladesh and Madagascar microfinance borrowers, respectively, examining the impact of 
group characteristics, lender characteristics and community characteristics on loan default 
rates. The repayment behaviour among borrowers in the group-lending model was also 
investigated by Wydick (1999). The author investigated the impact of social ties, group 
sanctions and peer monitoring on loan repayment behaviour among Guatemalan microfinance 
borrowers. 
Bhatt and Tang (2002) conducted a study to investigate the determinants of loan repayments 
in microcredit programmes that applied the group lending approach, but took a different 
approach. Bhatt and Tang looked at the borrower’s socio economic variables instead of the 
elements of group lending for their influence on loan repayment behaviour. The borrower’s 
socio-economic variables included gender, educational level, household income and 
characteristics of the business (type of business, years in business, etc.). In their study, they 
found that a higher education level was significant and positively related to better repayment 
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performance. Conversely, female borrowers, level of household income, type of business and 
borrower’s experience had no significant effect on repayment behaviour.  
Most previous research that investigated the issue of loan repayment defaults in microcredit 
concentrated more on the effectiveness of group lending in discouraging defaults. However, 
little study has been conducted on the issue of the credit worthiness of the individual lending 
design applied by microfinance institutions. Research on the determinants of loan repayment 
defaults in individual-based lending schemes can be found only for rural banks or semi-formal 
financial institutions. 
Chaudhary and Ishafq (2003) examined the credit worthiness of 224 rural borrowers in 
Pakistan. Using logistic regression, they found that borrowers with higher educational levels, 
involved in a non-farm business activity, who were using the loans for investment and were 
female had a higher probability of repaying their loan. The study found that the subsidised 
interest rate level did not have a significant effect on repayment behaviour among rural 
borrowers in Pakistan. They concluded that a subsidised interest rate was not the best way to 
ensure good repayment by borrowers. 
The determinants of loan repayment rates for agricultural loans were investigated by Brehanu 
and Fufa (2008). Using probit and logit regression, they conducted a study on the 
determinants of repayment performance among small-scale farmers in Ethiopia. In the study, 
they found that borrowers with larger farms, higher numbers of livestock and farms located in 
a rainfall area had a higher capacity to repay loans, since all those factors increased the 
farmers’ productivity and income. The study also found that borrowers who had extra 
business income and were experienced in using agricultural technology had a good repayment 
performance.  
Roslan and Abd Karim (2009) investigated microcredit loan repayment behaviour in 
Malaysia. They conducted a study on microcredit loan borrowers from AgroBank Malaysia. 
AgroBank is a commercial institution specialising in loans to borrowers involved in 
agricultural business. Apart from giving large-scale loans, it also provides small-scale loans, 
such as microcredit loans, to borrowers. In their research, they found that male borrowers and 
borrowers who had a longer duration for repayments had a higher probability of defaulting. 
Borrowers involved in non-production oriented business activities such as in the service or the 
support sectors who had training in their particular business and who borrowed higher loans 
had lower probabilities of defaulting.  
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Okorie (1986) studied the repayment behaviour in one agricultural corporation in Nigeria. The 
author’s results from interviews with borrowers showed that the nature of the loan, either cash 
or in kind (seeds, fertilizer and equipment) can influence the borrowers’ repayment behaviour. 
He found that borrowers who received a loan in kind had higher repayment rates than 
borrowers who received a cash loan. This was because many borrowers misused the cash, 
diverting it into personal consumption instead of investing in making their business 
productive. Regular visits by the loan officer to the borrowers’ business site and higher profits 
generated by the borrowers also contributed to higher repayments by borrowers.  
Overall, the loan repayment performance can be influenced by three factors: borrower 
characteristics, business characteristics and loan characteristics (see Table 2.6). 
 
Table 2.6: Key factors affecting the loan repayment performance of microcredit loans 
Groups Determinant factors Study by 
 
Borrower characteristics 
Gender  Chaudhary and Ishfaq (2003) 
Roslan and Abd Karim 
(2009) 
Educational level  Bhatt and Tang (2002) 
Chaudhary and Ishfaq (2003) 
 
 
Business characteristics 
Business type  Chaudhary and Ishfaq (2003) 
Roslan and Abd Karim 
(2009) 
Business profit  Okorie (1986) 
Training and experience  Brehanu and Fufa (2008) 
Roslan and Abd Karim 
(2009) 
Extra business income  Brehanu and Fufa (2008) 
 
 
Loan characteristics 
Loan size  Roslan and Abd Karim 
(2009) 
Repayment period Roslan and Abd Karim 
(2009) 
Use of loan  Chaudhary and Ishfaq (2003) 
Nature of loan (cash or in 
kind) 
Okorie (1986) 
Level of monitoring from the 
institution 
Okorie (1986) 
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     Chapter 3                                                                            
The Malaysian Microfinance System and a Comparison with                          
the Grameen Bank and Bank Perkreditan Rakyat 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides background information about microfinance in Malaysia and compares 
the lending systems with the Grameen Bank and the People’s Bank (Bank Perkreditan 
Rakyat-BPR). Section 3.2 provides an overview of microfinance institutions in Malaysia. 
Section 3.3 discusses the background of Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) followed by The 
Economic Fund for National Entrepreneurs Group (TEKUN) and Yayasan Usaha Maju 
(YUM) in sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. Section 3.6 provides a summary of Malaysia’s 
microfinance system. Section 3.7 compares Malaysia’s microfinance system with the 
Grameen Bank and People’s Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat-BPR). Section 3.8 provides a 
summary of the microfinance lending systems. 
 
3.2 Overview of Microfinance Institutions in Malaysia 
 
Malaysia has four microfinance institutions, namely, Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia, Yayasan 
Usaha Maju, Economic Fund for National Entrepreneurs Group and the People’s Credit 
Cooperation (KKR). Both the AIM and YUM, established in 1987, were modelled on the 
Grameen Bank framework. TEKUN was established in 1998 and KKR in 1974. 
AIM is a non-government organisation (NGO) whereas YUM and TEKUN are under the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry Malaysia, respectively. KKR is a credit 
union, or co-operative, belonging to rubber plantation workers in Selangor State. AIM is the 
dominant microfinance institution in Malaysia.  
This study will examine only AIM, YUM and TEKUN since they provide significant 
microfinance services to the poor throughout country and receive full support from the 
government. KKR is excluded because it provides microfinance services to only a small 
number of people. 
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3.3 Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia  
 
Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia was the first microfinance institution in Malaysia and the largest 
Grameen Bank replication outside Bangladesh (McGuire, Conroy, & Thapa, 1998). It was 
developed in 1988, under the Trustee Incorporation Act 258 (revised 1981) (Chamhuri & 
Quinones, 2000). AIM is a poverty-oriented microfinance institution that provides loans only 
to the poor. 
Selangor, in Peninsular Malaysia, was the site of the pilot project of the Grameen Bank 
concept, known as “Project Ikhtiar”. The pilot project was conducted by two social scientists, 
Dr David Gibbons and Professor Sukor Kasim from the Universiti Sains Malaysia. “Project 
Ikhtiar” was successful and showed that a group lending system similar to the Grameen Bank 
model can be applied in Malaysia. AIM’s micro lending services have been widely offered 
throughout Malaysia.  
AIM has had a convoluted development over the years, experiencing a mission breakdown 
from 1992 to 1999 when the original objective of AIM to assist the poor was distorted by 
political motives (Kasim, 2000). This breakdown began in 1992 when the existing members 
in top management were replaced with new members who wanted AIM to be a mechanism to 
attract political supporters (Kasim, 2000). The breakdown included leakage from loans to not-
so-poor people with the introduction of two new loan schemes (Kasim, 2000). The new loan 
schemes were “Skim Pinjaman Nelayan” (SPIN) loans for fishermen and “Skim Khas Ibu 
Tunggal” (SKIT) loans to single urban mothers (Kasim, 2000). The SPIN and SKIT 
participants were given very large amounts for their first loans (RM10,000) and this led to 
uncollectible loans since the borrowers could not afford to repay them (Kasim, 2000) 
In addition, the loans were not cost-effective and were more like charity-loans (Conroy, 
2002). The loss of direction resulted in managerial disarray and AIM recorded the highest 
non-loan repayments in the institution’s history. In order to cover the cost of uncollectible 
loans, management increased administration fees from zero, at the beginning, to 19% 
(Conroy, 2002). The increased loan administrative fees contributed to higher drop-out rates 
among the borrowers who were significantly poor (Conroy, 2002). Following this, in 2003, 
major reforms were made in AIM and the institution underwent a change to a new 
management that struggled to re-establish AIM as a viable institution. 
From 2004, the new management team struggled to restore AIM to its original objective. 
Many efforts have been made to improve the efficiency of the operation, loan repayment 
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collection and to attract more borrowers. As a result, AIM has had 59,971 new members with 
an average of 4998 new members every month (Chan, 2010). AIM also introduced additional 
microcredit loan schemes for economic and social purposes and maintained the policy of 
charging a low management fee. Today, AIM is the leading microfinance institution in 
Malaysia. 
 
3.3.1 AIM’s loan schemes 
 
The loan schemes offered by AIM can be divided into three categories. The first is loans for 
economic purposes, the second is for non-economic purposes and the third is for recovery. 
The urban micro loan in the economic category is a new loan scheme introduced by AIM. 
This loan scheme is tailored to poor and low-income earners living in urban areas. With this 
loan scheme, it is hoped that the poor can set up small businesses to increase their income and 
have a better life in the city. Each loan group has different eligible loan amounts and duration 
of instalments (see Table 3.1). 
AIM offers loans to borrowers involved in various types of legal business activities. The AIM 
borrowers’ major business activities include small businesses, agriculture, manufacturing, 
animal husbandry, fishing and services. As of December 2007, small business activity 
received most financing from AIM. As of 31 July 2009, AIM had 222,559 borrowers with 
RM3,328,694,213 in total loans disbursed, with a recorded 98.98% loan repayment 
performance (see Table 3.2) 
 
As part of making loans to its members, AIM is concerned about members who face 
difficulties in their lives, for example, death, accidents, chronic disease, destruction of their 
house or project due to fire and natural disasters. In recognition of these disasters, AIM has 
established the Welfare and Well Being Fund for AIM members. The funds are collected from 
the members and are for the use of members and their families (see Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.1: AIM’s loan schemes 
Loan Schemes Detail Amount- in 
Ringgit 
Malaysia 
(RM) 
Instalment 
Economic 
(General loan) 
I-Mesra Continuously 2,000-20,000 25-150 weeks 
I-Srikandi Continuously 2,000-20,000 25-150 weeks 
I-Wibawa Short term loan 5,000 24 weeks 
Urban micro 
loan 
Continuously 3,000-20,000 12-100 weeks 
Non-Economic 
(Social loan) 
I-Bistari Educational loan 5,000 50-100 weeks 
I-Sejahtera Multipurpose loan 10,000 50-100 weeks 
Recovery 
Loan 
I-Penyayang Provide for those 
who had a project 
failure because of 
health problems 
or natural 
disasters. 
1,000 –5,000 12 – 50 weeks 
  Management fees: 10% for all types of loans 
Group Savings: RM1 –RM15 per week 
              Grace Period: 1 week after receiving the loan 
Source: AIM (2009)      
 
 
 
                                 Table 3.2: AIM’s achievements as of 31 July, 2009 
Total borrowers 222, 559 
Total branches 86 
Total staff 1416 
Total loans disbursed RM3,328,694,213 
Repayment rate 98.98% 
                                 Source: AIM (2009) 
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Table 3.3: Welfare and well being fund for AIM members 
Schemes/Type of Benefit Rate of award (RM) 
(A) Death 
i.    Member 
ii.   Husband 
iii. Children under care aged below 18 years 
(except children who are still studying or 
disabled)   
 
                              500 
                              500 
                              250 
(B) Ward admission due to accident or 
chronic disease.   
(member or husband only- minimum two 
days and maximum 20 days in one year). 
                          30 per day 
(C) Contribution for costs of chronic 
disease treatment only. 
(member and husband only - treatments 
such as surgery) 
                    Maximum 500 in a life time 
(D) Destruction of own house caused by 
fire (unintentional) or natural disaster 
(flood, storm and others). 
 
House on land          water/squatter/long house 
i.   Total destruction (100%) 10,000                                         4,000 
ii.  More than half destroyed  7,000                                          3,000 
iii. Less than half destroyed  4,000                                          2,000 
(E) Destruction of rented/lodging house According to the damage – maximum 2,000 
(F) Total destruction of the project (to 
AIM loan sponsored only- caused by 
natural disasters (not inclusive of 
drought) and fires (unintentional) 
20 per cent of current economic loan 
(whichever is lower) 
(G) Halal loan (for members who are not 
eligible to be covered by insurance 
(members who are above 75 years old) 
Maximum  2,000 
Source: AIM (2009) 
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3.4 Yayasan Usaha Maju 
 
The second Grameen-modelled microfinance institution in Malaysia is Yayasan Usaha Maju, 
located in Sabah. Sabah is east of Peninsular Malaysia and forms the north east part of 
Borneo. Sabah is the second largest state in Malaysia after Sarawak (Sabah, 2009). There are 
32 officially recognised ethnic groups in Sabah, with Kadazan the largest group, followed by 
Bajau and Murut (Sabah, 2009). Sabah’s economy traditionally relied heavily on timber 
exports and some agricultural products such as cocoa and rubber (Sabah, 2009). 
In 1970, Sabah was one of the richest states in Malaysia but by 2007 it was recorded as one of 
the poorest (Sabah, 2009). In the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010), Sabah’s poverty was 
three times higher than the national average caused by the inequitable distribution of wealth 
between the State and Federal governments (Sabah, 2009).  
YUM began in 1988 as a “Project Usaha Maju” initiated by the Grameen Trust Fund and the 
Rural Development Corporation (Chamhuri & Quinones, 2000). Project Usaha Maju was 
successful in lifting its members out of poverty. The state government of Sabah decided to 
institutionalise Project Usaha Maju and form Yayasan Usaha Maju on June 30, 1995. YUM is 
registered as a foundation under the Trustee (Incorporation) ordinance 1951 chapter 148 of 
Sabah (YUM, 2009).  
YUM is under the purview of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry Malaysia. 
The core role of YUM is to provide loans to the poor and hard-core poor and to complement 
government efforts to alleviate poverty in Sabah (YUM, 2009). YUM’s lending system is 
similar to that of AIM, since both are poverty-oriented institutions. The only difference is that 
YUM uses an individual lending system rather than AIM’s group lending system. The reason 
YUM uses an individual lending system is because its borrowers live far apart even though 
they live in the same village. Due to the geographical conditions, it is difficult for the 
borrowers to meet each other often. Peer monitoring will not work effectively in such a 
situation.  
 
 
 
 
 41
3.4.1 YUM’s loan schemes 
 
YUM has two loan schemes, namely, “General Loan” and “Short-Term Loan”. Each loan 
scheme has different eligible loan amounts and duration of loan instalments (see Table 3.4). 
As of 31 December 2008, YUM had 8,252 borrowers with a total of RM 46,070,700 in loans 
disbursed and a 90.72% repayment rate. Table 3.5 shows the YUM achievements as of 31 
December, 2008. 
 
Table 3.4: YUM’s loan schemes 
Characteristics General Loan Scheme Short-Term Loan Scheme 
Loan size   RM 500 – RM 20,000. 
 Maximum loan for borrower in 
hard-core poverty group is RM 
10,000. 
RM 100 – RM 5,000 
Type of activities  Vegetable cultivation 
 Fruit farming 
 Cattle farming (livestock and 
fishery) 
 Grocery shops, food stalls, 
vegetable vendor 
 Hair salon, motor workshops, 
tailoring 
 Craftsmanship 
This type of loan is offered 
only to hawkers. 
The purpose of this loan is to 
limit the role of ‘loan sharks” 
in giving capital to hawkers. 
Instalment 
Periods 
a. Loan value  = RM 500 – RM 900 
    Instalments = 50 weeks 
b. Loan value = RM 1,000 – RM 5,400             
    Instalments = 50 -100 weeks 
c. Loan value  = RM 5,500 – RM 7,400 
    Instalments = 50 -150 weeks 
d. Loan value = RM 7,500 – RM 8,900 
    Instalments = 50-200 weeks 
e. Loan value =RM 9,000 – RM 20,000 
    Instalments = 50 -250 weeks 
Loan value = RM 100 – RM 
5,000 
instalments: 50 weeks   
instalments are three times 
per week (Monday, 
Wednesday and Friday). 
 
 
                        Management fees    : General loan scheme        = 10% every 50 weeks   
                                                          Short-term loan scheme   = 18% every 50 weeks 
                      Compulsory Savings : 2% of total loan 
                             Grace Period      : General loan scheme = 2 weeks after receipt of the loan 
                                                          Short-term loan scheme = 1 week after receipt of the loan 
Source: YUM (2009) 
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                           Table 3.5: YUM’s achievements as of 31 December, 2008 
No of borrowers 8,252 
No of branches 20 
No of staff 165 
Loans disbursed RM 46,070,700 
Repayment rate 90.72% 
                           Source: YUM  (2009) 
 
3.5 The Economic Fund for National Entrepreneurs Group 
 
The third microfinance institution in Malaysia is The Economic Fund for National 
Entrepreneurs Group (TEKUN) established on 9 November 1998. TEKUN is different from 
AIM and YUM. It provides loans to both poor and not-so-poor people. The main objective of 
TEKUN is to provide easy and quick loans to Bumiputra and Indian entrepreneurs. Since 
2008, TEKUN has expanded its services to provide business opportunities and business skills 
training to its borrowers and to develop networking among innovative and progressive 
entrepreneurs from all over Malaysia. TEKUN is under the purview of Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agro-Based Malaysia. 
 
3.5.1 TEKUN’s loan scheme 
 
TEKUN offers six financing schemes to micro-entrepreneurs. The value of the loans ranges 
from RM500 to RM50,000. TEKUN offers loans to both male and female small-medium 
scale entrepreneurs aged between 18 and 65 years old. The modes of loan repayment are 
weekly, monthly or semi-annually, depending on the types of business involved and TEKUN 
management’s decisions. Management fees are 4% of the loan. This new fee charge started in 
August 2008; it was previously 8%. Apart from their loan repayments, each borrower is also 
encouraged to put savings into TEKUN at a minimum value of 5% of the annual payment, 
from their repayments. The details of TEKUN’s loan schemes are documented in Table 3.6. 
TEKUN provides its services to the both Peninsular and East Malaysia and has set up offices 
according to parliamentary divisions. As of August 2009, TEKUN had 150,131 borrowers 
with RM1,377,371,300 value of loans disbursed (see Table 3.7). 
TEKUN is experiencing a crisis in loan repayments. As stated by the Minister of Agriculture 
and Agro-Based Industry, Datuk Noh Omar, in Berita Harian (national newspaper) on 8 July 
2009, TEKUN recorded a non-performing loan rate as high as 15% with a value of RM225 
million uncollectible loans that had accumulated since 1999 (Berita Harian, 2009). The 
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minister also mentioned that TEKUN has difficulty in disbursing loans to new borrowers 
because it does not have enough capital. TEKUN launched the campaign “Let’s Pay Back the 
Loan” to its borrowers on July 1, 2009 (TEKUN, 2009). Discounts were given as an incentive 
to borrowers to repay loans. Recently, TEKUN management blacklisted defaulters who 
continued to ignore loan repayment reminders. 
Table 3.6: TEKUN’s loan schemes 
Loan Scheme Type of business 
activity finance 
Loan size 
(RM) 
Instalment 
 
General Loan 
 
 Manufacturing 
 Retailing 
 Services 
 Farming 
 Animal 
husbandry 
 Fishery 
 Tourism 
 Education 
 Transportation 
500 - 50,000 Periods: 
1 month to 5 years 
-weekly 
-monthly 
-semi-annually 
                                              Management fees: 4%  
       Compulsory Savings: 5 % of annual repayment 
                                                     Grace Period: Flexible – according to project 
Source: TEKUN (2009) 
 
 
Table 3.7: TEKUN’s achievements as of 31 July, 2009 
Total borrowers 150,131 
Total branches 194 
Total staff 920 
Total loan disbursed RM 1,377,371,300 
Repayment rate 85.0% 
                             Source: TEKUN (2009) 
 
 
3.6 Summary of the Malaysia Microfinance System 
 
Malaysian microfinance institutions (AIM, YUM and TEKUN) have different types of 
lending systems and provide services to different strata of people. AIM and YUM offer loans 
to the poor and hard-core poor women, whereas TEKUN gives loans to both poor and not-so-
poor men and women borrowers. AIM uses a group lending scheme, whereas TEKUN and 
YUM use an individual lending scheme.  
Microfinance institutions in Malaysia offer only microcredit loans and no other microfinance 
services such as microsavings or microinsurance. This limited financial service is due to 
restrictions based on the Malaysia Banking and Financial Act 1989 that states “No person 
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shall carry on banking services, including receiving deposits on current account, deposit 
account, savings account or no other similar account, without a licence as a bank or financial 
institutions” (McGuire et al., 1998, p. 9). Furthermore, within the restrictions of Muslim law 
(Sharia Law)4, interest cannot be charged on loans in Malaysia, therefore it has been replaced 
with management fees.  
Both AIM and YUM impose weekly loan instalments for all kinds of business activities 
regardless of their revenue cycle. They impose one to two week grace periods for the 
borrowers involved in agricultural businesses. TEKUN, in contrast, imposes a weekly loan 
instalment system for small business activities and monthly or seasonal loan instalments for 
some small business activities and agricultural businesses such as farming, fisheries and 
animal husbandry. TEKUN allows borrowers involved in agricultural businesses to choose 
the duration of grace periods based on their harvest or production times. Among the three 
microfinance institutions, only AIM has taken the initiative to provide welfare benefits to its 
borrowers and families in order to reduce the burden on borrowers in cases of emergency and 
disasters. Table 3.8 compares the three microfinance institutions.  
In a recent development in the microfinance industry in Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia 
(The Central Bank), in 2007, gave a mandate to several banking institutions in the country to 
offer microcredit loans (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). This was due to the realisation that, of 
the existing half million small medium enterprises in the country, 80% were microenterprises 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). Nine banks are involved: Bank Simpanan Nasional, Bank 
Rakyat, AgroBank, Alliance Bank, AMBANK, CIMB Bank, EONCAP Islamic Bank, Public 
Bank, and United Overseas Berhad (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). The size of the 
microcredit loan given is between RM1,000 to RM50,000 with no collateral (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2010). The interest rate charged is based on the Bank Lending Rate (BLR) plus 
0.50%. As of 2010, the BLR is 6.30%, so the interest charged on microcredit loans is 6.80% 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). This rate is slightly higher than the management fee charged 
by TEKUN, at 4%, but lower than AIM, at 10%, and YUM, at 10-18%.  
The microcredit loans offered by commercial banks are guaranteed by the Credit Guarantee 
Cooperation (CGC). The CGC is a government agency that provides guarantees on lending by 
other financial institutions to small and medium enterprises that have no track record or 
collateral to obtain credit facilities from the financial institutions (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
                                               
4 Sharia law is a Muslim or Islamic law. It covers both civil and criminal justice as well as regulating personal 
and moral conduct of individuals based on the Holy Quran and Prophet Muhammad’s teachings (Esposito, 
2003). 
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2010). With this development, the opportunity for microfinance borrowers in the country to 
access a credit facility has widened.  
Table 3.8: Summary of Malaysia’s microfinance institutions’ lending systems 
Characteristic AIM TEKUN YUM 
Target borrower Female only Both female and male Female only 
Service 
outreach 
All Malaysia All Malaysia Sabah only 
Loan eligibility People who live at or 
below the poverty line 
People who live at or 
below the poverty line 
and not-so-poor 
people 
People who live at or 
below the poverty 
line 
Lending design Group lending Individual lending Individual lending 
Loan size Min: RM1,000 
Max: RM20,000 
Min: RM500 
Max: RM50,000 
Min: RM100 
Max: RM20,000 
Loan instalment Weekly Weekly, monthly and 
seasonally. 
Weekly 
Grace periods 1 week after receiving 
the loan 
Flexible - according to 
the project 
1-2 weeks after 
receiving the loan 
Management 
charge 
10% 4% 10% per 50 weeks for 
General Loan 
Scheme. 
18% per 50 weeks for 
Short-Term Loan 
Scheme. 
Compulsory 
savings 
RM1-RM15 per week 5% from annual 
repayment 
2% from the loan 
 
 
3.7 A Comparison of Microfinance Lending Systems  
 
This section compares the Malaysian microfinance institution’s lending systems and products 
offered by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and the People’s Bank (Bank Perkreditan 
Rakyat-BPR) in Indonesia. Malaysia replicated the Grameen Bank model that is the leading 
example of the microfinance framework in the world. BPR in Indonesia has a unique 
microfinance system and has a long history in microlending practices since the Dutch colonial 
time of the 1890s5 (Jay et al., 2007).  
One of the major differences between Malaysian microfinance institutions and the Grameen 
Bank and BPR is that the Malaysian microfinance institutions are subsidised. Microfinance 
institutions in Malaysia also only offer microcredit loans and no other microfinance products. 
                                               
5BPR in Indonesia serves only poor borrowers compared with the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) that offered 
microfinance services to both poor and not-so-poor borrowers. The BPR in Indonesia can be classified into three 
categories: BPR established as a limited liability company and in private ownership; BPR registered as a 
cooperative; and BPR established by the commercial bank as their subsidiary division (Conroy, 2003). 
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The Grameen Bank, in contrast, apart from offering microcredit loans as a core products, also 
offers microsavings, microinsurance and pension funds to its borrowers, and BPR offers 
microcredit loans and microsavings to its borrowers. Malaysian microfinance institutions do 
not offer microsavings facilities because taking deposits is legally restricted (Siwar & Abd. 
Talib, 2001; McGuire et al., 1998)6.   
The Bank Nagari-BPRs in West Sumatra, Indonesia7 has a unique way to attract deposit 
savings from its borrowers. Each borrower needs to put some savings in the BPR before being 
able to start borrowing. The borrowers can request a loan only if the amount of the loan 
requested is less than their savings. Some borrowers said that they are comfortable with 
placing their savings into the BPR because sometimes they wanted to save only 1,000 Rp 
(less than USD 1) and they felt embarrassed to go to a commercial bank just to deposit that 
amount. Besides depositing their savings in the banks, the borrowers’ savings can also be 
collected by the BPR’s staff (Bank Nagari, 2009). 
BPR realised that not all borrowers are able to go to the bank regularly because of business 
and family commitments as well as transportation constraints. Therefore, BPR staff took the 
initiative go to the borrower’s house or business premises on a daily or weekly basis to collect 
the savings. This is an almost unique aspect of the BPR system; a similar system has been 
applied by Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). This shows that microfinance providers in 
Indonesia place considerable emphasis on savings. This approach was recommended by 
Robinson (2001b) and Morduch (2000) whereby microfinance institutions emphasised 
savings mobilisation as a way to achieve financial self-sufficiency. 
Grameen Bank is the only microfinance institution among Malaysian microfinance 
institutions and BPR that offers microinsurance policies to its borrowers. In realising the 
higher climatic risk faced by the agricultural activities, microinsurance not only reduces the 
burden on the borrowers when a disaster happens but also saves the financial accounts of the 
Grameen Bank from deficits caused by uncollectible loans. Other microfinance products 
offered by Grameen Bank are a pension fund and scholarships to the outstanding of borrowers 
children. The pension fund is to help the poor build a nest egg for their old age. Among the 
                                               
6 This restriction is based on the Malaysia Banking and Financial Act 1989 that states only bank and financial 
institutions are allowed to take deposits from borrowers. 
7 Bank Nagari was established in 12 March 1962, by the West Sumatra regional government with the objective 
of providing financial services to the local people of West Sumatra (Bank Nagari, 2009). The Bank Nagari’s 
headquarters are located in Padang, the capital of the West Sumatra. Bank Nagari not only acts as a commercial 
financial institution but also plays a role as one of the microfinance providers in the province.  
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subsidiary microfinance products offered, the Grameen Bank pension fund savings 
programme is the most successful programme in the Grameen Bank (Yunus, 2007b). In 2007, 
total deposits in the pension fund amounted to USD 400 million, which represented 53% of 
the total deposits in the bank (Yunus, 2007b).  
AIM and YUM impose weekly loan payments on all types of businesses, both small and 
agricultural businesses, regardless of their business revenue cycle (AIM, 2009; YUM, 2009). 
Both AIM and YUM also impose one and two week grace periods, respectively, to 
agricultural types of businesses (AIM, 2009; YUM, 2009). Unlike YUM and AIM, TEKUN 
gives reasonable grace periods to borrowers involved in agricultural businesses. For example, 
a one-year grace period is given for cattle farming activities, six months for fishponds and 
poultry farming and one year for fruit and vegetable farming (TEKUN, 2009). According to 
TEKUN, the duration of the grace period given to the borrowers is based on harvesting cycles 
(TEKUN, 2009). 
The Grameen Bank and BPR lending contracts are more flexible than the Malaysian 
microfinance institutions, especially AIM and YUM. Both Grameen Bank and BPR loan 
repayment modes, duration, amount, grace periods and interest rates charged are tailored to 
the nature of the borrowers’ businesses and are based on the borrowers’ affordability. They do 
not impose similar loan contracts on all borrowers or business types as do Malaysian 
microfinance institutions.  
For example, in the Grameen Bank the borrowers involved in dairy farming are allowed to 
pay their loans according to the milking cycle (Yunus, 2007b). Thus, with the Grameen Bank, 
loan repayments are based on the cash flow cycle of the borrowers’ businesses (Islam, 2007). 
In terms of loan products, Grameen Bank offers four different loan products with four 
different interest rates and the loans are flexible. In a flexible loan, borrowers who cannot pay 
the loan according to the original repayment schedule are allowed to extend the repayment 
schedule (Yunus, 2007b).  
Similar practices are applied by the BPR in Indonesia. There are many BPRs in one district 
and the types of loans offered by the BPRs are also different from others (Bank Nagari, 2009). 
The microfinance services offered are tailored to the needs of the borrowers in a particular 
village in the district. Before the BPR grants a particular loan, it conducts market research, 
such as the amount of repayment and interest rate that can be afforded by the borrower or the 
nature of cash flow cycle that will be generated by the business. This ensures that the loan 
contracts will not burden the borrowers (Bank Nagari, 2009). Since there are many BPRs in 
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one particular district, there is competition among them in terms of the types of loan offered, 
interest rates on savings and the attractiveness of the loans to the borrowers (Bank Nagari, 
2009).  
Muhamad Yunus, in his book Creating a World without Poverty: Social Business and the 
Future of Capitalism (Yunus, 2007b, p. 74), stressed that if any commercial banks wanted to 
participate in a microcredit business, they needed to create a subsidiary microcredit division 
in their bank. This microcredit subsidiary division must have separate management from the 
bank itself. This principle has been applied in West Sumatra by the Bank Nagari, which is 
also a commercial bank. The BPRs set up by the Bank Nagari have a separate management 
from the bank. However, Malaysian commercial banks that offer microcredit loans do not use 
this system; there is no separate subsidiary microcredit division created by those banks.  
Bank Nagari set up BPRs in particular districts and villages so are they easily accessible by 
the poor (Bank Nagari, 2009). In the beginning, Bank Nagari provided capital, management 
and information technology (IT) support to the BPRs which, in turn, hired eligible local 
people as staff (Bank Nagari, 2009). Other than receiving capital from the Bank Nagari, the 
villagers welcome public shares in the BPR and, as a return each year, they receive dividends 
from the profits generated by the BPR (Bank Nagari, 2009). 
The opportunity to contribute capital by the villagers gave a feeling to them that the BPR 
belonged to their village and they gave full support to ensure its survival. After several years 
of operation, and once the Bank Nagari is confident that the BPR could operate alone, the 
BPR is given autonomous status by Bank Nagari (Bank Nagari, 2009). However, BPRs still 
need to report their operational and financial performance to the Bank Nagari and, in some 
circumstances, Bank Nagari still gives professional advice. Even though the BPRs and Bank 
Nagari are separate entities, BPRs still play a role in promoting Bank Nagari’s financial 
services, such as Hajj savings, money transfers and pawn services to their borrowers (Bank 
Nagari, 2009). The establishment of the Bank Nagari BPRs is not only for channelling 
microfinance services to the poor in rural areas but also serves as part of Bank Nagari’s social 
business. Giving local communities the autonomy to run the BPRs by themselves provides a 
good incentive for the local people to save. Table 3.9 summarises the similarities and 
differences of the Malaysian microfinance institutions, the Grameen Bank and the BPR. 
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Table 3.9: Comparison of Malaysian microfinance institutions, Grameen Bank and the BPR  
                  system 
 Malaysian 
Microfinance 
Institutions 
(AIM, TEKUN YUM) 
Grameen Bank BPR 
Type of institution Subsidised Unsubsidised Unsubsidised 
Source of operation (i) Management fees 
(ii) Government grants 
and soft loans 
(i)  Interest rates 
(ii) Savings 
(i) Interest rates 
(ii)  Savings 
(iii) Investment 
from borrower 
and local people 
Lending design AIM: Group lending 
TEKUN: Individual  
                lending 
YUM: Individual    
            lending 
Group lending Individual lending 
Product offered Microcredit Microcredit Microcredit 
  Microsaving Microsaving 
  Microinsurance  
  Pension fund  
Lending contracts    
(i) Interest rate Fixed for all kinds of 
loan schemes. 
Different for each 
loan scheme 
Different for each 
loan scheme 
(ii) Repayment mode AIM and YUM: 
weekly to all kinds of 
businesses and 
borrowers. 
 
TEKUN: weekly 
mostly to small 
businesses and 
monthly/seasonally to 
agricultural businesses 
Flexible according to 
borrower’s business 
revenue cycle. 
Flexible according to 
borrower’s business 
revenue cycle. 
(iii) Grace periods AIM: 1 week 
YUM: 2 weeks 
TEKUN: According to 
harvesting cycle. 
According to 
harvesting cycle 
According to 
harvesting cycle 
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3.8 Summary of Microfinance Lending Systems 
 
Malaysian microfinance institutions offer limited microfinance products and have a 
standardised lending contract. The Grameen Bank and BPR have more variety in their 
microfinance products and flexible lending contracts. Furthermore, the Grameen Bank and 
BPR are unsubsidised microfinance institutions, thus they need to offer a variety of 
microfinance products to generate revenue from the services. The revenue generated is used 
to support their operational and lendable funds. This operation is different from the Malaysian 
microfinance institutions whose operation is fully subsidised by the government. Therefore, 
there is no incentive from such institutions to offer any other microfinance products apart 
from microcredit loans to finance their operation. 
However, the microfinance products such as microinsurance and pension funds are important 
benefits to borrowers. Microinsurance, for example, can give protection to the borrower’s 
business, especially an agricultural business, which is exposed to climatic factors. Pension 
funds can reduce the borrower’s financial burden during old age. Therefore, the Malaysian 
microfinance institutions should consider introducing microinsurance and pension funds to 
support their borrowers. The lending flexibility in the Grameen Bank and BPR contracts 
provides more flexibility to borrowers in repaying their loans and the Malaysian microfinance 
institutions could adopt such a lending scheme. The discussion in Chapter 5 provides 
evidence about whether the microfinance institutions’ (TEKUN and YUM) lending contracts 
such as their repayment period, repayment amount and mode of repayment, have any impact 
on borrowers’ capability to repay their loans.  
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     Chapter 4                                                                            
Research Methodology and Data 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research methodology and data. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 provide a 
description of the study area and sample selection, respectively. Data sources and data 
descriptions are discussed in section 4.4. The approach for the microcredit impact assessment 
study and the investigation of the determinants of loan repayment problems are discussed in 
sections 4.5 and 4.6, respectively.  
 
4.2 Description of the Study Area 
 
AIM and TEKUN provide microcredit services throughout Malaysia and have a large number 
of borrowers. AIM, for example, as of 31 July 2009, had 222,559 borrowers (AIM, 2009), 
whereas TEKUN, as of 31 August 2009, had 150,131 borrowers (TEKUN, 2009). For this 
research, three regions in Peninsular Malaysia were chosen to conduct the survey 
questionnaire with AIM and TEKUN borrowers.  
The selected regions were Selangor and Melaka (West Malaysia), Kelantan (East Malaysia) 
and Kedah (North Malaysia). Both AIM and TEKUN borrowers were selected from these 
three regions. This provided an adequate representative population of AIM and TEKUN 
borrowers in Malaysia. The surveys were conducted in several districts in the selected 
regions. In the west, the surveys were conducted in the Kuala Langat district of Selangor, and 
the Teluk Mas and Masjid Tanah districts in Melaka. In the east, four districts in Kelantan 
were chosen: Tumpat, Tanah Merah, Pasir Mas and Kota Bharu. The survey was also 
conducted in four districts in Kedah: Kuala Muda, Padang Terap, Kota Setar and Langkawi 
Island. 
YUM borrowers were surveyed in the state of Sabah, where the institution is located. Three 
districts in Sabah were chosen for the survey: Kota Kinabalu, Kota Belud and Kota Marudu. 
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As of 30 June 20088, AIM had 19,609 borrowers in West Malaysia (including Selangor, Johor 
and Melaka states), 34,215 borrowers in Kelantan (East Malaysia) and 28,994 borrowers in 
Kedah (North Malaysia) (AIM, 2009). Similarly, as of August 2009, TEKUN had 15,238 
borrowers in Selangor (West Malaysia), 15,261 borrowers in Kelantan (East Malaysia) and 
14,049 borrowers in Kedah (North Malaysia). YUM had 8,252 borrowers in Sabah as of 
February 2009. There were 698 borrowers in Kota Kinabalu, 983 in Kota Belud and 787 in 
Kota Marudu (YUM, 2009). 
 
4.3 Sample Selection 
 
This study selected seasonal borrowers who would provide a better understanding of and 
sufficient information about the impact of microcredit on borrowers. This study randomly 
selected borrowers in various microcredit loan schemes (economic purposes only), such as 
small businesses, services, plantations, animal husbandry, fishery and manufacturing.  
This study used a stratified sampling procedure where the population (borrowers) was divided 
into subgroups or strata (seasonal borrowers) (Zikmund, 2003). According to Mendenhall, 
Reinmuth and Bearer (1993), in calculating the satisfactory sample response, this study 
required 383, 383 and 367 borrowers from AIM, TEKUN and YUM, respectively (see 
Appendix 1). To overcome sample attrition, the sample size must be larger than the calculated 
sample responses required. Response rates, based on survey questionnaires in previous 
research, were normally between 60% and 90% (see Coleman, 1999; Husain, 1998. Taking an 
80% estimated response rate, the calculated working sample sizes for this study were 479 for 
AIM, 479 for TEKUN and 460 for YUM.  
 
4.4 Data Sources and Data Description 
 
This study used both primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected through a 
survey using a closed-ended questionnaire. Before the survey was administered, a pre-test of 
the questionnaire was conducted with 100 microcredit borrowers (50 AIM, 50 TEKUN)9 to 
evaluate the clarity, consistency and appropriateness of the survey questions. Based on the 
                                               
8 These are the latest data available for AIM. 
9 A pre-test questionnaire was not conducted on YUM borrowers since YUM is located in Sabah (Borneo 
Island), whereas the selected borrowers of AIM and TEKUN for the pre-test questionnaire were from Peninsular 
Malaysia. The high transportation costs and time constraints were the reasons a pre-test was not conducted with 
YUM borrowers. 
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comments and suggestions from the pre-test sample, the survey questions were amended. The 
survey field work started in May 2009 and continued to July 2009. 
The survey questionnaire was divided into four sections. The first and second sections were 
designed to gather information about the background and impact of microcredit loans on the 
borrower’s microenterprise and household, respectively. The third section focused on the 
impact of the microcredit loan on the borrower’s personal life. The final section captured 
information about the borrower’s demographics and socio-economic characteristics (see 
Appendix 2). 
Closed-ended questions were used to simplify the respondents’ answers and this saved a lot of 
time in the survey. Most participants took approximately 30 to 40 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire. They either filled in the questionnaire at the time of the survey or took the 
questionnaire home and the researcher collected the completed questionnaire the next day or 
the following week.  
This study employed different approaches in administering the survey to borrowers. For AIM 
and YUM borrowers, the surveys were conducted during the borrowers weekly meeting in the 
village. Every week, staff from the two institutions meet the borrowers at a community centre 
in the village to collect loan repayments. The meetings comprised 30 to 50 borrowers.  
For TEKUN borrowers, the survey was conducted either in the TEKUN office, when the 
borrowers came and paid their loans, or at the borrowers’ business premises. TEKUN 
management at selected branches provided a room to conduct the survey with the borrowers.  
Secondary data were obtained from the microfinance institutions. The data collected included 
the background of the institution, the total number of borrowers and staff, branches and the 
repayment records. The three microfinance institutions (AIM, TEKUN and YUM) were strict 
about giving out some information regarding the institution. As a result, this study could not 
access their financial statements in order to evaluate the financial performance of the 
institutions. 
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4.5 Microcredit Impact Study 
 
This study examined the impact of microcredit loans on borrowers by applying the Household 
Economic Portfolio (HEP) framework introduced by AIMS10 in 1996. The framework was 
used by Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) to assess the impact of microcredit loans in Peru. The 
framework suggested that the impact assessment study should be conducted at three levels: (i) 
microenterprise level; (ii) household level; and (iii) individual level. 
The HEP framework was chosen for this study because it can resolve the fungibility problem 
common in microcredit impact assessment studies. The fungibility of funds, as discussed in 
the literature review, occurs when the researcher cannot separate the use of microcredit funds 
from one particular microfinance institution from sources of additional loans (Khalily, 2004). 
This produces a problem when a microcredit impact study is conducted solely on the 
microenterprise, household or individual, because it causes over-estimation of the impact. In 
order to overcome the fungibility of funds problem, this impact study combines the impact of 
microcredit on the microenterprise, household and individual borrowers in one study. Since 
some microcredit borrowers in Malaysia also borrowed additional loans from other sources, 
the HEP framework is appropriate for microcredit impact assessment in this study.  
This study also used a “before” and “after” approach in examining the impact of microcredit 
loan on the borrowers. This is similar to Afrane’s (2002) study. This study did not use a 
control group (non-borrowers) since this research was conducted on a large scale. Since this 
study was of three different microfinance institutions (AIM, TEKUN and YUM), selecting 
non-borrowers who are in the similar location, economic, physical and social environment as 
the borrowers would be time consuming and costly. This approach avoided selection bias in 
the study and is supported by Hulme (2000) who stated that the type of approach taken by a 
researcher in a microcredit impact assessment study depended on the researcher’s budget, 
availability of human resources and research timing. 
In the “before” and “after” approach, borrowers were asked whether their businesses, as well 
as their household conditions and their personal life, had improved two years after they 
received a microcredit loan. In the survey questionnaire, the borrowers were given three 
choices: the microcredit loan had a positive (increase) impact; did not have any impact 
(remained the same); or had a negative impact (decrease) on the business performance, as 
well as the household and individual development, after they received the microcredit loans.  
                                               
10 AIMS stands for Assessing the Impact of Microenterprises Services  
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In order to operationalise the HEP framework, the study tested several hypotheses. The 
hypotheses are divided into three levels: (i) Microenterprise level; (ii) Household level; and 
(iii) Individual level. 
(i) Microenterprise Level: 
Hypothesis 1: Microcredit loans increase the microenterprise’s revenue. 
Hypothesis 2: Microcredit loans increase the microenterprise’s fixed assets. 
Hypothesis 3: Microcredit loans increase the microenterprise’s employment level. 
 
(ii) Household Level: 
Hypothesis 4: Microcredit loans increase the borrower’s household income. 
Hypothesis 5: Microcredit loans increase the borrower’s household assets. 
Hypothesis 6: Microcredit loans increase the borrower’s expenditure on children’s education. 
Hypothesis 7: Microcredit loans increase the borrower’s expenditure on food. 
 
(iii) Individual Level: 
Hypothesis 8: Microcredit loans increase the borrower’s control of business and family 
 decision making11.     
Hypothesis 9: Microcredit loans increase the borrower’s self-esteem. 
Hypothesis 10: Microcredit loans increase the borrower’s personal savings. 
Hypothesis 11: Microcredit loans has a buoyant effect on the borrower’s attitude towards the 
  future. 
Hypothesis 12: Microcredit loans increase the borrower’s effectiveness in coping with      
                         negative shocks. 
 
The microenterprise’s revenue is the gross monthly business revenue received by the 
borrower. The microenterprise’s fixed assets consist of land, premises, tools and equipment. 
As discussed in the literature review, the growth and profitability of the business that resulted 
from the microcredit loan is associated with an increase in the microenterprise’s fixed assets 
and employment levels (Islam, 2007; Hossain & Diaz, 1997). Before the borrowers received 
the microcredit loan, many rented or leased pieces of land to carry out their business activities 
because they could not afford to buy land. In addition, they had been operating in old, poor 
business premises with limited tools and equipment. It is hypothesised that, after they 
received the microcredit loan, they are now able to afford to buy a piece of land, improve the 
                                               
11 This hypothesis is tested only on women borrowers in AIM and YUM institutions. 
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existing premises or shift to better business premises, increase their tools and equipment and 
number of employees hired (Chen & Dunn, 1996). 
The household’s income is the gross monthly income received by the borrower’s household. 
The household’s fixed assets consist of the borrower’s house, household appliances, personal 
land, farm land and livestock. The indirect impact of microcredit loan on the household is 
hypothesised to improve the borrower’s housing conditions (bigger and more comfortable); 
increase the number of household appliances, such as televisions, refrigerators and stoves, to 
enhance their standard of living; and increase their personal land, the family’s farm and their 
livestock holdings (Nader, 2008; Coleman, 2006; Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001; Khandker et al., 
1998). 
The household’s increase in income is also hypothesised to increase the borrower’s spending 
on children’s education by sending the children to private tuition, buying extra books and 
purchasing a computer to allow the children to access technology and, at the same time, 
enhance their learning opportunities (Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001). The increase in the 
household’s income will also result in increased family spending on food (Khandker, 2005; 
Zaman, 1999). This implies they are spending more money to provide sustainable healthy 
diets for the family compared with before receiving the microcredit. 
In terms of the impact of microcredit on the borrower’s empowerment, five important 
variables were measured. The variables are: the borrower’s control over resources and 
income, their self- esteem, personal savings, attitude towards the future and their effectiveness 
in coping with negative shocks (Chen & Dunn, 1996). The control over resources and income 
is measured by examining the women borrowers’ influence in decision making about the 
resource allocations in their businesses and households (Chen & Dunn, 1996). In the survey, 
women borrowers were asked whether they made decisions on their own or whether others, 
such as spouse or business partner, helped them make the decisions.  
In relation to gender in Malay/Muslim society (AIM and TEKUN borrowers) and in the 
indigenous ethnic group in Sabah (YUM borrowers), men usually have greater control over 
decision-making. This study investigates whether women borrowers have a greater voice in 
business and family decisions after they received a microcredit loan. 
Since the microcredit loan is used to improve the business, outcomes from the business will 
help the borrower contribute to the household and the community (Woller & Parsons, 2002). 
Thus, it is hypothesised this will result in an increase in borrower’s self-esteem.  
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A microcredit loan also has an impact on the borrower’s personal savings (Hulme, 2000; 
Goetz & Gupta, 1996). It is hypothesised that any increase in income from the business after 
receiving the microcredit loan will increase the borrower’s personal savings. The stability and 
growth of the business are hypothesised to provide future security and confidence to the 
borrowers (Hashemi et al., 1996). It is also hypothesised that the growth will increase the 
borrower’s effectiveness in coping with the negative shocks such as an increase in goods and 
fuel prices, increased competition, having a serious illness or a business reversal (Chen & 
Dunn, 1996; Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001). 
4.6 Determinants of the Loan Repayment Problem 
4.6.1 Empirical framework 
 
According to the literature, the determinants of loan repayment default are a function of the 
borrower’s characteristics, business characteristics and loan characteristics. This study 
examines the determinants of loan defaults among the borrowers from TEKUN and YUM. 
However, the study could not access information on loan defaulters of the two institutions 
since the information is private and confidential. Therefore, as an alternative, in the survey 
questionnaire borrowers were asked whether they had missed loan repayments more than four 
times since they received the microcredit loans two years previously. This approach is similar 
to Sexton (1977), who classified borrowers who missed any repayments as bad borrowers. It 
is believed that the borrowers who faced problems in repaying their loans are more likely to 
default in the future. Thus, this study investigates the determinants of the loan repayment 
problem among the microfinance borrowers. 
 
4.6.2 Estimation techniques 
 
The determinants of the loan repayment problem model are analysed using logistic regression. 
The loan repayment model is as follows (Gujarati, 1995): 
 
Loan repayment problem = f (Borrower characteristics, business characteristics,  
                                                microcredit loan characteristics)               (4.1) 
 
   i j ij iji i ij -z - α+ β X +ε
1 1P =E Y =1 X = =
1+e 1+e 
        (4.2) 
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Where: 
iY  is equal to 1 if the borrower missed loan repayments more than four times in the 
two years since receiving the microcredit loan (having a repayment problem); 0 if the 
borrower never missed a loan repayment (not having a repayment problem); and 
iP  is the estimated probability of a loan repayment problem (high value of iP  implies 
a high loan repayment problem risk); 
i j ij ij
Z =α+ β X +ε  
 iZ  is the probability of a loan repayment problem,  
 α  and jβ  are an intercept term and parameter, respectively.  
Xij  are the vectors of borrower characteristics, business characteristics and 
microcredit loan characteristics; and 
 iε  is the error term.  
Equation 4.2 represents the cumulative logistic distribution function. If iP  is the probability 
of having loan repayment problem, then the probability of not having loan repayment problem 
or (1 - iP ) is given by: 
  
ii z
11-P =
1+e
                     (4.3) 
Therefore, the odds in favour of having a loan repayment problem or i
i
P
1+P
 can be written as: 
 
i
i
i
z
zi
-z
i
P 1+e= =e
1+P 1+e
                   (4.4) 
Taking the natural log, equation 4.4 becomes: 
 i j ij ij
i
PZ=ln =α+ β X +ε
1-P
 
 
 
                   (4.5) 
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Where iZ  is the natural logarithm of the odds ratio in favour of having a loan repayment 
problem. 
The model is a binary choice model so the use of the ordinary least squares estimation 
technique is inappropriate (Maddala, 1983). Thus, to obtain efficient parameter estimates, the 
maximum likelihood estimation technique is applied to the logistic regression. The likelihood 
function L for the model is given by (Maddala, 2001): 
  
i i
i i
Y =1 Y =0
L= P 1-P                               (4.6) 
From equation 4.5, the probability of having a loan repayment problem can be obtained by the 
following equation (Greene, 1997): 
  
i
i
z
i i ij z
eP =Prob Y =1 X =
1+e
                            (4.7) 
 
4.7 Explanatory variables 
 
Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable for the logit model takes a value of “1” for borrowers who missed a 
loan repayment more than four times in the two years since they received the microcredit loan 
and “0” if they never missed a loan payment. 
Independent variables 
 
The independent variables used in the logit model are: 
X1 = Gender (+): gender of borrower (1=male, 0=female) 
 
X2 = Marital status (+): marital status of the borrower (1=single, 0=married) 
 
X3 = Educational level (-): educational level of borrower (1= higher than 
primary school, 0= lower than primary school) 
 
X4 = Business type (+): type of business conducted by borrower 
(1=agricultural type of business, 0=small business) 
 
X5 = Extra income (-): existence of borrower’s extra income (1=yes, 
0=otherwise) 
 
X6 = Repayment period (+): loan term period (1=more than 1 year, 0=less 
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than 1 year) 
 
X7 = Repayment mode (+): weekly mode of payment paid by the borrower 
(1=yes, 0=otherwise) 
 
X8 = Extra loan (+): existence of borrower’s extra loan (1=yes, 0=no) 
 
X9 = Age: a vector of dummy variables indicating age group between 
borrowers [where X9(1)= 1 for 18-25 years old, 0=otherwise;  X9(2)=1 
for 26-35 years old, 0=otherwise; X9(3)= 1 for 36-45 years old, 
0=otherwise; X9(4)= 1 for 46-55 years old, 0=otherwise] 
 
X10 = Number of dependants: a vector of dummy variables indicating number 
of dependants in the borrower’s household [where X10(1)= 1 for 1-2 
people, 0=otherwise;  X10(2)=1 for 3-4 people, 0=otherwise; X10(3)= 1 
for more than 4 people, 0=otherwise] 
 
X11 = Business revenue: a vector of dummy business revenue indicating 
amount of revenue received by borrowers [where X11(1)= 1 for less 
RM1,000, 0= otherwise; X11(2)=1 for RM1,001-RM2,000, 0=otherwise; 
X11(3)= RM2,001-RM3,000, 0=otherwise;  X11(4)= RM3,001-RM4,000, 
0=otherwise; X11(5)= More RM4,000, 0=otherwise] 
 
X12 = Repayment amount: a vector of dummy repayment amount indicating 
amount of payment paid by weekly [where X12(1)= 1 for less than 
RM100, 0=otherwise; X12(2)=1 for RM101-RM150, 0= otherwise; 
X12(3)=1 for RM151-RM200, 0=otherwise; X12(4)= More RM201, 
0=otherwise]  
 
 
The positive and negative signs in parentheses in the above Table indicate the hypothesised 
relationship between the variable and the loan repayment problem. For example, Educational 
level (-) is hypothesised to negatively affect the loan repayment problem. The Education 
variable of the borrower indicates the literacy of the borrower. It is hypothesised that a 
borrower with a higher educational level would be negatively associated with a loan 
repayment problem (Chaudhary & Ishfaq, 2003; Bhatt & Tang, 2002). This is because the 
educated borrower is able to manage the business well, comprehend information, keep 
business records and conduct a cash flow analysis (Bhatt & Tang, 2002). 
Chaudhary and Ishfaq’s (2003) and Roslan and Abd Karim’s (2009) studies showed that a 
male borrower is more likely to have a loan repayment problem and become a defaulter. Thus, 
it is hypothesised that male borrowers are less responsible and disciplined in repaying loans12. 
The Marital Status dummy variable indicates whether the borrower is single or married. 
Marriage often refers to maturity and responsibility. It is hypothesised that a single borrower 
                                               
12 This hypothesis is tested only on TEKUN’s borrowers since the borrowers are male and female. 
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would be less responsible, since there is no spouse or children to financially support. Thus, 
they might not need to maintain a good relationship with the microfinance institution in order 
to improve their chances of getting future loans compared with married borrowers (Peng, Li, 
Lv & Zhou, 2009). Therefore, a single borrower is associated with a higher probability of 
having a loan repayment problem. 
The Type of Business dummy variable indicates the borrower’s type of business. It is either an 
agricultural or a small business activity. It is hypothesised that an agricultural business would 
be associated with a lower cycle of cash flow than a small business (Chaudhary & Ishfaq, 
2003). This might contribute to a higher probability of a loan repayment problem. It is also 
believed that the borrower who has Extra Income apart from the microcredit loan business 
will have a higher capability to repay their microcredit loan (Brehanu & Fufa, 2008). Thus, a 
borrower who has extra income is hypothesised to be negatively associated with having a loan 
repayment problem. 
The Repayment period dummy variable shows whether the borrower has more or less than a 
one year loan period. It is hypothesised that the borrower who has a longer loan period, which 
also means that they have a longer commitment to repay the loan, contributes to a positive 
relationship of having a loan repayment problem (Roslan & Abd Karim, 2009). The 
Repayment mode dummy variable shows whether the borrower pays weekly or monthly loan 
repayments. The mode of loan repayment imposed by the microfinance institution can 
contribute to loan repayment behaviour (Derban, Binner & Mullineux, 2005). For example, 
TEKUN allows borrowers to choose their mode of loan repayment. According to TEKUN 
management, many borrowers involved in retail business choose to repay their loan on a 
weekly basis and many always missed the loan repayment schedule. This study investigates 
whether a weekly loan repayment schedule contributes to the loan repayment problem, 
especially to the borrower who receives a lower business revenue cycle13.  
The Extra Loan dummy variable indicates the commitments of loan repayments faced by the 
borrower. The existence of an extra loan apart from the microcredit loan will influence the 
capability of borrowers to repay their microcredit loan. An extra loan means additional 
responsibility in meeting loan repayments apart from the microcredit loan. Based on the 
questionnaire survey, this study found that many Malaysian microfinance borrowers 
borrowed from more than one microfinance institution. This study examines whether the 
                                               
13 This hypothesis is tested only on TEKUN borrowers since TEKUN imposed weekly and monthly mode of 
loan repayment while YUM only imposed a weekly loan repayment. 
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borrowers confront their loan repayment when borrowing extra loans. It is hypothesised that 
the borrower who has an extra loan is positively associated with a loan repayment problem. 
The Age variable refers to the age of the borrower. The age of the borrower reflects the 
borrower’s ability to repay the loan. For example, older borrowers are believed to be more 
responsible than younger borrowers. Thus, an older borrower will be associated with a lower 
probability of loan repayment problems (Brehanu & Fufa, 2008). The number of Dependants 
in the borrowers’ household also influences the ability of borrowers to repay the microcredit 
loan. The more dependants they have, the more responsibility they have in terms of expenses 
for food, clothes, education, medical and other expenses. Thus, it is hypothesised that the 
borrower who has many dependants will have a higher probability of having a problem in 
paying back the microcredit loan (Brehanu & Fufa, 2008). 
Monthly business revenue (Business Revenue) reflects the borrower’s ability to repay the 
loan. It is hypothesised that a lower business revenue is associated with a higher probability of 
a loan repayment problem (Okorie, 1986). The Repayment Amount dummy variable indicates 
the amount of weekly loan repayments. YUM imposes weekly loan repayments to all kinds of 
the borrowers regardless of the borrowers’ cash flow cycle. As discussed by Derban et al. 
(2005), the unfavourable loan product’s characteristics for certain kind of borrowers such as 
the mode of loan repayment and the amount of loan instalment, can influence borrowers to 
not repay loans. Thus, this study examines whether the level of weekly loan repayments has 
any impact on the YUM and TEKUN borrowers’ ability to repay their loan. It is hypothesised 
that the borrower who makes high loan repayments is associated with a higher probability of a 
loan repayment problem.  
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     Chapter 5 
Research Results and Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the empirical findings of the impact of microcredit loans on the 
borrowers and the determinants of the loan repayment problem model. Section 5.2 presents 
the main characteristics of the borrowers and microcredit loans. Section 5.3 discusses the 
results of the impact of microcredit loans on the borrowers. The results of the determinants of 
loan repayment problem model are discussed in Section 5.4.  
 
5.2 Characteristics of Borrowers and Microcredit Loans 
 
This section discusses the characteristics of the borrowers sampled in each of the 
microfinance institutions, including their demographics and socio-economic characteristics. 
The discussion is based on the data collected from the questionnaires. 
There were 470 AIM, 350 TEKUN and 377 YUM respondents. However, some survey 
questionnaires were incomplete and the information given by the respondents was insufficient 
for further analysis. Only 391 questionnaire respondents from AIM (80% response rate), 204 
from TEKUN (43% response rate) and 268 from YUM (59% response rate) were useable in 
this study.  
Both AIM and YUM offers loans only to women whereas TEKUN offers loans to both 
women and men. Table 5.1 shows 52.5% of TEKUN borrowers were women and 47.5% were 
men. The AIM (44.5%) and TEKUN (44.1%) borrowers mostly belonged in the 36-45 years 
age group and the greatest proportion of YUM borrowers (33.6%) belonged in the 26-35 years 
age group. YUM borrowers were generally younger than AIM and TEKUN borrowers. 
The survey results showed 57.5%, 10.8% and 56.8% of the AIM, TEKUN and YUM 
borrowers, respectively, had less than primary school education. Primary school education in 
Malaysia is the basic education level received by a person. A person stays in primary school 
from age 7 to 12 years. However, not everyone has received the basic education, especially 
the older generation. Conversely, 42.5%, 89.2% and 43.2% of the AIM, TEKUN and YUM 
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borrowers had received education higher than primary school level. This shows that TEKUN 
borrowers were more educated than AIM and YUM borrowers.  
All AIM (100%) and TEKUN (100%) borrowers were Malay, whereas most YUM borrowers 
(46.3%) belonged to the Kadazan group, the largest ethnic group in Sabah. Most borrowers 
from the three microfinance institutions were married (AIM = 93.1%, TEKUN=91.7%, 
YUM= 87.7%) at the time of the survey. Borrowers had quite a number of children. For 
instance, 39.6% of AIM borrowers had 3-4 children and 40.2% had more than four children. 
At least 33.3% of the TEKUN borrowers had 3-4 children and 31.4% had more than four 
children. Most YUM borrowers had more than four children (51.5%) (see Table 5.1). 
In terms of the numbers of children in school, most borrowers had 1-3 children still in school 
(AIM=74.9%, TEKUN=62.8%, YUM=63.4%) at the time of the survey. In terms of the 
number of children studying in college or in university level, only 23.8%, 19.1% and 21.6% 
of AIM, TEKUN and YUM borrowers, respectively, had at least 1-2 children studying at 
college or university. For AIM, TEKUN and YUM, 73.1%, 79.4% and 76.1% of borrowers, 
respectively, did not have any children studying in college or university (see Table 5.1). The 
number of borrowers who did not have children studying in colleges or university was much 
higher. This showed that many Malaysian microfinance borrowers’ children did not receive 
higher education. 
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Table 5.1: Profiles of the respondents from the three microfinance institutions AIM,TEKUN 
and YUM 
 AIM TEKUN YUM 
N1 =391  N2 = 204 N3 =268 
Count 
( N1) 
% of  
N1 
Count 
( N2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(N3) 
% of  
N3 
Demographic       
Gender 
Female 391 100.0 107 52.5 268 100.0 
Male - - 97 47.5 - - 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Age (in years) 
18-25  7 1.8 9 4.4 85 31.7 
26-35  91 23.3 39 19.1 90 33.6 
36-45  174 44.5 90 44.1 73 27.2 
46-55  119 30.4 66 32.3 20 7.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Educational Level 
Lower than Primary school 225 57.5 22 10.8 156 56.8 
Higher than Primary school 166 42.5 182 89.2 116 43.2 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Ethnic Group 
Malay 391 100.0 204 100.0 57 21.3 
Chinese       
Indian       
Kadazan     124 46.3 
Bajau     40 14.9 
Dusun     33 12.3 
Rungus     14 5.2 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Marital Status 
Single/Never married 5 1.3 9 4.4 17 6.3 
Married 364 93.1 187 91.7 235 87.7 
Divorced/Separated 22 5.6 8 3.9 16 6.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Number of Children       
0 8 2.0 21 10.3 20 7.5 
1-2 71 18.1 51 25.0 48 17.9 
3-4 155 39.6 68 33.3 62 23.1 
More than 4 157 40.2 64 31.4 138 51.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Number of Children in 
School 
      
0 35 9.0 52 25.5 58 21.6 
1-3 293 74.9 128 62.8 170 63.4 
More than 3 63 16.1 24 11.8 40 14.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Number of Children in 
College/University 
      
0 286 73.1 162 79.4 204 76.1 
1-2 93 23.8 39 19.1 58 21.6 
More than 2 12 3.1 3 1.5 6 2.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Household Members       
3-4 90 23.0 73 35.8 58 21.6 
5-6 151 38.6 71 34.8 95 35.4 
More than 6 150 38.4 60 29.4 115 42.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Table 5.1: Profiles of the respondents from the three microfinance institutions  
AIM,TEKUN and YUM (cont.) 
 
 AIM TEKUN YUM 
 N1 =391  N2 = 204 N3 =268 
 Count 
( N1) 
% of  
N1 
Count 
( N2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(N3) 
% of  
N3 
Number of Dependants in 
Household 
      
1-2 66 16.8 83 40.7 61 22.8 
3-4 166 42.4 72 35.3 110 41.0 
More than 4 159 40.7 49 24.0 97 36.2 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Number of Income Earners 
in Household 
      
1-2 352 90.0 175 85.8 224 83.5 
3-4 34 8.7 28 13.8 42 15.7 
More than 4 5 1.3 1 0.5 2 0.7 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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The survey results also showed that all borrowers had 3-6 members living in their household. 
The borrowers also had 1-4 members who were dependant or not contributing any income to 
the household (see Table 5.1). The survey results showed that most borrowers had only one or 
two income earners in their household (AIM=90.0%, TEKUN=85.8% and YUM=83.5%). 
This showed that the AIM, TEKUN and YUM borrowers needed to financially support quite 
a number of members in the family. 
This study only surveyed seasonal borrowers and not first time borrowers who had similar 
borrowing patterns in terms of the number of times borrowed and the amount of money 
borrowed (see Table 5.2). This borrowing pattern is important, since the number of times 
borrowed and the amount of money borrowed influenced the magnitude of the microcredit 
loan impact on borrowers. From the survey results, over half of the AIM (62.1%), TEKUN 
(63.2%) and YUM (63.4%) borrowers had borrowed a microcredit loan four times. 
Meanwhile, the highest proportion of AIM (30.4%), TEKUN (36.8%) and YUM (36.6%) 
borrowers borrowed between RM 5,001 and RM 10,000. 
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Table 5.2: Characteristics of microenterprises and microcredit loans from the three   
microfinance institutions AIM, TEKUN and YUM 
 AIM TEKUN YUM 
 N1 =391  N2 = 204 N3 =268 
 Count 
( N1 ) 
% of  
N1 
Count 
( N2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(N3) 
% of  
N3 
Times of Borrowing       
Twice 14 3.6 5 2.5 12 4.5 
3 Times 96 24.5 50 24.5 56 20.9 
4 Times 243 62.1 129 63.2 170 63.4 
More than 4 Times 38 9.7 20 9.8 30 11.2 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Amount of Money Borrowed       
Less than RM 5,000 61 15.6 21 10.3 45 16.8 
RM5,001-RM10,000 119 30.4 75 36.8 98 36.6 
RM10,001-RM15,000 96 24.6 44 21.6 57 21.3 
RM15,000-RM20,000 42 10.7 27 13.2 26 9.7 
RM20,000-RM25,000 23 5.9 8 3.9 5 1.9 
More than RM25,000 50 12.8 29 14.2 37 13.8 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Type of Business       
Small Business 258 65.9 119 58.3 169 63.1 
Agricultural Business 133 34.1 85 41.7 99 36.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Owner of the Business       
Borrower  164 41.9 117 
[73(M)] 
[44(W)] 
57.4 
[35.8] 
[21.6] 
115 42.9 
 
Borrower’s Spouse 49 12.5 9(W) 4.4 24 9.0 
Business Partner 3 0.8 3 1.5 5 1.9 
Borrower and Spouse 165 42.2 69 33.8 122 45.5 
Borrower and Business 
Partner 
8 2.0 5 2.5 1 0.4 
Borrower, Spouse and 
Business Partner 
2 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.4 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Have Other Sources of 
Credit? 
      
Yes 80 20.5 81 39.7 55 20.5 
No 311 79.5 123 60.3 213 79.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Other Sources of Credit       
AIM - - 14 17.3 12 21.8 
TEKUN 19 23.7 - - 5 9.0 
YUM - - - - - - 
Commercial Banks 5 6.3 12 14.8 - - 
Pawnshops 18 22.5 8 9.9 20 36.5 
Friends and Relatives 38 47.5 47 58.0 18 32.7 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Amount of Additional Credit       
Less than RM 5,000 38 47.5 35 43.3 35 63.6 
RM5,001-RM10,000 23 28.7 19 23.4 15 27.3 
RM10,001-RM15,000 11 13.7 13 16.0 2 3.6 
RM15,000-RM20,000 5 6.3 5 6.2 1 1.8 
RM20,000-RM25,000 2 2.5 2 2.5 2 3.6 
More than RM25,000 1 1.3 7 8.6 - - 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Table 5.2: Characteristics of microenterprise and microcredit loans from the three 
microfinance institutions AIM, TEKUN and YUM (cont.) 
 
 AIM TEKUN YUM 
 N1 =391  N2 = 204 N3 =268 
 Count 
( N1 ) 
% of  
N1 
Count 
( N2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(N3) 
% of  
N3 
 
Monthly Business Revenue 
      
Less than RM1,000 78 19.9 39 19.1 156 58.2 
RM1,001-RM2,000 139 35.5 61 29.9 81 30.2 
RM2,001-RM3,000 75 19.2 59 28.9 19 7.1 
RM 3,000-RM4,000 49 12.5 35 17.2 12 4.5 
More than RM4,000 50 12.8 10 4.9 - - 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Monthly Household Income       
Less than RM 1,000 61 15.6 31 15.2 140 52.2 
RM1,001-RM2,000 155 39.6 63 30.9 94 35.1 
RM2,001-RM3,000 86 22.0 41 20.1 22 8.2 
RM 3,000-RM4,000 44 11.3 31 15.2 7 2.6 
More than RM4,000 45 11.5 38 18.6 5 1.8 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Subsidiary Income Apart 
From  Microcredit Based 
Business 
      
Yes 176 45.0 124 60.8 190 70.9 
No 215 55.0 80 39.2 78 29.1 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Repayment Mode       
Weekly 391 100.0 86 42.2 268 100.0 
Monthly - - 118 57.8 - - 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Repayment Period       
Less than 1 year 253 64.7 65 31.9 137 51.1 
More than 1 year 138 35.3 139 68.1 131 48.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Weekly Repayment Amount       
Less than 100 98 25.1 15 7.4 20 7.5 
101-150 124 31.7 43 21.1 160 59.7 
151-200 57 14.6 68 33.3 41 15.3 
More than 201 112 28.6 78 38.2 47 17.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Missed Payment More Than 
4 times 
      
Yes 10 2.6 90 44.1 112 41.8 
No 381 97.4 114 55.9 156 58.2 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Over half of the borrowers from the three microfinance institutions were involved in small 
business activities (65.9% =AIM, 58.3%=TEKUN, 63.1%=YUM) rather than agricultural 
activity. In terms of business ownership, 41.9% the AIM women respondents owned their 
businesses and 42.2% of them shared the business with their spouse. A similar pattern was 
reported for YUM borrowers (see Table 5.2). With regard to TEKUN borrowers, 57.4% of the 
respondents, comprising 35.8% male borrowers and 21.6% women borrowers, owned their 
business and 33.8% operated with their spouse. The pattern of women borrowers sharing their 
business with their spouse showed that there were some women borrowers who played a role 
in contributing capital to their family business through microcredit loans. 
The proportion of spouses who owned and operated a business (12.5%-AIM, 4.4%-TEKUN, 
9.0%-YUM) revealed that some women borrowers obtained microcredit loans for their 
husbands’ businesses. Table 5.2 also shows that 20.5%, 39.7% and 20.5% of the AIM, 
TEKUN and YUM respondents, respectively, requested an additional loan apart from the 
microcredit loan. They borrowed from other microfinance institutions, commercial banks, 
pawnshops or friends and relatives. The survey results showed that 23.7% of AIM borrowers 
borrowed an additional loan from TEKUN, whereas 17.3% of TEKUN borrowers borrowed 
from AIM. YUM borrowers also obtained additional microcredit loans from AIM (21.8%) 
and TEKUN (9.0%). In addition, a large number of AIM (47.5%) and TEKUN (58.0%) 
borrowers had also borrowed additional funds from friends and relatives. A large number of 
YUM borrowers received additional funds through pawning (36.5%). This showed that the 
microcredit loans were not sufficient and the borrowers needed to find other sources of capital 
to finance their businesses. In terms of the amount of additional loans borrowed, the greatest 
proportion of AIM (47.5%) TEKUN (43.3%) and YUM (63.6%) borrowers borrowed less 
than RM5,000. However, the additional funds borrowed were for smaller amounts than the 
microcredit loans. 
The borrowers’ monthly business revenue was divided into four levels (see Table 5.2). Table 
5.2 shows that 35.5% of the AIM borrowers received RM1,001 to RM2,000 monthly business 
revenue, whereas 12.8% received over RM4,000 business revenue per month. In terms of the 
TEKUN borrowers, 29.9% received between RM1,001 to RM2,000 and 28.9% received 
between RM2,001 to RM3,000 business revenue per month. Similarly, over half of YUM 
borrowers (58.2%) received less than RM1,000 business revenue per month. Overall, TEKUN 
borrowers received a higher monthly business revenue than AIM and YUM borrowers. The 
survey also showed that the AIM and TEKUN borrowers received higher monthly business 
revenue than YUM borrowers. 
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Over half of the YUM borrowers still received less than RM1,000 monthly business revenue 
after they had received the microcredit loan. For monthly household income, the survey 
results showed that greatest proportion of AIM borrowers (39.6%) received between 
RM1,001 to RM2,000 per month and 11.5% received over RM4,000 per month. For TEKUN 
borrowers, 30.9% received between RM1,001 and RM2,000 per month and 18.6% received 
over RM4,000 per month. Most YUM borrowers (52.2%) received less than RM1,000 per 
month. For monthly household income, AIM and TEKUN borrowers received similar 
incomes. Like the borrowers’ monthly business revenue, AIM and TEKUN borrowers 
recorded higher monthly household income than YUM borrowers. Over half of the YUM 
borrowers received less than RM1,000 monthly household income. The poverty line income 
for Sabah14 is RM888, so there is the possibility that the YUM borrowers still lived in or 
under the Malaysia’s national poverty line even after receiving the microcredit loans. 
Borrowers from the three microfinance institutions also had subsidiary income apart from the 
microcredit-based business. The survey results showed that 45.0%, 60.8% and 70.9% of AIM, 
TEKUN and YUM borrowers, respectively, had other sources of income besides the income 
from the microcredit-based business. All borrowers from AIM and YUM made loan 
repayments weekly, since these institutions imposed weekly loan repayments for all types of 
microcredit loans. In contrast, TEKUN imposed weekly and monthly loan repayments; 42.2% 
of the borrowers paid on a weekly basis and the rest (57.8%) paid monthly. 
Table 5.2 shows that over half of the AIM borrowers (64.7%) had a less than one year and 
35.3% had a more than a one year repayment period. TEKUN had 31.9% and 68.1% of 
borrowers with less and more than one year repayment periods, respectively. With YUM 
borrowers, 51.1% had less than a one year and 48.9% had more than a one-year repayment 
period. The repayment amount was divided into four levels with a minimum of less than 
RM100 and a maximum of over RM201 (see Table 5.2). Overall, the greatest proportion of 
AIM (31.7%) and YUM (59.7%) borrowers paid RM101-150 loan repayments weekly. 
However, the greatest proportion of TEKUN borrowers (33.3%) paid RM151-200 loan 
repayments per week. This is because TEKUN provides larger loans than AIM and YUM. 
Finally, with missed repayments, only 2.6% of the AIM borrowers had missed their loan 
repayments more than four times in the last two years since they had received the microcredit 
loan. In contrast to the AIM borrowers, 44.1% and 41.8% of the TEKUN and YUM 
borrowers, respectively, had missed their loan repayments more than four times in the last two 
years since they received the microcredit loan. 
                                               
14 The YUM microfinance institution is located in Sabah. 
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Overall, AIM, TEKUN and YUM borrowers shared very similar demographic profiles. 
However, TEKUN borrowers were more educated and YUM borrowers were slightly 
younger. In terms of socio-economic profile, TEKUN borrowers received higher monthly 
business revenue and household income than AIM and YUM borrowers. In contrast, AIM and 
TEKUN borrowers received higher monthly business revenue and household income than 
YUM borrowers.  
 
5.3 The Impact of Microcredit Loans on the Borrowers   
5.3.1 Microcredit impact on the microenterprise 
 
This section begins with a discussion of the impact of microcredit loans on the 
microenterprises of the borrowers from the three microfinance institutions. The 2  test was 
used to test whether there were any significant differences between those who had an increase 
in microenterprise revenue, fixed assets and the number they employed compared with those 
who did not show any changes after they had received the microcredit loans.  
Table 5.3 presents the results of the impact of microcredit loans on the AIM, TEKUN and 
YUM borrowers’ microenterprises. Two years after receiving the microcredit loan, 74.0% of 
the AIM borrowers had increased their business revenue, but 24.0% earned a similar level of 
revenue. The 2  test showed that the proportion of borrowers who experienced increased 
business revenue was significantly higher than those who did not have any change; hence we 
can concluded that microcredit loans increased the microenterprise’s revenue for AIM 
borrowers. This result is similar to studies on microfinance borrowers in Bangladesh by 
Khandker (1998b), South Africa and Ghana by Afrane (2002) and in Peru by Dunn and 
Arbuckle (2001), who also found that microcredit loans increased the borrowers’ 
microenterprise revenue. 
In terms of a microenterprise’s fixed assets, this study found that microcredit loans produced a 
significant increase only in the borrower’s tools and equipment, since the proportion of 
borrowers who had increased their microenterprise tools and equipment (61.9%) was 
significantly higher than those who had no change (38.1%).  
In contrast, the proportion of borrowers who had not increased their land holdings (79.3%) 
was significantly higher than those who had an increase (20.7%). The borrowers whose 
business premises were in a similar condition to the state before they received the microcredit 
loans (82.4%) were significantly more than those who had increased or improved their 
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business premises (17.1%). These findings showed that even with a significant increase in the 
microenterprise’s revenue, there was only a marginal positive impact on the microenterprise’s 
fixed assets. This result contradicts the findings of Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) and Khandker 
(1998b) who found microcredit loans significantly increased the microenterprise’s fixed 
assets.  
The proportion of borrowers who had generated new employment in the microenterprise was 
lower (39.9%) than the borrowers who did not generate any new employment (59.5%) after 
they received the microcredit loans. An increase in employment is an indication that the 
business has been growing and required more workers (Hossain & Diaz, 1997). This study 
showed that with the significant increase in microenterprise’s revenue the number of workers 
in the microenterprise had increased only marginally.  
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Table 5.3:   Microcredit loans’ impact on AIM, TEKUN and YUM borrowers’ 
microenterprises  
 AIM TEKUN YUM 
N1=391 N2=204 N3=268 
% of % of % of 
 N1 N2 N3 
Revenue Trends    
     Increase     74.0**     61.3**     70.1** 
     Remain the same 24.0 37.7 23.1 
     Decrease 2.0 1.0 6.7 
    
Fixed Asset: Tools and  
                      Equipment 
   
     Increase     61.9** 52.9 45.9 
     Remain the same 38.1 47.1 51.9 
     Decrease - - 2.2 
    
Fixed Asset: Land    
     Increase     20.7**     10.3**      9.0** 
     Remain the same 79.3 89.7 90.3 
     Decrease - - 0.7 
    
Fixed Asset: Premises    
     Increase     17.1**    10.3**       8.2** 
     Remain the same 82.4 85.3 91.4 
     Decrease 0.5 4.4 0.4 
    
Employment    
     Increase     39.9**     38.2**     16.8** 
     Remain the same 59.5 60.8 80.2 
     Decrease 0.5 1.0 3.0 
Note: **, represent 5% significance level. 
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Table 5.3 shows 61.3% of TEKUN’s borrowers had significantly increased their business 
revenue compared with 37.7% of the borrowers who recorded no change in revenue from 
before they received the microcredit loans. Thus, microcredit loans had a positive impact on 
the microenterprise’s revenue for TEKUN’s borrowers.  
For TEKUN borrowers microenterprise’s fixed assets, Table 5.3 shows no significant 
difference between the borrowers’ microenterprises that had increased their tools and 
equipment and those who reported no change. This implies that there were few increases in 
the microenterprise’s tools and equipment after borrowers received microcredit loans. After 
receiving the loans, the proportion of borrowers who had no change in their microenterprises’ 
land holdings (89.7%) was significantly higher than proportion that had an increase in land 
holdings (10.3%). The results also showed that for the microenterprise’s premises only 10.3% 
of the borrowers had improved or moved to better business premises, whereas 85.3% operated 
in the same business premises as before they received the microcredit loan. The findings were 
similar for the AIM borrowers (except for tools and equipment), in that there was only a 
marginal increase in TEKUN microenterprise’s fixed assets after receiving the microcredit 
loans.  
The results in the Table 5.3 show that the proportion of TEKUN borrower’s microenterprises 
that reported no changes in their number of employees (60.8%) was significantly higher than 
microenterprises that had more employees (38.2%) after they received the microcredit loans. 
This showed that the microcredit loans had only a marginally positive impact on the 
microenterprise’s level of employment for TEKUN borrowers.  
Table 5.3 also shows the microcredit loans impact on YUM borrowers’ microenterprises. The 
results showed that 70.1% of the borrowers recorded an increase in their microenterprise’s 
revenue after they received the microcredit loans. This increase was significantly higher than 
for the borrowers who had no increase in their business revenue (23.1%). Thus, microcredit 
loans helped YUM borrowers increase their microenterprise’s revenue. 
The results also showed that there was no significant difference between borrowers who had 
an increase in tools and equipment and those who reported no change. This implied there 
were not many increases in the microenterprise’s tools and equipment after the borrowers 
received the microcredit loan. As with the TEKUN borrowers, the results showed that 
microcredit loans had only a marginal positive impact on YUM borrowers’ microenterprise’s 
fixed assets. Table 5.3 shows that the proportion of YUM’s borrowers who had no change in 
their microenterprise’ land holdings (90.3%) was significantly higher than the proportion of 
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borrowers who had an increase in their land holdings (9.0%). A similar pattern also showed in 
the microenterprises’ premises; where only 8.2% of the borrowers had improved or moved to 
a better business premises, whereas 91.4% of them still operated in the same condition 
premises as before they received the microcredit loan. The results showed a marginal positive 
impact for YUM microenterprises’ fixed assets but it was much smaller than AIM and 
TEKUN microenterprises. Microcredit loans also did not have a huge impact on the 
microenterprise’s employment level. After the borrowers received microcredit loans, only 
16.8% generated new employment and 80.2% did not.  
 
 
5.3.2 Summary of the microcredit impact on the microenterprise 
 
As hypothesised, after borrowers received microcredit loans there should be an increase in 
their microenterprise’s profitability and growth. Among the indicators of the 
microenterprise’s growth are increases in the microenterprise’s business revenue and fixed 
assets such as land holdings, tools and equipment, improved business premises’ condition and 
numbers of workers employed (Islam, 2007; Hossain & Diaz 1997).   
Based on the results of the impact of microcredit loans on the microenterprise, microcredit 
loans had a significant positive impact only on the AIM, TEKUN and YUM borrowers’ 
microenterprises’ business revenue. However, microcredit loans did not have a significant 
positive impact on the borrowers’ microenterprises’ fixed assets and the level of employment 
generated. The numbers of borrowers’ microenterprises that had no change in their land 
holdings, tools and equipment, improved business premises and number of workers was larger 
than the borrowers’ microenterprises that showed such increases. 
This study surveyed seasonal borrowers who had borrowed microcredit loans more than 
twice. They also received additional loans from other funding sources. However, the 
microcredit loans and extra loans they received did not make a positive impact on the growth 
of the microenterprise. 
Furthermore, among the AIM, TEKUN and YUM borrowers, only AIM borrowers’ 
microenterprises showed a significant positive impact on their microenterprises’ tools and 
equipment. TEKUN and YUM borrowers, in contrast, did not show a significant positive 
impact on any of their microenterprises’ fixed assets and level of employment. Based on the 
borrowers’ monthly business revenue after they received the microcredit loans, TEKUN 
borrowers received a higher monthly business revenue than AIM and YUM borrowers (see 
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Table 5.2). However, there was still no significant positive impact on the growth of TEKUN 
borrowers’ microenterprises in terms of fixed asset accumulation or level of employment. 
Overall, microcredit loans have a greater impact on AIM borrowers’ microenterprises 
(showed significant increases in their tools and equipment) than TEKUN and YUM borrowers 
(showed a marginal increased in all fixed assets). In addition, microcredit loans had less 
impact on YUM borrowers’ microenterprises than AIM and TEKUN borrowers. 
The reasons there were no significant positive impacts on the borrowers’ microenterprises 
growth could be because the increases in revenue were still insufficient or there was a 
possibility of the mis-use of loans among the borrowers. For example, most YUM borrowers 
(see Table 5.2) received a monthly business revenue of less than RM1,000 after they received 
the microcredit loan. Thus, the business revenue received might be insufficient for them to 
accumulate more business assets. 
In addition, during the fieldwork, the staff from the three microfinance institutions mentioned 
that not all borrowers made full use of the money borrowed. According to the microfinance 
institutions’ staff, there were many cases when the staff visited the borrowers’ business 
premises two weeks after the borrowers received the microcredit loan and found there was no 
increase in the microenterprises’ stock or new equipment as they had stated in the business 
proposal. Even though the microfinance institutions requested receipts of payment as a proof 
that the money had been spent according to their business proposal, the fact was that a 
borrower can get a receipt from any shop and they can even buy the receipts.  
Based on observations of the borrowers during the fieldwork, this study also found that many 
microfinance borrowers in Malaysia lacked the knowledge to manage their business income. 
Many did not know how to allocate the business income received between their business 
investment and personal consumption. Many borrowers allocated a large portion of their 
income for personal consumption and only a little to their businesses. Many used the 
businesses to financially support their daily living expenses and made little effort to grow 
their businesses. This is the reason why, even with a significant increase in the borrower’s 
microenterprise revenue, there was no significant impact on the microenterprises’ overall 
fixed assets or business growth. 
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5.3.3 Microcredit loans’ impact on the household 
 
This section discusses the impact of microcredit loans on the borrower’s household. The 
variables used for measuring the impact were: household income, fixed assets (house, 
household appliances, personal land, farm land and livestock), expenditure on children’s 
education and food. The 2  test was used to test whether the proportion of those who had an 
increase in the household’s income, fixed assets, children’s education and food expenditure 
was significantly different from those who reported no change (remained the same). 
Table 5.4 shows that microcredit loans had a positive impact on the AIM borrower’s 
household income; 89.8% reported an increase in the household’s income after they received 
the microcredit loans compared with only 9.5% who received a similar amount of income as 
before. Thus, a microcredit loan increased a borrower’s household income. The findings 
support Mahjaben (2008) and Nader (2008) who showed that microcredit loans increased 
household income on the microfinance borrowers in Bangladesh and Egypt, respectively15.  
In terms of the household’s fixed assets, compared with other fixed assets, only household 
appliances showed a significant increase. The survey results showed 67.0% of borrowers 
reported a significant increase in their household appliances after they received the 
microcredit loans whereas only 30.2% showed no change.  
The results in Table 5.4 showed there was no significant difference between the proportion of 
borrowers who reported their houses either increased or improved in size and value after they 
received the microcredit loans and borrowers who reported no change in the condition of their 
houses from before they received the microcredit loans. This implied there were no significant 
increases in borrower’s house after the borrower received a microcredit loan. Microcredit 
loans contributed only marginally to an increase in a household’s land holdings. Only 14.6% 
of the borrowers showed an increase in their household’s land holdings compared with 85.4% 
that showed no change. However, most households (94.9%) reported no change and only 
5.1% of borrowers showed an increase in their farmland holdings after they received the 
microcredit loans. Most borrowers (83.4%) also reported no change in livestock holdings and 
only 16.6% reported an increase after they received the microcredit loan. The findings showed 
that even with an increase in household income, there was only a marginal positive impact 
reported in AIM borrower’s household fixed assets.  
                                               
15  Even though this study showed similar findings to Mahjaben (2008) and Nader (2008), both studies, however, 
were conducted on unsubsidised microfinance institutions in Bangladesh and Egypt, respectively, and the 
borrowers’ characteristics were different from the Malaysian microfinance institutions. 
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Table 5.4 Microcredit loans’ impact on AIM, TEKUN and YUM borrowers’     
                 households 
 AIM TEKUN YUM 
N1=391 N2=204 N3=268 
% of % of % of 
 N1 N2 N3 
Household income trends    
     Increase   89.8**     78.4**     55.6** 
     Remain the same 9.5 20.6 37.3 
     Decrease 0.8 1.0 7.1 
    
Fixed Asset: Household’s appliances    
     Increase     67.0** 46.5   41.8* 
     Remain the same 30.2 52.0 56.0 
     Decrease 2.8 1.5 2.2 
    
Fixed Asset: House    
     Increase 48.6     22.5**     19.4** 
     Remain the same 51.4 73.5 77.2 
     Decrease - 4.0 3.4 
      
Fixed Asset: Household’s land    
     Increase     14.6**   6.9**    7.8** 
     Remain the same 85.4 93.1 91.4 
     Decrease -  0.7 
    
Fixed Assets: Household’s farm    
     Increase     5.1**   1.5**      19.0** 
     Remain the same 94.9 98.5 80.2 
     Decrease - - 0.7 
    
Fixed Assets: Household’s livestock    
     Increase     16.6**    3.9**    7.1** 
     Remain the same 83.4 96.1 88.8 
     Decrease - - 4.1 
    
Children’s Education Expenditure    
     Increase      68.0**     40.2**     33.2** 
     Remain the same 28.4 59.8 60.8 
     Decrease 3.6 - 6.0 
    
Household’s Food Expenditure    
     Increase     71.4**     40.2**     34.0** 
     Remain the same 27.6 59.3 64.2 
     Decrease 1.0 0.5 1.9 
Note: *, **, represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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In contrast, microcredit loans had a positive impact on the borrowers’ children’s education 
and family expenditure on food. The proportion (68.0%) showing an increase in the 
borrowers’ expenditure on their children’s education after they received the microcredit loans 
was significantly higher than those who reported no change (28.4%). A similar pattern was 
also seen in the family’s food expenditure where 71.4% showed a significant increase in their 
family’s food expenditure after they received the microcredit loans compared with those who 
reported no change (27.6%).  
Table 5.4 also shows the impact of microcredit loans on TEKUN borrowers’ households. The 
results show that microcredit loans had a positive impact, i.e. increased the borrowers’ 
household income. The data show that 78.4% of borrowers reported a significant increase in 
their household income after they received the microcredit loans and only 20.6% reported no 
change. Thus, microcredit loans increased the borrowers’ household income. 
This study found there was no significant difference between the proportion of borrowers who 
reported an increase in their household appliances and those borrowers who reported no 
change. Microcredit loans also had only a marginal positive impact on TEKUN borrowers’ 
household fixed assets. For example, only 22.5% of borrowers showed an increase in their 
house size or value compared with 73.5% who still lived in similar housing conditions. 
Almost all borrowers reported no change in land (93.1%), farmland (98.5%) or livestock 
(96.1%), after they received the microcredit loan.  
The results also showed that microcredit loans had only a marginal positive impact on 
TEKUN borrowers’ households’ children’s education or food expenditure. Over half of the 
borrowers reported no change (59.8%) and only 40.2% showed an increase in their children’s 
educational expenditure after receiving the microcredit loan. The results also showed 59.3% 
reported no change in family food expenditure compared with 40.2% who reported increased 
family food expenditure after receiving the microcredit loan.   
Table 5.4 also shows the impact of microcredit loans on YUM borrowers’ households. 
Microcredit loans had a positive impact on household income. The results showed 55.6% of 
the borrowers reported an increase in their household income and 37.3% reported a similar 
income after they received the microcredit loans.  
For all household fixed assets, the proportion of borrowers’ households that reported no 
change in their fixed assets (household appliances: 56.0%; house: 77.2%; land: 91.4%; farm 
land: 80.2% and livestock: 88.8%) after they received a microcredit loan was significantly 
higher than those who reported an increase (household’s appliances: 41.8%; house: 19.4%; 
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land: 7.8%; farm land: 19.0% and livestock: 7.1%) (see Table 5.4). This study found that 
microcredit loans have only a marginally positive impact on the borrowers’ household fixed 
assets.  
Regarding borrowers’ expenditure on their children’s education and family food, only 33.2% 
of borrowers reported an increase in their children’s educational expenditure compared with 
60.8% who reported no change after they received the microcredit loans. More than half 
(64.2%) the borrowers reported spending a similar amount of money on their family’s food 
after they received the microcredit loan compared with 34.0% who reported an increase in 
their food expenditure. The results also showed that microcredit loans have only a marginally 
positive impact on YUM borrowers’ children’s educational expenditure or their family’s food 
spending.  
 
5.3.4 Summary of the microcredit loans impact on the households 
 
The findings of the impact of microcredit loans on the borrowers’ households show that 
microcredit loans did not significantly impact their households. The microcredit loans made a 
significant positive impact only on the households’ monthly income for all kinds of borrowers 
(AIM, TEKUN and YUM). The microcredit loans also gave only a marginally positive impact 
on all borrowers’ household fixed assets, except for AIM borrowers, who had a significant 
positive impact on their households’ appliances.  
As hypothesised, after receiving the microcredit loans there should be changes in the 
borrowers’ life conditions such as improvements in their house and an increase in their 
household appliances, land, farm or livestock. The life of the borrower was supposed improve 
after receiving a microcredit loan. However, few changes took place among Malaysian 
microfinance borrowers’ household fixed assets even after receiving a microcredit loan 
several times. 
One possible explanation for this situation was insufficient income received by the borrowers. 
This situation might apply to YUM borrowers whereby most borrowers still earned less 
income than AIM and TEKUN borrowers after they received the microcredit loans (see Table 
5.2). Another possible explanation is that this study perceived Malaysian microfinance 
borrowers in Malaysia are among the non-poor. Moreover, Nawai and Bashir (2010) stated 
that institutions like AIM reached only 4% of the total poor in Malaysia. During the 
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fieldwork, this study also found that many AIM, TEKUN16 and YUM borrowers were not 
really poor and lived in comfortable houses which they already had before they received the 
microcredit loan. 
Furthermore, microfinance institutions’ management staff also admitted that it is difficult to 
offer microcredit loans to the poorest because they are not interested in conducting a business. 
The poor also do not have the ability, in terms of knowledge and resources, to conduct any 
businesses, either retail or agricultural. Hence, many microcredit loans reach non-poor 
borrowers. This could be the reason why there was only a marginal impact on borrowers’ 
households after they received the microcredit loans since they could have owned those assets 
before they received the loan. 
In terms of the microcredit’s impact on the borrowers’ children’s education and family food 
expenditure, only AIM borrowers showed a significant increase. Both TEKUN and YUM 
borrowers showed only a marginal increase in their children’s education and family food 
expenditure after they received the loan. Since many borrowers were non-poor, they already 
had sufficient family food before they received the loan. Based on observations during the 
fieldwork, this study found that the income from the microcredit loans used to maintain or 
increase food consumption had changed only marginally. 
Some borrowers did not spend much on their children’s education because education in 
Malaysia is subsidised by the government. Borrowers will spend more only if they send their 
children to extra tuition classes outside school or bought extra books. Since TEKUN and 
YUM borrowers had only a marginal increase in their children’s education, it showed that 
TEKUN and YUM borrowers did not spent much on their children’s education compared 
with AIM borrowers. However, some borrowers mentioned that they were satisfied with the 
education their children received from the government school and they did not need extra 
tuition classes and materials such as reference books.  
 
5.3.5 Impact of microcredit loans on the individual borrowers 
 
This section discusses the impact of microcredit loans on individual borrowers. Five 
important factors were used to measure the changes microcredit loans had on the individual 
borrower: (i) the borrower’s control over resources and income; (ii) the borrower’s self-
esteem; (iii) the borrower’s personal savings; (iv) the borrower’s attitude towards the future; 
                                               
16 TEKUN is supposed to offer microcredit loans to both poor and not-so-poor borrowers, however, according to 
TEKUN management, most borrowers are not-so-poor and some of them are better off borrowers. 
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and (v) the borrower’s effectiveness in coping with negative shocks. Both the 
2  and binomial 
statistical tests showed a statistically significantly difference at the 10% level (see Table 5.5). 
Two criteria were used to measure the borrower’s control over their resources and income. 
The first was the borrower’s control over business decision-making and the second was the 
borrower’s control over family decision-making. Respondents who made decisions in their 
business were: the borrowers themselves; the borrowers together with their spouse; only the 
borrowers’ spouse; and the borrowers with others, such as a business partner or a family 
member. Table 5.5 shows that most business decisions were either made by the borrowers 
themselves (42.5% - AIM; 52.5% - TEKUN17; 40.3% - YUM) or together with their spouse 
(41.6% - AIM; 37.2% - TEKUN; 48.8% - YUM). The results showed that many women 
borrowers in AIM, TEKUN and YUM were making business decisions on their own or 
together with their spouse. This meant, AIM, TEKUN and YUM borrowers held either a 
dominant or sharing decision-making power with their spouse. The results also showed that 
only a small number of borrowers’ spouses had full control over decision making in their 
businesses (13.0% - AIM; 5.8% - TEKUN; 10.1% - YUM). This trend could be because some 
women borrowers shared the business with their spouse (see Table 5.2). 
A similar pattern was also shown in the control of family decision making where over half of 
the borrowers from the three microfinance institutions (62.1% - AIM, 55.4% - TEKUN, 
68.6% -YUM), held equal decision-making power with their spouse. These findings showed 
that many borrowers made family decisions based on the collective opinion of the husband 
and wife. The findings were similar to those by Garikipati (2006), Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) 
and Husain (1998) who found that microcredit loans provided a greater opportunity for female 
borrowers to make business and family decisions.  
This study also found that 86.2%, 85.8% and 88.1% of AIM, TEKUN and YUM borrowers, 
respectively, agreed that microcredit loans increased the borrower’s self-esteem. The findings 
were consistent with those of Nader (2008), Afrane (2002), Goetz and Gupta (1996) and 
Hashemi (1996), who found microcredit loans improved the borrowers’ confidence in 
managing their business and income and increased their involvement in the community. In 
this study, the borrowers agreed that after they received the microcredit loans they were able 
to control their own business, increase their income, manage their own money and savings, 
and participate in social organisations in the community (see Table 5.6). Microcredit loans 
also increased the borrowers’ personal savings. Many (91.8% - AIM, 90.2% - TEKUN, 
                                               
17  It consists of 35.8% male borrowers and 16.7% women borrowers. 
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77.9% - YUM) reported that their personal savings also increased after they received the 
microcredit loan.  
This study also investigated whether microcredit loans had a buoyant effect on the borrowers’ 
attitude towards the future. A great majority (98.2% – AIM; 90.7% - TEKUN and 85.4% - 
YUM) agreed that microcredit loans had a buoyant effect in enabling them to face the future. 
They felt that the microcredit loans had improved their businesses giving them an opportunity 
to accumulate wealth, increase their financial security and give them more confidence in 
conducting their business (see Table 5.7).  
This study also examined whether microcredit loans had increased the borrowers’ 
effectiveness in coping with negative shocks. Most borrowers (86.2% – AIM; 85.8% - 
TEKUN and 88.1% - YUM) agreed that by having microcredit loans, their ability to cope 
with negative shocks had increased. The negative shocks included increases in input goods 
and fuel prices, increased business competition, having a serious illness or a business reversal 
(see Table 5.8). Table 5.8 also shows the types of actions taken by the borrowers in response 
to negative shocks. Among the actions taken were: using savings, liquidating household 
assets, engaging in other income earning activities, reducing expenditure and pawning 
business or household items. 
According to Dunn and Arbuckle (2001), actions that reduced the level of a household’s 
productive assets, such as liquidation and pawning assets, were classified as harmful 
strategies. This was because such strategies will cause long-term productivity losses for the 
household. Table 5.8 shows that for all borrowers (from the three microfinance institutions), 
asset-reducing strategies (liquidation and pawning assets) were rarely used in response to 
negative shocks. This study found many borrowers (from the three microfinance institutions) 
used savings or reduced their expenditure in response to negative events that occurred.   
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Table 5.5: Microcredit loans impact on the individual AIM, TEKUN and YUM borrowers 
 AIM TEKUN YUM 
N1=391 N2=204 N3=268 
Count % of Statistical 
 test 
Count % of Statistical  
Test 
Count % 
of 
Statistical  
test 
 (N1) N1  (N2) N2  (N3) N3  
Borrower’s 
control over 
business 
decision 
         
  Borrower 166 42.5 2 =480.35** 107 
73-M    
34-W       
52.5 
  35.8 
16.7 
 
2 =304.00** 
 
 
108 40.3 2 =279.46** 
 
  Borrower and   
  spouse 
163 41.6 76 
 
37.2 
 
131 48.8 
  Spouse 51 13.0 12 5.8 27 10.1 
  Others 11 2.8 9 4.4 2 0.7 
Borrower’s 
control over 
family decision 
         
  Husband 69 17.6 2 =304.35** 59 28.9 2 =126.58** 36 13.4 2 =273.88** 
  Wife 62 15.9 23 11.3 25 9.3 
  Husband and    
  wife 
243 62.1  113 55.4  184 68.6  
  Own (single) 17 4.3  9 4.4  23 8.6  
Microcredit 
loans increases 
a borrower’s  
self-esteem 
         
 Agreed 337 86.2 P = 0.001 175 85.8 P = 0.001 236 88.1 P = 0.001 
 Disagreed 54 13.8 29 14.2 32 11.9 
Microcredit 
loans increases 
a borrower’s 
personal 
savings 
         
 Agreed 359 91.8 P = 0.001 184 90.2 P = 0.001 209 77.9 P = 0.001 
 Disagreed 32 8.2 20 9.8 59 22.1 
Microcredit 
loans has a 
buoying effect 
on the 
borrower’s 
attitude 
towards future 
         
  Agreed 384 98.2 P = 0.001 185 90.7 P = 0.001 229 85.4 P = 0.001 
  Disagreed 7 1.8 19 9.3 39 14.6 
Microcredit 
loans increases 
the borrower’s 
effectiveness in 
coping with 
negative 
shocks 
         
  Agreed 337 86.2 P = 0.001 175 85.8 P = 0.001 236 88.1 P = 0.001 
  Disagreed 54 13.8  29 14.2 32 11.9 
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Table 5.6: Reasons for increased self-esteem among borrowers of microcredit loans  
AGREED AIM 
N1=391 
TEKUN 
N2=204 
YUM 
N3=268 
 N % of 
N1 
N % of 
N2 
N % of 
N3 
Able to control own 
business 
198 50.6 69 33.8 84 31.3 
Able to increase income 340 87.0 151 74.0 188 70.1 
Able to manage own 
money and savings 
240 61.4 85 41.7 102 38.1 
Able to participate in 
social organisation 
105 26.9 33 16.2 34 12.7 
 
Table 5.7: Reasons microcredit loans have a buoyant effect on the borrowers  
AGREED AIM 
N1=391 
TEKUN 
N2=204 
YUM 
N3=268 
 N % of 
 N1 
N % of 
N2 
N % of 
N3 
Microcredit loans  
improved business 
294 75.2 143 70.1 149 55.6 
Microcredit loans 
accumulated wealth 
166 42.5 59 28.9 35 13.1 
Microcredit loans increase 
financial security 
286 73.1 115 56.4 122 45.5 
Microcredit loans give 
more confidence in 
business 
210 53.7 91 44.6 125 46.6 
 
Table 5.8: Negative shock events and actions taken by the borrowers  
TYPES OF NEGATIVE 
EVENT 
AIM 
N1=391 
TEKUN 
N2=204 
YUM 
N3=268 
 N % of 
N1 
N % of 
N2 
N % of 
N3 
Increase in goods and fuel 
prices 
247 63.2 103 50.5 167 62.3 
Competitors increase in 
business 
220 56.3 134 65.7 121 45.1 
Serious illness 54 13.8 18 8.8 15 5.6 
Business reversals 53 13.5 22 10.8 53 19.8 
TYPES OF ACTION 
TAKEN 
   
Used savings 220 56.3 109 53.4 103 38.4 
Liquidated household 
assets 
29 7.4 19 9.3 4 1.5 
Engaged in other income 
earning activities 
70 17.9 30 14.7 82 30.6 
Reduced expenditure 222 56.8 109 53.4 168 62.7 
Pawned item 30 7.7 15 7.4 9 3.4 
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5.3.6 Summary of the impact of microcredit loans on the individual borrower 
 
This study found that for all three microfianance institutions microcredit loans have a positive 
impact on the borrower’s self-empowerment. For example, female borrowers became more 
involved in making important business and family decisions after receiving a microcredit 
loan. Borrowers from the three institutions also agreed that microcredit loans increased their 
self-esteem and personal savings, increased their optimism in facing the future and increased 
their ability to cope with negative shocks. The findings also showed that microcredit loans 
provided financial security to the borrowers. 
 
5.3.7 Summary of the findings of the impact of microcredit loans on borrowers 
 
This study examined the impact of microcredit loans from Malaysian microfinance 
institutions (AIM, TEKUN and YUM). One similar characteristic among the three 
microfinance institutions is that they are subsidised by the government. Most microcredit 
loans impact studies in the literature were conducted on unsubsidised microfinance 
institutions. The findings showed that microcredit loans positively impacted the borrowers’ 
microenterprises, household and individual empowerment (Copestake et al., 2001; Hossain et 
al., 1997; Schuler & Riley, 1996). Other studies on unsubsidised microfinance institutions 
showed microcredit loans reached and benefited the non-poor and better off borrowers rather 
than the poor (Mosley, 2001; Coleman, 2002). 
The results in this study showed that microcredit loans did not have a significant impact on 
the borrowers’ microenterprises and households. Based on observations during the fieldwork 
and information from the microfinance institution’s staff, this study perceived that microcredit 
loans were mis-used by some borrowers and also reached non-poor borrowers. This study 
supported the arguments of Robinson (2001), Morduch (2000) and Adam et al. (1984) who 
argued that subsidised microfinance programmes reached non-poor borrowers and 
undermined their impact. This situation is also common among Malaysian microfinance 
borrowers. 
There is also a possibility that the Malaysian microfinance borrowers’ lack of financial 
management skills whereby the increases in income did not show up as growth in their 
microenterprises. However, this study did find that microcredit loans significantly impacted 
the borrowers’ empowerment. The microcredit loans increased the confidence of the 
borrowers in conducting their business and in facing the future.  
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Among all the borrowers, AIM borrowers showed a higher positive impact from microcredit 
loans than TEKUN and YUM borrowers. YUM borrowers showed a less positive impact from 
microcredit loans than AIM and TEKUN borrowers.  
 
5.4 Empirical Results of the Investigation of the Repayment Problem 
with Microcredit Loans  
 
Logistic regression was used (Equation 4.2) to investigate the determinants of the microcredit 
loan repayment problem among TEKUN and YUM borrowers. The maximum likelihood 
estimation technique was used. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present the results of the logistic model 
for TEKUN and YUM, respectively. Table 5.9 shows that four out of 20 predicted influencing 
factors were statistically significant (Chi-Square = 45.1836, P-Value = 0.001, 20 degrees of 
freedom). The estimated coefficients were statistically different from zero variously at the 1% 
and 5% levels of significance. Overall, the logistic model successfully predicted factors 
contributing to 74.26% of the microcredit loan repayment problem among TEKUN 
borrowers.  
The significant positive sign on the Gender variable indicated that the probability of a loan 
repayment problem was higher for males than for females. As hypothesised, male borrowers 
were less responsible and disciplined in repaying their microcredit loans than female 
borrowers. This finding is similar to the results reported by Chaudray and Ishfaq (2003) 
among rural borrowers in Pakistan and Roslan and Abd Karim (2009) for Malaysia, who also 
found male borrowers had loan repayment problems and became defaulters. Since TEKUN 
male borrowers have a higher problem in repaying their loan, TEKUN needs to check the 
financial commitment of male borrowers in their family as well as the record of any male 
borrower’s financial obligations towards loans in other financial institutions before granting 
them a new loan. The Business Type variable was positive and significant at the 5% level of 
significance. This implied that borrowers involved in agriculture, such as farming, animal 
husbandry and fisheries, were more likely to have a problem repaying the microcredit loan 
than borrowers involved in a small business activity. The finding supports the hypothesis that 
the lower revenue cycle in agricultural businesses creates repayment problems for borrowers. 
The result agreed with Chaudray and Ishfaq’s (2003) findings that the problem of loan 
repayments in the agricultural sector was related to the irregularity of income from producing 
agricultural products. The reliance of agriculture on the weather caused fluctuations in 
production that were beyond the control of the farmers. 
 89
Table 5.9: Logit estimates for the microcredit loan repayment problem for TEKUN   
borrowers 
Independent Variables1/ Estimated Coefficients Marginal Effect 
Gender        1.1087*** 0.1823 
Marital status -1.0044 -0.1250 
Educational level  -0.3785 -0.0607 
Business type     1.5028** 0.3221 
Extra income -0.0843 -0.0136 
Repayment period 0.1422 0.0234 
Repayment mode    1.2794** 0.2070 
Extra loan 0.7865 0.1477 
   
Dummy variables2/   
(Age)   
Age(2) 0.8940 0.1678 
Age(3) 0.7532 0.1255 
Age(4)    1.9923** 0.3894 
(Dependant)   
Dependant (2) 0.1101 0.0182 
Dependant(3) 0.4164 0.0633 
(Business revenue)- 
 in Malaysian Ringgit-RM 
  
Business revenue(2) 0.3085 0.0520 
Business revenue(3) 0.0359 0.0058 
Business revenue(4)               -0.1851 -0.0289 
Business revenue(5) 0.3092 0.0531 
(Repayment amount)- in Malaysian 
Ringgit (RM) 
  
Repayment amount(2) -0.9522 -0.1311 
Repayment amount(3)   -0.11194 -0.0177 
Repayment amount(4) -0.4605 -0.0723 
   
Constant      -3.6924**  
   
McFadden R-squared   0.1572 
Log likelihood -94.2965 
LR statistics  45.1836** 
Degree of Freedom  20 
Total observation  204 
% Correct Prediction  74.26 
Note: 1/. Dependent variable=1 if borrower has missed payment more than four times; 
                 and 0 otherwise 
            2/. To avoid the dummy trap problem, a dummy variable is dropped in each group.   
                 The group that has the fewest responses is dropped.  
                 **,***, represent 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Hence, since TEKUN borrowers involved in agricultural activities have a greater problem 
repaying their loan, TEKUN needs to consider giving flexibility in loan repayments to 
borrowers who receive income irregularly caused by drought or flood. In addition, TEKUN 
also needs to consider introducing a microinsurance policy especially weather insurance for 
borrowers.  
A discussion with TEKUN management regarding the reason borrowers involved in 
agricultural business faced problems in repaying their loans revealed that it was also related to 
government policy during the fifth Malaysian prime minister, Tun Abdullah Bin Ahmad 
Badawi (November 2003-2009). The government, in its efforts to reduce the number of 
unemployed graduates, introduced a special scheme to help new graduates find jobs. One 
scheme encouraged them to be involved in agriculture. The objective was to encourage young 
graduates to become agribusiness entrepreneurs in line with the country’s mission, which was 
to promote the country’s agricultural industry. This coincided with TEKUN giving 
microcredit loans to young graduates to be involved in agricultural projects. However, many 
projects faced problems and some were unsuccessful because the young graduates lacked 
knowledge and experience in agriculture.  
 
The results also showed that the Repayment mode coefficient was positive and significant at 
the 5% significance level. That result implies that the probability of a loan repayment problem 
was higher for borrowers who repaid their loans on a weekly basis. As hypothesised, a weekly 
loan repayment schedule posed problems for borrowers who generated a lower revenue cycle. 
Therefore, TEKUN should consider lowering the weekly repayment amount and a longer 
duration of payments in response to borrowers who generate lower revenue having a problem 
meeting their weekly repayment. The Age(4) dummy variable was positive and significant at 
the 5% level. This implies that borrowers in the 46 to 55 age group had a higher probability of 
having repayment problems. This finding contradicted the hypothesis that older borrowers 
were more responsible in repaying their loans than younger borrowers. This could be because 
the TEKUN borrowers in this age group might have higher financial commitments to their 
family and business expenses. Thus, with higher financial obligations, they could have 
difficulty in repaying their loans. Hence, it is suggested that TEKUN requests information and 
analyses the financial commitments and obligations of borrowers in this age group as a 
condition of giving them the loan. TEKUN should have a certain limit of microcredit loans to 
the borrowers who have higher financial commitments to family or other financial 
institutions. 
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Table 5.9 shows the coefficients for the remaining explanatory variables. Marital status, 
Educational level, Extra income, Repayment period, Extra loan, Age(2)-(26-35 years old), 
Age(3)-(36-45 years old), Dependant(2)-(3-4 people), Dependant(3)-(more than 4), Revenue(2)-
(1,000-2,000), Revenue(3)-(2,001-3,00), Revenue(4)-(3,001-4,000), Revenue(5) -(More 4,000), 
Repayment(2)-(101-150), Repayment(3)-(151-200), Repayment(4)-(More 201) did not 
significantly contribute to the repayment problem among TEKUN borrowers.  
For example, the borrowers’ Educational level did not have a significant effect on the 
probability of a loan repayment problem. This contrasts with Bhatt and Tang’s (2002) results 
in a study of microenterprises in the USA and Chaudray and Ishfaq’s (2003) study of rural 
borrowers in Pakistan that found that a lower educational level of borrowers was associated 
with higher repayment problems.  
The results also showed that Extra income and Repayment Period were not significant in the 
loan repayment problem; however, the study by Brehanu and Fufa (2008) found that 
borrowers who had extra business income had a lower probability of having a loan repayment 
problem. Our results also found that the repayment period was not significant in the loan 
repayment problem, which contradicts Roslan and Abd Karim’s (2009) results that a longer 
loan repayment period gave a higher indication of a loan repayment problem.  
The results showed Business revenue did not have a significant effect on the probability of a 
loan repayment problem. This contrasted with Okorie’s (1986) finding that borrowers 
receiving a higher business revenue had fewer problems in repaying their loans.  
Additional information can be obtained through an analysis of the marginal effects calculated 
as the partial derivatives of the non-linear probability function, evaluated at each variable’s 
sample mean (Greene, 2003). For example, the results showed that a unit increase in the 
Gender factor results had an 18.23% probability that a male borrower will have a loan 
repayment problem (see Table 5.9). Similarly, a unit increase in the Business type factor 
resulted in a 32.21% increase in probability that a borrower whose business was in agriculture 
will have a loan repayment problem. 
From the marginal effects values in Table 5.9, it can be concluded that TEKUN should rank 
borrowers aged between 46 and 55 as the most important factor contributing to a loan 
repayment problem. Agricultural businesses and weekly repayment instalments were the 
second and third most important factors affecting the loan repayment problem. Being a male 
borrower was the fourth most important factor contributing to the loan repayment problem.    
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The estimated results of the YUM loan repayment problem are presented in Table 5.10. 
Gender and Repayment mode variables were excluded from YUM models because YUM 
offered loans only to women borrowers and imposed weekly loan payments. The results 
showed four of the 17 predicted influencing factors were statistically significant (Chi-
Square=52.9038, P-Value=0.001, 17 degrees of freedom). The coefficients were statistically 
different from zero variously at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. Overall, the 
logistic model successfully predicted the factors that contributed 76.32% to the microcredit 
loans repayment problem among YUM borrowers.  
The results show the Business type coefficient was positive and significant at the 1% 
significance level. This result was similar to TEKUN borrowers and shows that borrowers 
involved in agricultural business activities such as farming, animal husbandry and fisheries, 
had a higher probability of encountering repayment problems than borrowers involved in a 
small business activity. Apart from the income irregularity facing by the borrowers, the results 
also showed that the YUM standard lending contract for an agricultural business with weekly 
loan repayments and a two week grace period could have contributed to loan repayment 
problems. Thus, a revision of the lending contract is necessary by YUM to overcome this 
problem. 
This study found a significant negative effect of Repayment period at the 5% significance 
level. The finding implies that borrowers who had a loan period of over one year had a lower 
probability of having a loan repayment problem. This contrasted with the results of Roslan 
and Abd Karim (2009) who showed a long term loan period (more than one year) gave a 
higher loan repayment problem to the borrowers. This means the longer the duration of loan 
contracts offered by YUM the less of a problem borrowers have in repaying their loan. This is 
a sign to YUM that their longer duration of loan contract is not giving a problem to the 
borrowers in meeting their loan repayments. 
The Age(1) dummy variable was positive and significant at the 10% level of significance. This 
implies that borrowers aged between 18 and 25 years old had a higher probability of having a 
problem in repaying their loans. The age group 18 to 25 years old is the youngest group 
among YUM borrowers. These findings support the argument that older borrowers would be 
more responsible and disciplined in repaying their loans than younger borrowers. The lack of 
experience in the business involved, which resulted in less income received, might be the 
reason that the younger group has difficulty in repaying the loan. In addition, younger 
borrowers are not committed to repaying their loan since they might believe that even if they 
default; they still can receive microcredit loans from other microfinance institutions because 
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Table 5.10: Logit estimates for the microcredit loans repayment problem for YUM borrowers 
Independent Variables1/ Estimated Coefficients Marginal Effect 
Marital status  0.5192  0.0896 
Educational level -0.0010 -0.0001 
Business type       1.8698*** 0.3132 
Extra income 0.4283 0.0778 
Repayment period   -0.8177** -0.1561 
Extra loan 1.1142 0.1777 
   
Dummy variables2/   
(Age)   
Age(1) 1.2021* 0.2739 
Age(2) 0.3353 0.0667 
Age(3) -0.1231 -0.0233 
(Dependant)   
Dependant (2) 0.3474 0.0634 
Dependant(3) 0.3957 0.0736 
(Business revenue)- 
 in Malaysian Ringgit-RM 
  
Business revenue(1) 1.4657 0.2599 
Business revenue(2) 0.8591 0.1765 
Business revenue(3) 1.0601 0.2379 
(Repayment amount)- in Malaysian 
Ringgit-RM 
  
Repayment amount(2) -0.3681 -0.0657 
Repayment amount(3) -0.6721 -0.1100 
Repayment amount(4)    0.7553* 0.1599 
   
Constant  -1.0813  
   
McFadden R-squared   0.1637 
Log likelihood -135.1261 
LR statistics   52.9038** 
Degree of Freedom   17 
Total observation   268 
% Correct Prediction   76.32 
Note: 1/. Dependent variable=1 if borrower has missed payment more than four times, 
                 and 0 otherwise; 
            2/. To avoid the dummy trap problem, a dummy variable is dropped in each group.   
                 The  group that has the fewest responses is dropped.  
                 *,**,***, represent e 10%,  5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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they have more opportunities since they are still young. Thus, YUM needs to monitor closely 
businesses that belong to borrowers in this age group and ensure they make full use of the 
loan given. The Repayment amount(4) coefficient was positive and significant at the 10% level 
of significance. This result suggests that the probability of having a loan repayment problem 
was higher for borrowers who repaid more than RM201 per week. The finding supports the 
hypothesis that higher loan repayments burdened borrowers, especially those who received a 
lower cycle of cash flow. Since YUM imposed weekly loan repayments on all kinds of 
borrowers regardless of their business cycle, borrowers in general confront problems in 
repaying loans with repayments over RM201 per week. Thus, YUM needs to revise its 
lending system that applies weekly loan repayments on all type of businesses in a way to 
reduce repayment problems faced by borrowers.  
Table 5.10 shows that the coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables: Marital status, 
Educational level, Extra income, Extra loan, Age(2)- (26-35 years old), Age(3)- (36-45 years 
old), Dependant(2)- (3-4 people), Dependant(3)- (more than 4), Revenue(1)- (Less than 1,000), 
Revenue(2)-(1,001-2,00), Revenue(3)- (2,001-3,000), Repayment(2)- (101-150), and 
Repayment(3)- (151-200), did not have any significant effects on the loan repayment problem 
among YUM borrowers.  
Like TEKUN borrowers, the borrowers’ Educational level, Extra income and Business 
revenue did not have any significant effect on the probability of a loan repayment problem, 
which contradicts what Brehanu and Fufa (2008), Chaudray and Ishfaq (2003), Bhatt and 
Tang (2002) and Okorie (1986) found.  
The marginal effects results in Table 5.10 show that a unit increase in the Business type factor 
resulted in a 31.32% probability that a borrower whose business was in agriculture will have a 
loan repayment problem. In contrast, borrowers with a Repayment period of over one year 
had a decreased probability of 15.61% of having a loan repayment problem (see Table 5.10).  
Based on the marginal effects results, it can be concluded that YUM should rank agricultural 
types of businesses as being the most important factor contributing to loan repayment 
problems. Borrowers aged between 18 and 25 years old and with repayments of over RM201 
per week are the second and third, respectively, most important factors affecting the loan 
repayment problem.  
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Overall, the findings of this study can provide information to both TEKUN and YUM to find 
ways to overcome the loan repayment problem faced by the borrowers and reduce their 
number of defaulters. 
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     Chapter 6                                                                         
Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research findings. Section 6.2 presents a summary of the objectives 
and major findings. The implications of the research findings are discussed in Section 6.3. 
Section 6.4 discusses the research limitations and Section 6.5 provides recommendations for 
future research. 
 
6.2  Summary and Major Findings 
 
Microcredit was introduced to Malaysia as a part of poverty eradication programmes in the 
country. Microfinance institutions have existed in Malaysia for 23 years, with Amanah Ikhtiar 
Malaysia as the pioneer lender. Yayasan Usaha Maju was the second microfinance institution 
established and The Economic Fund for National Entrepreneurs Group began 11 years after 
the establishment of AIM and YUM. AIM and YUM are replicates of the Grameen Bank. 
However, YUM modified the Grameen Bank lending system a few years after it was 
established when it changed from group lending to an individual lending approach. 
The purpose of this research was to examine the performance of microfinance institutions in 
Malaysia. One objective was to investigate the impact of microcredit loans on borrowers. The 
study investigated the impact of microcredit loans on the borrower’s microenterprise, 
household and empowerment. The study also examined the determinants of loan repayment 
problems among YUM and TEKUN borrowers, since these two institutions recorded lower 
repayment rates than AIM borrowers. This study also compared Malaysian microfinance 
institutions’ lending systems with the Grameen bank, in Bangladesh, and the People’s Bank 
(Bank Perkreditan Rakyat-BPR) in Indonesia. 
The three subsidised microfinance institutions in this study received support and subsidies 
from the government. Both primary and secondary data were used in this research. Primary 
data were used to assess the impact of microcredit loans on AIM, TEKUN and YUM 
borrowers and the determinants of loan repayment problems among TEKUN and YUM 
borrowers. The primary data were collected through survey interviews using a structured 
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questionnaire. Using a stratified sampling technique, a total of 391 AIM, 204 TEKUN and 
268 YUM borrowers (usable sample) from four states (Selangor, Kedah, Kelantan and Sabah) 
were included in the sample. The survey questionnaire was personally administered to the 
microfinance borrowers between May and July 2009.  
Secondary data were obtained from the Malaysian microfinance institutions and Bank Nagari 
in Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia. Secondary data were used to compare the lending 
systems between the Malaysian microfinance institutions, the Grameen Bank and BPR.  
The impact of microcredit loans on the borrower’s microenterprise, household and personally 
was analysed using the 2  test. The 2  test tests whether there are any significant differences 
between borrowers who experienced an increase in their microenterprise, household and 
individually after they received the microcredit loans with those who did not experience any 
changes. Logistic regression was employed to identify the factors influencing the borrowers’ 
problems in repaying their loans. 
 
Table 6.1 summarises the estimated results of the impact of microcredit loans on the 
borrower. In summary, the microcredit loans’ impact on the borrowers showed: 
 At the microenterprise level, microcredit loans significantly increased AIM, TEKUN 
and YUM microenterprises’ monthly business revenue. In terms of asset 
accumulation, microcredit loans significantly increased only AIM borrowers’ 
microenterprises’ tools and equipment and had only a marginal increase in land 
holdings or business premises. However, for TEKUN and YUM borrowers, 
microcredit loans significantly increased only the microenterprises’ business revenue, 
but had only a marginal increase on all fixed assets. Microcredit loans also had a 
marginal positive impact on the microenterprises’ employment for all borrowers 
(AIM, TEKUN and YUM) (see Table 5.3). These results suggested that the increased 
business revenue did not significantly increase the borrowers’ microenterprises’ fixed 
assets or employment level. This study perceived that borrowers mis-used the 
microcredit loans given to them and that was why there was little change shown after 
they received the microcredit loans. In addition, this study also revealed the 
borrowers’ lack of financial management skills in managing their income.  
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 At the household level, microcredit loans showed a significant increase in AIM, 
TEKUN and YUM borrowers’ household income. In terms of households’ asset 
accumulation, microcredit loans significantly increased only AIM borrowers’ 
household appliances and gave a marginal increase in other household assets such as 
houses, land holdings, farmland or livestock (see Table 5.4). However, for TEKUN 
and YUM borrowers, microcredit loans showed marginal increases in the households’ 
fixed assets such as houses, household appliances, land holdings, farmland or 
livestock (see Table 5.4). Since this study perceived that borrowers were non-poor, 
they might have a comfortable life before they received the microcredit loans. This 
could be the reason there was not much change in the household’s fixed assets after 
they received the microcredit loans.  
Microcredit loans produced a significant increase in AIM borrowers’ expenditure on 
children’s education and food for the family. However, microcredit loans resulted in 
only a marginal increase in expenditure on TEKUN and YUM children’s educational 
expenditure. They were not spending more on their children’s education because they 
were satisfied with the subsidised school system provided by the government. 
Microcredit loans also did not have a significant impact on TEKUN and YUM family 
food expenditure. The expenditure on their family food was sufficient before they 
received the microcredit loans since they were not really poor before they received the 
microcredit loan.  
 At the individual level, microcredit loans had a positive impact on female borrowers’ 
self empowerment in that they were more involved in making family and business 
decisions (see Table 5.5). All borrowers agreed that microcredit loans had increased 
their self-esteem and personal savings, increased their optimism in facing the future 
(see Table 5.5) and also increased their ability to cope with negative shocks (see Table 
5.8). The results showed that microcredit promoted gender equality in the country and 
provided financial security to the borrowers. 
 
Table 6.2 summarises the results from the determinants of the empirical models on the loan 
repayment problem. Analysis of the determinants of loan repayment problems among 
TEKUN and YUM borrowers showed that: 
 TEKUN male borrowers (Gender) had a higher probability of loan repayment 
problems than female borrowers (see Table 5.9).  
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 TEKUN borrowers involved in agricultural types of business (Business type), such as 
farming, fishery and animal husbandry, had a higher probability of loan repayment 
problems (see Table 5.9). The results showed that a lower cycle of revenue inherent in 
agricultural businesses adversely affected the borrowers’ ability to meet their 
repayment schedules. 
 The probability of having a loan repayment problem was also higher for the TEKUN 
borrowers who repaid their microcredit loans on a weekly basis (Repayment mode) 
(see Table 5.9). This implied that a weekly loan repayment schedule caused problems 
for borrowers who generated a lower business revenue cycle. 
 The loan repayment problem in TEKUN was also significant among the borrowers in 
the 46 to 55 years age group (Age(4)) (see Table 5.9).  
 In the YUM model, borrowers involved in agricultural business activities (Business 
type) also had a higher probability of loan repayment problems (see Table 5.10). The 
result implied that, apart from the lower revenue cycles generated by the agricultural 
business, the weekly loan repayment mode imposed by YUM on agricultural 
businesses could also have caused problems to borrowers in meeting their repayment 
schedules. 
 YUM borrowers who had over a one-year loan repayment period (Repayment period) 
had lower repayment problems (see Table 5.10). These findings contradicted the 
hypothesis that stated that a longer repayment period would lead to a loan repayment 
problem. This meant that YUM’s longer loan repayment contracts gives fewer 
problems in repayment of loans. 
 A higher probability of having loan repayment problems occurred among YUM 
borrowers in the 18 to 25 age group (Age(1)) (see Table 5.10).  
 YUM borrowers who paid over RM201 in weekly payments (Repayment amount(4)) 
had a higher probability of having a loan repayment problem (see Table 5.10). Since 
YUM imposed a weekly loan repayment on all kinds of businesses, the results showed 
that the borrowers have problems repaying over RM201 per week.  
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Table 6.1: Microcredit loans’ impact hypotheses checklist on the AIM,TEKUN and YUM 
                 borrowers. 
Hypothesis AIM TEKUN YUM 
Impact of microcredit loans on microenterprise    
Microcredit increases a microenterprise’s revenue SI SI SI 
Microcredit increases a microenterprise’s fixed assets:    
-Land MI MI MI 
-Premises MI MI MI 
-Tools and equipment SI MI MI 
Microcredit increases a microenterprise’s employment MI MI MI 
Impact of microcredit on households    
Microcredit increases a borrower’s household income SI SI SI 
Microcredit increases a borrower’s household assets:    
-House MI MI MI 
-Household’s appliances SI MI MI 
-Household’s land MI MI MI 
-Household’s farm MI MI MI 
-Household’s livestock MI MI MI 
Microcredit increases a borrower’s expenditure on 
children’s education 
SI MI MI 
Microcredit increases a borrower’s expenditure on food SI MI MI 
Impact of microcredit on the individual    
Microcredit increases a borrower’s control of business 
and family 
   
-Control over business decisions SI SI SI 
-Control over family decisions SI SI SI 
Microcredit increases a borrower’s self-esteem SI SI SI 
Microcredit increases a borrower’s personal savings SI SI SI 
Microcredit has a buoyant effect on the borrower’s 
attitude towards the future 
SI SI SI 
Microcredit increases a borrower’s effectiveness in 
coping with negative shocks 
SI SI SI 
Note:  “SI” means significant increase; “MI” means marginal increase. 
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Table 6.2: Factors affecting loan repayment problems for the TEKUN and YUM 
                  microfinance institutions. 
Factors TEKUN YUM 
Male borrower (+) NI 
Marital status (0) (0) 
Educational level (0) (0) 
Agricultural business (+) (+) 
Extra income (0) (0) 
Repayment period (0) (-) 
Weekly repayment (+) NI 
Extra loan (0) (0) 
(Age)   
18-25 years old NI (+) 
26-35 years old (0) (0) 
36-45 years old (0) (0) 
46-55 years old (+) NI 
(Dependants)   
1-2 people NI NI 
3-4 people (0) (0) 
More than 4 people (0) (0) 
(Business revenue)- 
 in Malaysian Ringgit-RM 
  
Less than 1,000 NI (0) 
1,001-2,000 (0) (0) 
2,001-3,000 (0) (0) 
3,001-4,000 (0) NI 
(Repayment amount)- in Malaysian 
Ringgit-RM 
  
Less 100 NI NI 
101-150 (0) (0) 
151-200 (0) (0) 
Over 201 (0) (+) 
Note: 1. (+), (-), and (0) represent positive, negative, and no significant impact, respectively; 
            2. “NI” means that the variable is not included in the model. 
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6.3 Implications of the Research Findings 
 
The findings of this research have several important implications for academics, microfinance 
institutions and policymakers. For academics, the research findings on the impact of 
microcredit loans show that the subsidised credit system in Malaysian microfinance 
institutions does not have a significant impact on the borrowers’ microenterprise growth and 
household improvement. Morduch (2006) and Robinson (2001a) argued that subsidised credit 
undermines the microcredit loans’ impact on borrowers. This is because the subsidised credit 
system of the government is used as a political tool to attract supporters who can be non-poor 
and poor people. This study perceived a similar situation occurred in Malaysia and there is a 
possibility that many of the Malaysian microfinance borrowers are non-poor borrowers. 
In addition, based on the study findings, observation of the borrowers and information given 
by the microfinance institutions’ staff, this study also perceived that there is mis-use of 
microcredit loans occurring among the microfinance borrowers. Based on observations of the 
borrowers’ conditions during the fieldwork, this study also believes that the low impact of 
microcredit loans on the borrowers might be because of the borrowers’ lack of financial 
management skills in their businesses. However, the results from the impact of microcredit 
loans on borrowers’ empowerment showed that microcredit loans had promoted women in 
various ways, such as having a greater voice in making business and family decisions, having 
increased self-esteem, increased personal savings and helped them be more optimistic in 
facing the future. Like studies by Nader (2008), Goetz and Gupta (1996) and Hashemi et al. 
(1996), this study showed that microcredit loans provided financial and social security to the 
borrowers.  
Morduch (2006) and Robinson (2001a) argued that subsidised microcredit loan programmes 
led to higher default rates. A study by Park and Ren (2001) found that subsidised 
microfinance institutions in China recorded lower repayment rates. However, AIM recorded 
good loan repayment rates (98.98%) (AIM, 2009) and this showed that the repayment rate 
performance by the subsidised microfinance institution depended on the type of lending 
design they used. This study found that a subsidised microfinance institution that used a group 
lending design (AIM) had good loan repayment performance compared with the individual 
lending designs used by TEKUN and YUM. However, this study found that the higher 
repayment rate recorded by AIM is contributed to by the group members who forcibly paid 
the loan repayment because another group member failed to repay the loan. In the group 
lending mechanism, the members of the group are responsible for repaying the loan of the 
 103
other members if she cannot meet the repayment on any particular week. Thus, the higher 
repayment rates achieved by the AIM are not solely because of all members are committed to 
repay their weekly loan repayment, but also because of the obligation of the members in the 
group to repay the loan if other members failed to repay the loan. This study found that it is 
true that group lending contributes to the higher loan repayment rate of the institution, but it 
can also be a burden to other members in the group if any of their group members cannot 
make the payment. Hence, the group lending system gives more benefits to the institution in 
terms of loan collection rather than to the borrowers. 
Cull et al. (2007) and Mersland et al. (2007) stated that microfinance institutional designs 
(group lending versus individual lending) affect the microfinance institution’s performance. 
This study found that the type of microfinance institution design by the subsidised 
microfinance institutions played a major role in determining the institutions’ performance. In 
terms of the microcredit loans' impact on the borrowers’ microenterprises, households’ asset 
accumulation, school children and family food expenditure, the borrowers in the group 
lending design (AIM) performed better than those in the individual lending design (TEKUN 
and YUM). This is probably because the borrowers in the group lending design institution 
related more closely to one another, not only to ensure that the members are able to meet the 
loan repayment schedule (Armendariz de Aghion, 1999; Varians, 1990) but they are also 
motivated by each another to utilize the money borrowed to make their businesses grow. 
The results of the determinants of loan repayment problems among the TEKUN and YUM 
borrowers showed that the borrower’s characteristics (age and gender), business 
characteristics (business type) and loan characteristics (repayment period, repayment mode, 
and repayment amount) were among the factors that influenced borrowers in repaying their 
loans. For example, male borrowers in TEKUN had problems in repaying their loan. The 
finding is similar to those of Chaudhary and Ishfaq (2003) and Roslan and Abd Karim (2009), 
who found that male borrowers were the largest group of defaulters. Further, for both TEKUN 
and YUM borrowers involved in agricultural businesses, this fact contributed to loan 
repayment problems. Chaudhary and Ishfaq (2003) had similar findings and reported that the 
lower cycle of business revenue generated by agricultural businesses as well as exposure to 
climatic factors were among the reasons why borrowers faced loan repayment problems. 
This study found that the age of the borrower contributed to loan repayment problems. 
TEKUN and YUM borrowers aged between 46 to 55 years old and 18 to 25 years old, 
respectively, had loan repayment problems. Higher financial commitments to family could be 
the reason older borrowers in TEKUN had problems repaying their loan. Meanwhile, 
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microcredit loans offered by YUM are attracting more young age borrowers than older 
people. The less income received resulting from a lack of experience in the business involved 
might be the reason they are having problems repaying their loan. Younger borrowers might 
also have the perception that they have more opportunities to get microcredit loans even 
though they already had become a defaulter with one microfinance institution.  
Weekly loan repayments caused problems for TEKUN borrowers in repaying their loans, but 
a loan repayment period of over one year gave fewer problems to YUM borrowers in repaying 
their loans. YUM borrowers who had to pay over RM201 weekly loan instalment faced 
problems in repaying their loans. Overall, the findings of this study show that the loan 
repayment problems facing the TEKUN and YUM borrowers were not only caused by the 
individual borrower’s characteristics and business type but also the lending system (grace 
periods, mode of repayment, repayment amount) imposed by the microfinance institution. 
Similar findings were reported by Roslan and Abd. Karim (2009), Derban at al. (2005), 
Chaudhary and Ishfaq (2003) and Okorie (1986), who documented that the institutional 
lending system also played a role in determining the loan repayment ability of borrowers.  
The study findings have implications for microfinance institutions. With regard to YUM 
borrowers involved in agricultural businesses who were facing problems in repaying their 
loan, this study found that the lending system, such as weekly loan repayments and the two 
weeks grace period used by YUM, might have contributed to the problem. Borrowers 
involved in agricultural businesses used credit both to buy inputs, such as seed, fertilizer and 
pesticides, and assets, such as farm machinery and livestock. These borrowers have different 
time frames for their revenue cycle. For example, if the borrower uses credit to buy seed, the 
borrower needs at least six months to one year to receive the revenue from harvesting the 
crop. 
Therefore, they cannot pay back the loan in two weeks. Thus, YUM management should re-
evaluate and recognize these weaknesses in their lending system and modify it in order to 
reduce the burden on the borrowers in repaying loans. AIM imposes a similar lending system 
to YUM but AIM applies a group lending approach and generates a higher repayment rate. 
However, during the fieldwork, a few AIM borrowers complained about the one week grace 
period imposed by AIM. While waiting for the harvesting period borrowers needed to borrow 
money from family members to repay the loan. TEKUN, Grameen Bank and BPR practices in 
determining loan repayments for agricultural businesses according to the harvesting cycle 
need to be considered by AIM and YUM. Further, the flexibility in the lending contracts of 
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the Grameen Bank and BPR, which are designed specifically for the borrower’s affordability 
and the type of business, should be considered by AIM, TEKUN and YUM. 
With regard to TEKUN offering loans to inexperienced young graduate to conduct 
agricultural businesses that resulted in many unsuccessful agricultural projects, this study 
recommends that TEKUN, as well as other microfinance institutions, ensure that borrowers 
have the experience and related skills in agriculture before granting them loans. A study of 
Malawi microfinance borrowers also indicated that microcredit loans alone had not 
contributed to farming efficiency unless the borrowers also had good agricultural skills and 
technology (Zeller & Meyer, 2002a). 
This study also found that TEKUN borrowers who repaid by weekly loan instalments had 
problems repaying their loans. The repayment schedule, weekly, monthly or seasonally, was 
determined by the borrowers. Many borrowers involved in small businesses preferred to make 
loan payments on a weekly basis. However, many of them could not meet their weekly loan 
repayment schedule. Since TEKUN recorded a high level of non-performing loans worth 
RM225 million (Berita Harian, 2009), they should guide borrowers to choose the most 
suitable mode of payment and it must be based on the borrower’s revenue cycle. TEKUN also 
needs to closely monitor the businesses of male borrowers and the borrowers aged between 46 
and 55 since these groups contributed significantly to the loan repayment problem. 
Meanwhile, YUM needs to closely monitor borrowers aged between 18 and 25 because this is 
an age group that also had loan repayment problems. 
Agriculture is exposed to climatic factors beyond the borrowers’ control. This study 
recommends that microfinance institutions offer a microinsurance policy. An insurance plan 
not only reduces the burden on the borrowers if their agricultural project failed but also 
reduces the financial burden on the microfinance institution from uncollectible loans (Alip, 
Navarro, & Catibog, 2009). Among the three microfinance institutions in Malaysia, AIM has 
introduced the welfare and well-being funds to their members. However, the monetary award 
under this fund covers only the members, their spouse and children if they are sick or if the 
disaster happened to their house, for example a fire. No monetary award is given if drought or 
flood happens to the members’ agricultural project under this welfare fund. Thus, there is a 
need for AIM, as well as TEKUN and YUM, to introduce a microinsurance policy, especially 
weather insurance, that focuses on giving protection to the borrowers’ agricultural projects in 
the case of drought or flood. A few microfinance institutions in Southeast Asian countries, 
such as Cambodia, the Philippines and Vietnam, have started introducing microinsurance for 
borrowers (Alip et al., 2009). These countries received advice and technical help from 
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RIMANSI. RIMANSI is a regional resource centre based in the Philippines established to 
help professionally manage mutual benefit organisations and microinsurance programmes of 
microfinance institutions in Asia (Alip et al., 2009). This is the agency that Malaysian 
microfinance institutions can collaborate with in introducing a microinsurance policy for 
borrowers. 
This study also perceived that many microfinance borrowers in Malaysia lacked knowledge of 
business financial management. Hence, this study recommends to microfinance institutions 
that, apart from microcredit loans, borrowers also need to be given the entrepreneurial skills 
to manage their income and resources efficiently. This study also perceived that there is a 
mis-use of microcredit loans among Malaysian microfinance borrowers. Therefore, this study 
recommends that Malaysia’s microfinance institutions place extra conditions on borrowers 
when they apply in the next microcredit loan cycle. Before a new microcredit loan given to a 
borrower, the microfinance institution needs to request business records, such as sales 
performance and the microenterprise’s asset status, as the proof that their business had 
improved from the use of the previous microcredit loan. If they find there was no significant 
positive achievement, unless for reasonable reasons, they should not be given a new 
microcredit loan. Moreover, if the mis-use of a microcredit loan is found, the particular 
borrower needs to be blacklisted from obtaining a microcredit loan from any microfinance 
institution in the country. This strategy should reduce morally hazardous behaviour among 
microfinance borrowers and so make full good use of the microcredit loans given.  
 
For policymakers, the issue of Malaysian microfinance institutions achieving financial self-
sufficiency may not be appealing since the government is willing to give financial support. 
The government claimed that the financial support given to microcredit programmes is part of 
social cost that it needed to bear (Siwar & Abd. Talib, 2001). However, the subsidised 
microcredit programmes do not reach many of the poor in the country. Hence, a promotion 
strategy and encouragement must be implemented by microfinance institutions in order to 
attract more poor to borrow microcredit loans. 
The subsided microfinance system has also led to a higher level of non performing loans in 
YUM and TEKUN. Apart from the weaknesses in the lending systems of the microfinance 
institutions, the continuous financial assistance from the government could be the reason the 
microfinance institutions are not concerned about the low repayment rate they receive. Thus, 
the government needs to revise the subsidy policy in the microfinance sector in Malaysia. 
There are many steps that the government can take if they are willing to stop or reduce the 
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subsidy given to the microfinance institutions. One way is by lifting the restrictions on taking 
deposits, since microfinance institutions in Malaysia are legally forbidden from accepting 
deposits from borrowers. Malaysia’s policymakers should learn from the Grameen Bank and 
People’s Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat-BPR) practices in collecting savings from 
borrowers. The safety of the deposits must always be monitored by the Central Bank. 
Experience with the Self Help Groups (SHGs), a village banking type of microfinance 
institution in India, showed that when the members’ savings in the institution are more than 
the credits given, the microfinance institution could be profitable without subsidies and 
donations (Prahalad, 2005). African microfinance institutions also focus on savings as a 
source of funds for lending (Lafourcade et al., 2005). 
The People’s Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat-BPR) gives investment opportunities to 
borrowers that could also be considered by Malaysia’s policymakers. This strategy not only 
reduces the financial burden on the government but also gives the local community a share in 
the microfinance institution’s branch in their district. This practice can also create a feeling in 
the borrowers of belonging to a particular microfinance institution. 
However, this research is quite sceptical that the government is ready to stop subsidising the 
microfinance institutions and borrowers in the country. The microcredit programme in 
Malaysia is a favourite project of the government. This programme is always been a 
government political tool to attract political supporters, especially the poor people. This study 
would like to suggest an efficient way of subsidising if the government insists on continuing 
to give a subsidy to the microfinance institutions in the country. This study suggests that 
Malaysia’s policymakers establish a trust fund specifically for the microfinance institutions in 
the country. This would be similar to the Grameen Trust Fund introduced by the Grameen 
Bank (Yunus, 2007b). One of the Grameen Trust Fund functions is to offer training and 
technical assistance to national and international organisations to support Grameen Bank 
replication initiatives (Yunus, 2007b). The Grameen Trust received funding from 
international donors such as the World Bank and the United Nations Capital Development 
Fund (UNCDF) (Yunus, 2007b). In the Malaysian context, the government, as well as the 
private sector and individual donors, could contribute money to a similar fund. As incentives, 
the government could also provide tax exemptions to those making contributions. Like the 
Grameen Trust Fund, this fund could be used to provide funding, management and technical 
training to the existing microfinance institutions and their new branches. Table 6.3 provides a 
list of recommendations to policymakers. 
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Table 6.3: List of recommendations to Malaysian microfinance institutions and policymakers 
No: Recommendations 
1 Provide business management training to the borrowers  
2 Remove the standardisation of loan contracts 
3 Pass a new law so microfinance institutions can take deposits from borrowers 
4 Provide an insurance policy for agricultural projects 
5 Open investment opportunities to the borrowers 
6 Create a Microfinance Fund 
  
 
6.4 Research Limitations 
 
There are a number of limitations in this research relating to sample selection, data and 
estimation techniques. These include: 
 This study used only the borrower’s empowerment variables according to the 
Household Economic Portfolio Model (HEPM), which are the borrower’s control over 
business and family decisions, personal savings, the buoyant effect of the borrower’s 
attitude towards the future and borrower’s effectiveness in coping with negative 
shocks. Many empowerment variables were not tested in this study, such as women’s 
mobility, political awareness, knowledge regarding family control and the legal 
system. 
 
 This study did not take monetary data of the value of the borrowers’ fixed assets, the 
borrower’s children’s education and family food expenditure before and after they 
received the microcredit loan. This study asked the borrowers if there were any 
changes; increasing, remaining the same or decreasing after they received the 
microcredit loans. 
 
 The determinants of the loan repayment problem model used in this study did not take 
into account the “Training” variable, used by Roslan and Abd Karim (2009) in their 
study. Their study showed that the borrowers who had training related to the business 
they are involved in had a good repayment performance compared with borrowers 
who had no training. This study also did not take into account the moral hazard 
variable, such as the “unwillingness to repay”, in the determinants of the loan 
repayment problem model. Important information would be provided to the 
microfinance institutions and policymakers if we know whether the attitude of 
unwillingness to repay occurred in TEKUN and YUM borrowers. 
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 In the primary data collection process, some of the data were collected in TEKUN’s 
offices (for Tekun’s borrowers) and after the borrowers’ weekly meeting (for AIM and 
YUM borrowers). The information given by the borrowers could be biased or 
overstated to favour the microfinance institutions’ staff and the institution’s 
continuous provision of microcredit services to them.  
 
 
6.5  Recommendations for Future Research 
 
This study recommends that further research take monetary data about the borrowers’ fixed 
assets, their children’s education and family food expenditure before and after receiving the 
microcredit loans. Microfinance borrowers in Malaysia are less educated, thus, in order to 
obtain the monetary information, a future study would need to hire more assistant researchers 
to help the borrowers in understanding the questions and help them value their assets and 
expenditure.  
 
A future microcredit loan impact study should measure the impact of microcredit loans on 
non-poor, poor and hard-core poor borrowers, separately. This is because these groups of 
borrowers have different standards of living and needs. These findings will give more 
information to microfinance institutions and policymakers for improving strategies to enhance 
these groups’ standards of living. In addition, there are also variables that can be added to the 
determinants of the loan repayment problem model, such as the “training” and “moral hazard” 
variables, to enhance the performance of the model.  
A longitudinal study is also recommended for future research. The longitudinal study can 
monitor changes in the borrower’s business, household and individual after receiving the 
microcredit loan. If resources allow, this study suggests that a comparative study between 
borrowers and non-borrowers be conducted in future research.  
Future research also should conduct ethnographic studies to assess the impact of microcredit 
loans on the borrowers’ empowerment. In an ethnographic study, borrowers’ empowerment is 
measured through extensive observation and personal interviews with the borrowers. Thus, 
the impact of microcredit loans on the borrowers’ empowerment will be more comprehensive 
and will enhance the validity and reliability of the findings. 
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Appendix 1: Sample Size Calculation 
 
The sample size is estimated by using the formula given by Mendenhall et al. (1993). 
 
 
2
2
2
2 2( 1)
NZ pq
n
N e Z pq



 
 
 
Where: 
 
n          = the sample size 
 
N         = the size of population 
 
2
2NZ    = the critical value of a two-tailed Z test at 1   confidence level 
 
e          = the tolerable error level for estimation (5%) 
 
pq       =component of sample proportion variance estimate (maximize 0.5) 
 
This research assigned p =0.5 and q =0.5 to the equation above. Applying the formula above, 
the calculation of the minimum sample size, as follows: 
 
 
Sample size for AIM 
 
2
2 2
200,000 (1.96) 0.25 383
200,000(0.05) (1.96) (0.25)
n   

 
 
Sample size for TEKUN 
 
2
2 2
150,000 (1.96) 0.25 383
150,000(0.05) (1.96) (0.25)
n   

 
 
Sample size for YUM 
 
2
2 2
8,000 (1.96) 0.25 367
8,000(0.05) (1.96) (0.25)
n   

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119
Appendix 2: Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
Questionnaire No._______ 
 
IMPACT OF MICROCREDIT ON BORROWERS 
 
The purpose of this survey is to better understand the market in which small entrepreneurs work as 
well as the impact of microcredit on your business. We assure you that the information you provide us 
will be completely confidential and will be used exclusively for our research to help better understand 
the microcredit market. The information you give us will not be associated with your business in any 
way. The survey asks several questions about your household and your business over the past two 
years. We are trying to understand the changes that have taken place over the past year. The survey 
will take about 30 to 40 minutes of your time to complete. 
 
 
For each question with brackets provided, please tick your answer(s); otherwise, please follow the 
instructions given to answer the questions. 
 
 
 
SECTION 1 
Impact of Microcredit on Small Business Enterprise 
 
 
 
1. Which of the following microcredit institution did you borrow from in the last 2 years? 
a. Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM)  [ ] 
b. TEKUN    [ ] 
c. Yayasan Usaha Maju (YUM)   [ ] 
 
2. How many times did you borrow money from this institution? 
a. Once   [ ] 
b. Twice    [ ] 
c. 3 times   [ ] 
d. 4 times   [ ] 
e. More than 4 times [ ] 
 
3. Overall, how much money have you borrowed from this institution? 
a. Less than RM 5,000   [ ] 
b. Between RM 5,001 and RM 10,000 [ ] 
c. Between RM 10,001 and RM 15,000 [ ] 
d. Between RM 15,001 and RM 20,000 [ ] 
e. Between RM 20,001 and RM 25,000 [ ] 
f. More than RM 25,000   [ ] 
 
4. Was the loan amount received adequate? 
a. Yes [ ] b. No [ ] 
 
5. If inadequate, did you borrow from other credit sources? 
a. Yes [ ] b. No  [ ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120
6. If “Yes” in Q5, where did you source your additional credit? 
a. Commercial Banks   [ ] 
b. People’s Org/NGOs/Coop  [ ] 
c. Pawnshops    [ ] 
d. Traders/Wholesalers or Retailers [ ] 
e. Friends/Relatives   [ ]  
f. Government assistance   [ ] 
g. Other(s) please specify ______________ 
 
7. If “Yes” in Q5, what is the amount you borrowed? 
a. Less than RM 5,000   [ ] 
b. Between RM 5,001 and RM 10,000 [ ] 
c. Between RM 10,001 and RM 15,000 [ ] 
d. Between RM 15,001and RM 20,000 [ ] 
e. Between RM 20,001 and RM 25,000 [ ] 
f. More than RM 25,000   [ ] 
   
8. How would you describe your business?  
a. Small business    [ ] 
b. Services    [ ] 
c. Agriculture    [ ] 
d. Animal Husbandry   [ ] 
e. Fishing     [ ] 
f. Manufacturing    [ ] 
 
9. Who owns the business? 
a. You     [ ] 
b. Spouse     [ ] 
c.  You + spouse     [ ] 
d. You + business partner    [ ] 
e.  You + business partner + spouse [ ] 
 
10. Who makes the important business decisions? 
a. You      [ ]  
b.  Business partner    [ ]  
c.  Spouse       [ ] 
d. You + business partner    [ ] 
e.  You + spouse     [ ] 
f.  You + business partner + spouse [ ] 
 
11. What is your monthly business revenue?  
a. Less than RM1,000   [ ] 
b. Between RM1,001 and RM2,000 [ ] 
c Between RM2,001 and RM3,000 [ ] 
d. Between RM3,001 and RM4,000 [ ] 
e More than RM4,000   [ ] 
 
12. Compared with your business revenue without the microcredit loan, has your business 
revenue with microcredit loan in the last 2 years______________ 
 a. Increased  [ ] 
 b. Remain the same [ ] 
 c.  Decreased  [ ] 
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13.  Compared with the number of paid employees without the microcredit loan, has the number of 
paid employees with microcredit loan in the past 2 years_____________  
 
Workers Increased Decreased No change 
Full-time paid    
Part-time paid    
 
 
14.     Compared with your fixed assets without the microcredit loan, has your fixed assets with 
microcredit loan in the past 2 years_____________  
   
Fixed Assets Increased Decreased No change 
Land    
Premises    
Tools & 
equipment 
   
 
 
15. What is the mode of loan repayment for your existing loan? 
a. Weekly     [ ] 
b. Monthly    [ ] 
c. Semi-annually     [ ] 
d. Annually     [ ] 
 
16. How long is your loan repayment period? 
a. 6 months    [ ] 
b. 1 year     [ ] 
c. 2 years     [ ] 
d. 3 years     [ ] 
e. More than 3 years   [ ] 
 
17. How much is your loan repayment for each week? 
a. RM50-100     [ ] 
b. RM101-150    [ ] 
c. RM151-200    [ ] 
d. More than RM200   [ ] 
 
18. Have you missed your loan repayment more than 4 times in the last 2 years? 
 a. Yes [ ]  b. No [ ] 
(If no, please go to Section 2) 
 
 
 
SECTION 2 
Impact of Microcredit on Household 
 
 
 
1. What is your monthly household income?  
a. Less than RM1,000    [ ] 
b. Between RM1,001 and RM2,000  [ ] 
c. Between RM2,001 and RM3,000  [ ] 
d. Between RM3,001 and RM4,000  [ ] 
e. More than RM4,000    [ ] 
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2. Compared with your household’s income without the microcredit loan, has your household 
income with microcredit loan in the last 2 years______________ 
 a. Increased  [ ] 
 b. Remain the same [ ] 
 c.  Decreased  [ ] 
  
3. Compared with the household’s assets without the microcredit loan, has your household’s assets 
with microcredit loan in the past 2 years_____________ 
 
 
Household 
Assets 
Increased Decreased No 
change 
House    
Household’ 
appliances 
   
Household’s 
Land 
   
Household’s 
Farm 
   
Household’s 
Livestock 
   
 
4. Compared with your children’s education expenditure without the microcredit loan, has your 
children’s education expenditure with microcredit loan in the last 2 years    ______________ 
 a. Increased  [ ] 
 b. Remain the same [ ] 
 c.  Decreased  [ ] 
 
5. Compared with your food expenditure without the microcredit loan, has your food expenditure 
with microcredit loan in the last 2 years    ______________ 
 a. Increased  [ ] 
 b. Remain the same [ ] 
 c.  Decreased  [ ] 
 
6. Has microcredit loan helped you cope with the unexpected event(s)? 
 a. Yes [ ]  b. No [ ] 
 
7. If “Yes” in Q6, what was the event? (you may tick more than one) 
a. Increase in goods and fuel prices [ ] 
b. Competitors increase in business [ ] 
c. Serious illness    [ ] 
d. Business reversals   [ ] 
e. Other(s) please specify _____________ 
 
8. How did you respond to the unexpected event? (you may tick more than one) 
a. Used savings     [ ] 
b. Liquidated household assets   [ ] 
c. Engaged in other income earning activities [ ] 
d. Reduced expenditure    [ ] 
e. Pawned items     [ ] 
f. Other(s) please specify _____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123
 
SECTION 3 
Impact of Microcredit on the Individual 
 
 
 
1. Who makes the important family decisions in your household? 
a. Husband                           [ ]  
b. Wife                                         [ ]  
c. Both                                         [ ] 
d. Individually (single)                [ ] 
 
2. Do you have a plan for saving BEFORE the microcredit loan?     
a. YES   [ ]    
b. NO   [ ] 
 
3. Do you have a plan for saving AFTER the microcredit loan?    
  
a. YES   [ ]    
b. NO   [ ] 
    
4. Do you have personal savings independent of your spouse? 
 a. Yes [ ]  b. No [ ] 
 
5. Has microcredit loan helped you to increase your self- esteem? 
a.    Yes  [ ]  b.  No  [ ] 
 
6. If “Yes” in Q5, what are the reasons? (you can tick more than one) 
a. With microcredit loan, I am in control of my business such as  
signing documents and doing the  book keeping for my business  [ ] 
b. With microcredit loan, I am  a source of increased household’s 
income         [ ] 
c. With microcredit loan, I am able to manage my own money and 
savings          [ ] 
d. With microcredit loan, I am able to participate and be a member 
of some social organizations in my village    [ ] 
e.  Others______________________________________ 
 
7. With microcredit loan, I am more optimistic about the future? 
a.  Agree   [ ] b.  Disagree  [ ] 
 
8. If “Agree” in Q7, what are the reasons? (you can tick more than one) 
a. Microcredit loan improves my business    [ ] 
b. Microcredit loan helps me accumulate wealth   [ ]  
c. Microcredit loan increases my financial security   [ ] 
d. Microcredit loan gives me more confidence in my business [ ] 
         decision making 
e. Other____________________________________   
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SECTION 4 
Demographic and Socio Economic 
Characteristics of Borrowers 
 
 
 
1. What is your gender? 
a.  Male  [ ] b. Female [ ] 
  
2. Which age group do you belong to? 
a. 18 – 25 years olds [ ] 
b. 26 – 35 years olds [ ] 
c. 36 – 45 years olds [ ] 
d. 46 – 55 years olds [ ] 
e. Over 55 years olds [ ] 
 
3. Which ethnic group do you belong to? 
 a. Malay   [ ] 
 b. Chinese  [ ] 
 c. Indian   [ ] 
 d. Kadazan  [ ] 
 e. Other(s) please specify ____________ 
 
4. What is your marital status? 
a. Single/Never Married  [ ] 
b. Married   [ ] 
d. Divorced/Separated   [ ] 
 
5. What is your highest educational or professional qualification? 
a. No Education   [ ] 
b. Primary School   [ ] 
c. Middle School   [ ] 
d. High school   [ ] 
e. Vocational    [ ] 
f. College    [ ] 
g Postgraduate degree  [ ] 
 
6. How many children do you have? 
a. None    [ ] 
b. 1    [ ] 
c. 2    [ ] 
d. 3    [ ] 
e. 4    [ ] 
f. 5 
g. More than 5   [ ] 
 
7. How many of your children are in school? 
a. None    [ ] 
b. 1    [ ] 
c. 2    [ ] 
d. 3    [ ] 
e. More than 4   [ ] 
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8. How many of your children are studying in a college/university? 
a. None    [ ] 
b. 1    [ ] 
c. 2    [ ] 
d. 3    [ ] 
e. More than 4   [ ] 
 
9. How many of income earners in your household? 
a. 1    [ ] 
b. 2    [ ] 
c. 3    [ ] 
d. 4    [ ] 
e. More than 4   [ ] 
 
10. How many dependents live in your household? 
a. 1    [ ] 
b. 2    [ ] 
c. 3    [ ] 
d. 4    [ ] 
e. More than 4   [ ] 
 
 
Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and if you have 
further comments about microcredit loan, please feel free to comment in the space provided below. 
Once again, we assure you that your identity will remain STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments: ____________________________ 
                  ___________________________ 
                  ___________________________ 
 
